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ABSTRACT
A STRUCTURAL CRITIQUE OF THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY:
THE CARTER AND REAGAN YEARS
SEPTEMBER 1987
WILLIAM F. GROVER, B.A., MORAVIAN COLLEGE
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS
Directed by: Professor Glen Gordon
This project critiques the major twentieth century theories of the
presidency and lays the groundwork for an alternative model centered on
the relationship between the office, theories of the state, and the
structure of the political economy. Case studies analyze the inter-
related state imperatives of economic growth and national security as
illuminated by the Carter and Reagan administrations' handling of
occupational safety and health policy and the MX missile. The work
concludes that a theory giving analytic primacy to the structure
underlying the constitutional arrangement of political institutions -- a
deeper structure than conventional theories examine -- offers a richer,
more insightful account of the presidency than orthodox interpretations.
Moreover, it suggests we need to rethink and challenge the prevailing
priorities of economic growth and national security, as currently
understood, if the crisis of the state, and hence the crisis of the
presidency, is to be overcome.
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introduction
Energy in the executive is a leading character
in the definition of good government.
-- Alexander Hamilton
Alexander Hamilton was ahead of his time. The twentieth century
has seen his conception of the presidency become a celebrated maxim of
political science. Yet his late eighteenth century advocacy of broad
executive power -- expressed, though in somewhat muted terms, in the
famous passage from Federal i st No. 70 above -- did not fit the theory
and practice of the next hundred years. 1 This is not to say that his
vision of modern commercial expansion and American empire was absent
from the nineteenth century scene. On the contrary, these objectives
were pursued with vigor. 2 But the notion of the presidency as the locus
of institutional initiative for pol i ti cal -economi c ends -- joining his
theory of the executive and his vision of what kind of society America
should be — did not gain wide acceptance until after the Spanish-
American War. The preceding decades, with the notable exception of the
Civil War period, generally are characterized by political scientists as
the era of "congressional government." 3
The shift in power and importance from Congress to the presidency
can be demonstrated in the writing of Woodrow Wilson. In 1855 the young
Princeton professor's classic work, Congressional Go vernment, was
published. In it he argued that "the actual form of our present
government is simply a scheme of congressional supremacy.
4
"Congress
1
2[is] the dominant, nay, the irresistible, power of the federal
system...." 3 The president, according to the early Wilson, was a
comparatively minor official whose business, though "occasionally great,
is usually not much above routine," not much more than "mere
administration, mere obedience of directions from the masters of policy,
the Standing Committees."- By 1908, however, his thinking had changed
considerably. Reflecting on Theodore Roosevelt's tenure in the White
House, the rise of the regulatory function of the state, and the
enhanced stature of the U.S. in the world, he revised his earlier
assessment. The thrust of his Constitutional Government In The United
States concerns the political supremacy of the president, who he now saw
as "at liberty, both in law and conscience, to be as big a man as he
can ." 7
The President can never again be the mere domestic
figure he has been throughout so large a part of our his-
tory. The nation has risen to first rank in power and
resources. The other nations of the world look askance
upon her, half in envy, half in fear, and wonder with a
deep anxiety what she will do with her vast strength...
Our President must always, henceforth, be one of the
great powers of the world, whether he act greatly and
wisely or not. ..We can never hide our President again as
a mere domestic officer. ..He must stand always at the
front of our affairs.... 8
Here is a thoroughly Hamiltonian view of the presidency, with the chief
executive constituting the unifying force of the government, since
"there is but one national voice in the country, and that is the voice
of the President. . .Only the President represents the country as a
whole. " 9
3By the time Wilson himself reached the White House the presidency
thus had risen dramatically as an institutional component of the
government. Yet for all the heightened attention given to the office as
a practical focal point for policy leadership, it did not receive a
concomitant amount of attention as an area of study within political
science. That change took place only in light of the lengthy tenure of
Franklin Roosevelt, the chief executive who, in the words of one
historian, "re-created the modern presidency." 10 Emboldened by crisis
conditions, Roosevelt operated in highly personal terms. He oversaw the
unprecedented expansion of the federal government directly into the
everyday lives of Americans. As Theodore Lowi aptly puts it, the
Roosevelt years inspired "the new sense that the president is the
government." 11 FDR also bequeathed to American politics an
institutional and attitudinal apparatus that has been termed the
welfare-warfare state. His successors inescapably have had to come to
grips with the rich stylistic and substantive heritage of the activist
Roosevel ti an approach to the office. Describing this legacy, historian
William Leuchtenburg argues that all postwar presidents must labor "in
the shadow of FDR.
"
12
Not only presidents have been shaded by Roosevelt, however.
Subsequent scholarship has been profoundly affected as well. In the
postwar period studies of the presidency became something of a growth
industry in political science. Much, if not most, of this writing
touts
the beneficence and efficacy of the office. Thus, for example,
we learn
of Clinton Rossiter's "own feeling of veneration" for
"this astounding
institution" in his seminal 1956 text on the presidency.
13 While not
4all theorists shared Rossiter's effusiveness -- he characterized the
president as "a kind of magnificent lion" -- they were by and large
sanguine about the prospects of activist chief executives. And perhaps
rightly so. For the chief executive analysts had uppermost in their
minds when they examined the modern office almost invariably was FDR —
a paragon of presidential power and authority. Add to this the fact
that the U.S. emerged from World War II as the globally preeminent
political, economic and military power and you have a confluence of
forces that encourages heady optimism about American political
institutions.
The reality of the postwar period was, of course, much more
sobering. U.S. hegemony in the world political economy did not go
unchallenged. When the tapestry of economic and military superiority
began to unravel in the late 1960's and early 1970's, American
superpower status, and the power of the presidency as the guarantor of
both national and economic security, were severely tested. Vietnam and
Watergate in particular, and economic stagnation in general, combined to
help turn sour the dominant opinion of the presidency. Electorally, one
candidate based his campaign for the office on the belief that people
had lost confidence in their government. "It is obvious that the best
way for our leaders to restore their credibility is to be credible, and
in order for us to be trusted we must be trustworthy!" wrote Jimmy
Carter in 1975* 1 ^ More than halfway through his presidency he still
felt the need to warn the public about the "crisis of confidence
1 in the
American spirit which loomed as "a fundamental threat to American
democracy.
"
13 And in political science, paeans to presidential power
5were replaced by more cautious assessments that the presidency had
become "imperial," "a puzzle," "an illusion," "rhetorical,"
"impossible," and "plebiscitary." 16
This shift in conventional thinking about the nature of
presidential power serves as the focus of the first chapter of my
dissertation. Two main schools of thought have dominated the discourse
on the postwar presidency. One school -- the expansi vi sts -- generally
held sway from the time of FDR through the late 1960's. Tracing their
twentieth century origins back to Wilson and Theodore Roosevelt,
expansivists were energized by FDR's leadership. They celebrate the
ideal of the purposive, active, power-wielding, yet benevolent chief
executive, and tend to downplay the threat of a president amassing too
much power. Though they are aware of the need for countervailing power
within the mix of governmental institutions, expansivists clearly
endorse a political system within which the president has the upper
hand. The other school of thought — the restricti vists — are a more
recent phenomenon within the discipline, although they do include some
theorists who wrote with FDR's years fresh in mind. Their twentieth
century roots are most firmly planted in William Howard Taft's
relatively narrow conception of the office. Restr i cti vi sts are wary of
the growth in presidential power, and point to the excesses of the
Johnson and Nixon presidencies for confirmation of the danger inherent
in such growth. They seek a restoration of balance between the
executive and legislative branches. And they hope to deflate public
expectations about what any president can reasonably be expected to
accomplish in today's world.
6By contrasting the expansivist and restricti vist approaches I want
to illuminate the range of debate and analysis that dominates prevailing
notions of the presidency within political science and to argue that
this range is much too limited to adequately explain the dynamic forces
buffeting the chief executive. Specifically, the conventional
literature has three major interrelated deficiencies. The first
shortcoming of mainstream theories is the narrow scope of debate they
foster. Such a confined intellectual space provides little room for
orientations that seek to question the assumptions and settled
understandings upon which previous theories have rested. Second,
conventional accounts of the presidency are fixated on institutionalism.
They focus primarily on the institutional balance of power between the
president and Congress, making their difference one of degree, not one
of kind. Finally, such orientations are intoxicated with process,
tending to treat presidential power as a problem of means, not ends.
They view the office as a management issue, contending that the
complexities of the world have made the job of achieving the nation's
goals too big for any one man. While this may be true, the goals
themselves are taken for granted. Seldom are the ends of presidential
power critically questioned, or seen as contributing to the difficulties
confronting the president.
While not dismissing the two leading approaches -- indeed
acknowledging some debt to particular aspects of them — chapter two
widens the scope of inquiry to move toward an alternative framework
that
is sensitive to the relationship between the presidency
and the
structure of the American political economy .
17 This structural, approach
7is differentiated from what passes for "structural" analysis within
orthodox political science. The two dominant models of the presidency
view structure in a shallow sense, as a reflection of constitutional
structure. The balance of forces between the established political
institutions, particularly between the executive and legislative
branches, is accorded analytic primacy. Such conventional notions thus
regard events like Watergate or the Iran-contra scandal as indicative of
the most profound dangers facing American democracy. Yet while
undoubtedly important, these political crises can obscure more basic
systemic ills. The shallow notion of structure fails to analyze the
core assumptions and interests under lying governmental institutions and
their periodic instability. It cannot see the forest for the trees.
Structure understood in the deeper, more fundamental sense intended in
this work, by contrast, explores and questions these basic principles
which typically are taken as givens, directing the focus of study to the
context of the political economy of liberal democratic capitalism.
Used in this deeper sense of the term, structural analysis of the
presidency draws much of its sustenance from the large body of work
concerned with the theory of the state. For if Lowi is correct that
presidents now view their office as the "state personified," it makes
sense to explore the imperatives of the state to discover the dynamics
of presidential action . 10 The chapter considers three major variants of
non-pl ur al i st theories of the state which, despite their important
divergence in emphasis, highlight the structural continuities among all
presidents that transcend whatever differences they may have over party,
policy and personality. Conventional theories of the presidency place
8great weight on these differences; structural theory focuses on the
deeper continuities.
While analysts seldom attempt to place the presidency within the
context of state theory, when this encounter has been forged, two
intertwined priorities of the state — promoting economic growth and
national security -- have commanded attention for their centrality to
the president's issue agenda, regardless of who occupies the White
House. As provision of growth and security has become increasingly
problematic in light of changes in the context of U.S. postwar economic
and military supremacy, however, both the state and the presidency have
been in crisis. Structural theory thus can help us sketch the contours
of a perspective on the office in general, and particularly in an era of
declining hegemony, the setting inherited by presidents Carter and
Reagan
.
The next two chapters are policy case studies that employ the
structural approach to assess the efforts of Carter and Reagan to pursue
the fundamental imperatives of growth and national security within this
new setting. Chapter three examines occupational safety and health
policy as an example of how the two administrations confronted the
problem of reconciling the mandate of the Occupational Safety and Health
Act of 1970 with the pursuit of economic growth. The story of these
administrative attitudes toward OSHA policy reveals much about the
pressure business priorities put on presidential policymaking. What is
sacrificed and what is preserved in the name of promoting economic
growth has important consequences for the workers of America. And the
tradeoffs involved in OSHA policy are especially troubling because they
9can create a situation where, as some analysts contend, worker safety
and health is subordinated to the quest for national economic health, a
cruel twist of logic for those on the receiving end of presidential
power
.
Chaper four focuses on national security through the issue of the
MX missile. Like OSHA, the MX is a program with a relatively short
history involving consequences that literally can affect life and death.
And like OSHA, the MX also has been a lightning rod for intense debate
over the direction of national policy. One of the most controversial
weapons systems of the 70's and 80's, the MX has had a rocky, almost
bizarre history. Both Carter and Reagan spent considerable time and
energy trying to justify the need for this counterf orce
,
war-fighting
weapon. The extent and quality of their efforts at justification reveal
quite a bit about how leaders view the connection between our security
and our military capabilities. Moreover, the MX debate illustrates how
little difference there is between competing postwar definitions of
national security within the mainstream of "responsible" thought. Thus,
as with OSHA and the imperative of economic growth, the MX debate shows
us the narrow nature of the range of the possible for presidential
policy, and the overriding continuities between administrations with
ostensibly different political agendas.
The fifth and final chapter draws conclusions about the presidency
from the policy experiences of the two administrations. Of central
importance here is the extent to which each chief executive came to
terms with a job constrained by the dual imperatives of the state. For
Carter, and his version of the liberal agenda, this was an especially
10
painful process. After roughly two years in office he embarked on the
domestic and foreign policy course that would become Reaganism. The
similarity between the two presidencies is at times striking, as is the
very different public perception of them. The point in looking at these
similarities and differences is to highlight the dilemma faced by
Carter, Reagan and future presidents who are judged by criteria that are
increasingly difficult to fulfill.
What are the prospects for a presidency whose power appears
structurally directed toward the ends of economic growth and national
security as they are conventionally understood? How are these
imperatives affected as the political economy undergoes major
transformation? What are the implications of a citizenry that does not
hold its president accountable for policy failures because of a strongly
felt need to believe in the efficacy of the office? How might the
legitimacy of the office (and the state) be affected if its imperatives
could not be met without fundamental change in the political economy?
These and corollary queries lie at the heart of the final chapter. My
contention is that the two leading theories of the presidency cannot
adequately confront such basic issues because neither is capable of
questioning the premises of the system within which the president
operates.
A structural approach improves upon the prevailing theories; it
critiques the fundamental dynamics that exist independent of the
president at any given time. And it squarely confronts the possibility
that the current crisis of the political economy may require a serious
rethinking and redefinition of the guiding priorities of liberal
11
democratic capitalism. In that sense, it is a radical theory. With
this in mind, we should be less concerned with the question of what kind
of president our society needs, and more attuned to the question of what
kind of society we want to be. If my dissertation helps orient
political science toward the latter issue, it will have made a
contribution to the discipline.
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CHAPTER ONE
THE RISE AND DECLINE OF PRESIDENCY FETISHISM
The day of enlightened administration has come.
— Franklin D. Roosevelt
In 1941 Henry Luce proclaimed the dawning of the "American
Century." With political science in mind, he might have heralded the
"Presidential Century."
Franklin Roosevelt's tenure stimulated a veritable love affair
between political science and studies of the presidency. The "Roosevelt
revolution" not only overturned entrenched notions of the relationship
between government, economy and society. It also refocused the vision
of American government scholars. His handling of the dual crises of
depression and world war permanently elevated the office to heights
unimagined in the nineteenth century, save for periods of temporary
urgency. With the coming of the Roosevelt administration, political
scientists spent considerable time gazing up at the heights, often in
semi-awe. The era of presidential government had arrived.
1
Like any historic change, however, the rise of the presidency was
not without its antecedents. While FDR routinely is credited with
creating the modern office of the presidency and solidifying its
activist character, Theodore Roosevelt is thought to be the first
chief
executive who legitimately can be termed "modern" in outlook.
2 His view
of the office was filled with Progressive Era notions of
the president
14
15
as the guarantor of reform and innovation. There is, in fact, a direct
link between Theodore Roosevelt's enlarged conception of the office and
the expansion of the modern positive state, whose interventions to
rationalize the economy preceded similar New Deal efforts by several
decades. Roosevelt explains his energized view of the presidency in
his autobiography. The section where he enunciates his "stewardship"
theory is worth quoting at length:
The most important factor in getting the right
spirit in my Administration, next to the insistence
upon courage, honesty, and a genuine democracy of
desire to serve the plain people, was my insistence
upon the theory that the executive power was limited
only by specific restrictions and prohibitions appear-
ing in the Constitution or imposed by the Congress
under its Constitutional powers. My view was that
every executive of f i cer . . . was a steward of the people
bound actively and affirmatively to do all he could
for the people, and not to content himself with the
negative merit of keeping his talents undamaged in a
napkin. 1 declined to adopt the view that what was
imperatively necessary for the Nation could not be
done by the President unless he could find some
specific authorization to do it. My belief was that
it was not only his right but his duty to do anything
that the needs of the Nation demanded unless such
action was forbidden by the Constitution or by the
laws. Under this interpretation of executive power I
did and caused to be done many things not previously
done by the President and the heads of the departments.
I did not usurp power, but 1 did greatly broaden the
use of executive power. 4
Roosevelt's expansive theory of the president's powers gave the chief
executive wide latitude to pursue his idea of the public good, unless
prohibited by specific legal barriers. On this reading of the
presidency, the White House could become the "bully pulpit" Roosevelt
relished. "I believed in invoking the National power with absolute
freedom for every National need," he asserted, while maintaining high
16
regard
-for the Constitution as a tool for social progress, "not as a
strai ght jacket cunningly fashioned to strangle growth ." 55
Roosevelt contrasted his theory of the presidency -- what he
termed the Jackson-Lincoln" school -- with the more circumscribed
vision of the "Buchanan-Taf t" school. The latter outlook held the
narrowly legalistic view that the President is the servant of Congress
rather than of the people, and can do nothing, no matter how necessary
it be to act, unless the Constitution explicitly commands the action.
"
A
Roosevelt's successor upheld this second, more confined notion of the
presidency. William Howard Taft saw great danger of "executive
domination" in Roosevelt's stewardship theory. In addition to
encouraging presidents to hold inflated opinions of their own worth --
he chided Roosevelt for equating himself in any way with Lincoln — Taft
believed that making the president responsible for the general welfare
of the nation stretched the power of the chief executive well beyond
reasonable limits, establishing him as a "Universal Providence" whose
judgments are beyond reproach. Roosevelt's view of "ascribing an
undefined residuum of power to the President is an unsafe doctrine,"
Taft reasoned, one that "might lead under emergencies to results of an
arbitrary character, doing irremediable injustice to private right ." 7 A
far safer notion of executive power would limit the scope of
presidential discretion, as Taft here asserts:
The true view of the Executive functions is, as I
conceive it, that the President can exercise no power
which cannot be fairly and reasonably traced to some
specific grant of power or justly implied and included
within such express grant as proper and necessary to its
exercise. Such specific grant must be either in the
17
Federal Constitution or in an act of Congress passed in
pursuance thereof. There is no undefined residuum of
power which he can exercise because it seems to him to
be in the public interest.... The grants of Executive
power are necessarily in general terms in order not to
embarrass the Executive within the field of action
plainly marked for him, but his jurisdiction must be
justified and vindicated by affirmative constitutional
or statutory provision, or it does not exist.®
It was FDR's presidency that ensured the triumph of the earlier
Roosevelt’s conception of the office in the expectations of postwar
America. Coming to power in the wake of three passive Taft-like chief
executives, Franklin Roosevelt stood for virtually everything the more
restricted model opposed. He had an abounding faith in the stewardship
approach, believing in presidential leadership as the best hope for the
material and spiritual revival of the country. On the eve of the
election of 1932 he offered this well known assessment of the historic
role of the presidency:
The Presidency is not merely an administrative
office. That's the least of it. It is more than an
engineering job, efficient or inefficient. It is pre-
eminently a place of moral leadership. All our great
Presidents were leaders of thought at times when certain
historic ideas in the life of the nation had to be clarified.
^
Henceforth, the presidency would be both enormously expanded in its
scope of operation — the government would take on a host of functions
previously either beyond its purview altogether or not formally
institutionalized — and greatly enhanced as a source of affirmation for
society's basic principles. The president would provide the enlightened
administration espoused by FDR, the chief executive who, in the words of
one observer, "first made the office 'real' in the daily lives of
Americans.
"
1 °
18
The broad vision of Theodore Roosevelt, as etched into American
political life by FDR, and the narrower view of Taft, both have since
served to delimit the range of thinking about the presidency. Political
scientists typically locate the office, analytically and normatively,
somewhere between the poles articulated by these two presidents. The
former position endorses an active chief executive who expands the reach
of the office for the sake of achieving widely shared programmatic
goals. This expansivist view is presidency-weighted, regarding the
maximization of presidential power as virtually the sine qua non of
American politics. The latter perspective seeks to rein in presidential
power, viewing a relatively restrained chief executive as more closely
attuned to the intentions of the framers of the Constitution and less
prone to abuses of authority. Greater balance between the branches of
government, particularly the executive and legislative, forms the basis
of this restrictivist position. 11 Versions of these approaches have
survived in the wake of FDR, right on through the presidency of Ronald
Reagan. This chapter surveys some major works within these two schools
of thought, beginning with the expansivists -- those analysts who sought
to consecrate in theory, what the presidency had become in practice.
Expansivist Theories of the Presidency
Scholarly doubts about the ascendancy and virtue of presidential
initiative in postwar American politics were few and far between. By
the early 1960's the expansivist view of the office as an engine for the
pursuit of the liberal agenda seemed firmly entrenched in political
science. One can get a sense of the spirit and substance of the
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expanisvist outlook from the work of James MacGregor Burns. In
Presidential Government
,
Burns develops a model of the modern presidency
rooted in the ideas of Alexander Hamilton. The Hamiltonian model
"implied a federal government revolving around the Presidency, and
depending on energy, resourcefulness, inventiveness, and a ruthless
pragmatism in the executive office...." 1 * He hopes such a model might
serve as an antidote to the "delay and devitalization" of government he
discerned in an earlier work analyzing the "deadlock" built in to the
constitutional machinery of American democracy . 13
For Burns, Lyndon Johnson represented the glory of presidential
government. Writing at the outset of Johnson's Great Society program,
Burns confidently claims the presidency to be "at the peak of its
prestige." Johnson's tenure marks the "triumph of presidential
government," a kind of government geared to the achievement of new
qualitative goals of liberalism which FDR, another Hamiltonian chief
executive, had failed to achieve. These goals include "a concerted and
sustained and expensive effort to impart values like those of Johnson to
the barren lives of millions of Americans, middle class as well as
deprived," accompanied by the diversion of "the kind of resources into
cultural, recreational, and educational activities that we have in the
past poured into economic recovery, or even into national defense ." 1
'1
Burns wrote, of course, before the massive pouring of resources into the
effort of imparting "values like those of Johnson" to the "barren" lives
of millions of Vietnamese.
At times, Burns' affection for presidential assertions of power
goes even farther - - perhaps too far. It reaches nearly absurd
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p< oportions in his reflections on an earlier progressive president,
Theodore Roosevelt. He laments:
For a man with Theodore Roosevelt's need for per-
sonal fulfillment it was a sort of tragedy that he had
no war -- not even a Whiskey Rebellion. Not only would
war have given him immense psychological gratification,
it would also have brought his means and ends into better
relation. 10
This regret for the needs-gr ati f i cati on of a president who unflinchingly
championed the use of America's Big Stick to achieve its supposed
destiny as the global policeman. It takes little imagination to think
of the means Roosevelt would have employed to secure his ends, given his
record of allowing U.S. military interventions short of war to defend
the "civilized world's" standards of law and order. His racist,
patronizing attitude toward the "damned dagoes" of Columbia, or the
"Chinese halfbreds," "Malay bandits," "savages, barbarians, a wild and
ignorant people" of the Philippines provides a hint on this score . 16
Despite his exalted view of presidential government, Burns admits
Americans generally are ambivalent toward an energized, expansivist
administration like that of the Hamiltonian Johnson (or Roosevelt),
ambivalence rooted in the fear that "a current or future strong man in
the White House might threaten American democracy." However, such fear
has been misplaced, Burns reasons, for as it turns out, "presidential
government, far from being a threat to American democracy, has become
the major single institution sustaining it -- a bulwark of individual
liberty, an agency of popular representation, and a magnet for political
talent and leadership ." 17 When tempered by an abiding concern for
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Jeffersonian purposes, this situation can endure, to the benefit of the
office and the public.
Burns saw an entire "epoch" of presidential government on the
horizon. His endorsement of the expanisvist view proved to be
especially ironic, though, since Johnson's presidency marks the
beginning of the decline -- if not the end -- of expansivist theories in
postwar political science. To appreciate the precipitousness of this
decline it is useful to examine some of the major theorists whose tracks
Burns followed. Harold Laski, Clinton Rossiter and Richard Neustadt
will be the focus of my attention. They certainly do not exhaust the
supply of expansivist writers, nor do they include all the variations on
the expansivist theme. 10 But they do represent classic defenses of this
major approach to the presidency.
British political scientist and Labor Party leader Harold Laski
was one of the first analysts to posit the unique character of the
presidency. His 1940 book The American Presidency shuns any simple
comparisons between the chief executive and institutions of European
parliamentary systems. 117 Believing the essence of the presidency to be
its organic development within an American environment and historical
traditions, Laski contends that there is no foreign institution against
which it can be compared "because, basically, there is no comparable
foreign institution. 11 The presidency is novel: "The president of the
United States is both more and less than a king; he is, also, both more
and less than a prime minister." 20 The special nature of the office
places an enormous burden on its occupant. Citizens expect direct
thought and action from the president on the key issues of the day,
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since the officeholder symbolizes the entire nation. But while
embodying the hopes and dreams of the people as the head of state, the
president stands alone as head of the government, shouldering the
responsibility for the success or failure of government policies. No
one shares the blame if policies go awry, certainly not cabinet
officials. "In England, we blame an anonymous entity 'the Government'
if things go wrong, or a mistake is made," Laski points out, whereas "in
the United States it is the president who is blamed ." 21 Hence, Laski
sees an unusual degree of risk for presidents who would be bold and
innovative.
More than this risk, though, Laski everywhere sees limits to the
expansion of presidential influence. He has these constraints in mind
when he states that "the day of a successful election is the day on
which the president ceases to be a free man." Setting aside for now the
question of the freedom of a person before being elected, among the many
constraints on the officeholder is the deep-seated American aversion
toward strong governmental leadership. Laski notes Americans'
traditional fear of centralized authority, manifest in the scheme of
federalism and checks and balances established by the framers of the
Constitution. The institutionalized fragmentation of power and
authority has long been noted, and usually celebrated, as one of the
defining features of democracy in the U.S. Laski takes a dim view of
such impediments to coherent leadership. In particular, he finds
Congress an annoying barrier to presidential action. The oppositional
role of the U.S. legislature (unlike the unified parliamentary
government in Britain), combined with its sectional orientation and its
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will to assert its own power, makes tor tactionalized politics. Summing
up the relationship between the two branches ot government, Laski is
unambiguous about his opinion ot Congress. "Its own instinctive and
inherent tendency is, under all circumstances, to be anti -pr esi denti al ,
"
he says, adding that it constantly seeks ways to ditter trom the
president, tor in so dittering it is " affirming its own essence" and
"exalting its own prestige ." 22
Along with the divisive role of Congress, Laski cites the power of
big business as especially troublesome for presidents. He contends that
the "interstitial connections between business and politics in the
United States" color every facet of the context of political life.
Congress is affected, directing its energy to the maintenance of "those
conditions of confidence which business men approve." Parties are
equally deferential to the business ethos: "tSlince the Civil War the
dividing line between them has never been real.... The truth is, I
think, that these major parties have been essentially the agents of the
property interests of the United States ...." 23 And, of course, the
president must "pay continuous attention to the attitude of business
itself." Laski writes: "The president who arouses the suspicion that
he is not a 'sound' man from the angle of business philosophy is bound
to run into heavy weather ." 24 Forms of "heavy weather" can vary, but he
clearly has in mind some kind of investment strike on the part of
capital, with the attendant "rapid repercussion upon unemployment and
the standard of life." The general idea here simply is that any
government program for innovative social reform must prove acceptable to
big business, or risk confronting coordinated business efforts to
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undermine the conditions of economic health upon which such reforms must
r est
.
Aligned against the risk of presidential initiative, the historic
distrust of centralized power, and the effective veto power of the
business community is what Laski sees as the modern imperative of the
positive state, directed by strong presidential leadership. Citing the
presidencies of Washington, Jefferson, Lincoln, Wilson and FDR, Laski
argues that strong executive leadership has occurred in the U.S. during
periods of crisis. Indeed, it is a measure of the beauty of the
American political system that "so far, it is clear, the hour has
brought forth the man." His point is that the time has come for the
sustained exercise of presidential initiative. "America has now entered
the epoch where the requirements of the positive state can no longer be
denied," he writes. Political, economic and social forces have made a
strong president a necessary and enduring part of the nation's future.
And there is no question that he thinks of Franklin Roosevelt and the
New Deal as the kind of president and program such conditions demand.
For Laski, the first 100 days of FDR's term stand as the greatest
example of presidential leadership ever, including wartime. Roosevelt
was a positive president with a gift for knowing how to "prick men into
thought" and into enthusiastic support for his programs. But because
the tradition of negative government is so entrenchd in the U.S., once
the most immediate dangers of depression had passed, congressional and
other opponents of the New Deal were able to constrain the Roosevelt
administration in numerous ways, especially during his second term.
Laski wants America to overcome this cyclical, boom-bust quality
of
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assertions of executive power through the establishment of strong,
unified, presi denti al 1 y-1 ed government. For as he contends, "a
government does not prove its adequacy because it can transcend its own
principles in an emergency; its adequacy is born of its ability to
prevent the outbreak of emergency .
"
255 Central to this goal is a
"radical realignment of parties" in America. Absent the formation of a
truly progressive party, the "forces of privilege" will continue to
dominate the scope of political choices. But with disciplined parties a
strong president will find the institutional support, especially in
Congress, for executive leadership. No longer would parties simply
"enthrone the conservative forces in permanent power."
Such a shift ultimately depends on popular support among the
people, however, and it is here that Laski looks for the real staying
power of a president's claim to enhanced authority. Again with FDR as
the model, he asserts the need for presidents to draw upon the vigor of
movements for social and economic change to ensure a constituency for
reform. Roosevelt's passion for change aroused the "dynamic of
democracy," a dynamic with "an ener gy . . . mor e powerful and more pervasive
than the dynamic of any other form of state." 2 * Laski claims that
unleashing such a powerful democratic force is the answer to the problem
of generating the presidential leadership necessary for the nation in
the difficult times ahead. It can spark the interest and moral concern
of an ordinarily uninterested populous. And it is, after all, the
concerns of the common person with which a president must be in touch to
lead the nation successfully. Those concerns, and the object of broad
executive initiative for future generations, will center on the
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expansion of the positive state. Expanded presidential power will be
the vehicle for its realization. A weak presidency will not suffice.
As Laski explains:
A weak president, in a word, is a gift to the forces of
reaction in the United States. It enables them to manip-
ulate and maneuver between every difference that is pro-
voked by the absence of a strong hand at the helm. It
arrests the power to transcend the negativism which the
scheme of American government so easily erects into a
principle of action. A weak presidency prevents that
transcendence of the limitations of 1787 which the
compulsions of our generation demand. 27
It is, finally, in this potential transcendence that we can locate
the essence of Laski 's case for the expansion of the presidency. Only a
president with broader power can confront the problems plaguing the
nation. Only a president can rise above the pervasive obstacles to
progressive reform. Laski is mindful of the possible dangers of
increasing the power of the chief executive. The temptation to abuse is
great. Yet he sees power as an opportunity as well, an opportunity that
must be granted if the country is to achieve its highest aspirations.
"CGlreat power alone makes great leadership possible" he concludes; "it
provides the unique chance of restoring America to its people." 20 This
argument for the transcendent ability of the office (elsewhere referred
to as the ability to "suspend the normal assumptions of the American
system") seems thin, though, upon closer examination. Two weaknesses
are particularly damaging to his argument.
First, Laski offers no critical assessment of the dynamics of U.S.
foreign policy and how they impinge upon a president s power. He is
correct to point out that in matters of international affairs the
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president has a "decisive hand." He informs us that "in no other part
of American political life has the separation of powers counted for so
little as in the definition of this part." 2 * True enough. But he
proceeds to accept without a note of dissent the proposition that the
U.S. had developed, even before the Spanish-American War, a
"consciousness of a world-destiny" which the presidency reflects and
pursues. Apparently this American outlook is unproblematic -- no need
for presidential transcendence here. It is puzzling, though, why
someone who grounds his analysis of the domestic side of the office in
some kind of moral framework would accept without qualification the
premise of American empire. Moreover, even if he is simply expressing
an implicit hope for American resolve and aid in the face of growing
tension in Europe over the expansion of Nazi Germany (and it is not
clear that he is), he should not ignore altogether the connection
between U.S. foreign policy and the domestic economy, particularly the
interests of big business. If these interests constrain the president
in the domestic sphere, as he suggests, it bears notice how they do so
in the foreign sphere.
This raises a second, more significant, weakness of Laski's
analysis. While it may be true that a strengthened president working
within an invigorated party system might provide the unified leadership
the framers tried so hard to foil, it is less clear how such unity could
elude the reach of big business, whose powerful position he contends has
given it "an economic and psychological authority unexampled. .. in any
country in the world." Laski repeatedly refers to the maintenance of
business confidence as imperative for the realization of reform. Vet he
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also wants activist presidents -- emboldened by the ongoing equivalent
of crisis conditions -- to overcome the interests of privilege and the
propertied classes in order to extend the positive state. He makes no
attempt to resolve this tension. Hence his prescription for the
presidency rests on too sanguine a view of the possibilities of reform.
Systemic reforms can have a tremendous impact on people's lives.
The New Deal experience has taught us that. But the limits of reformism
stop well short of the transcendence of the basic structure of the
political economy, which is another New Deal lesson. After all, it was
FDR -- Laski's model of liberal reformism -- who offered perhaps the
most lucid summary of the status quo bounds of such a philosophy. "The
most serious threat to our institutions comes from those who refuse to
face the need for change," he declared while campaigning for reelection
in 1936. "Liberalism becomes the protection for the far-sighted
conservative.... 'Reform if you would preserve.’ I am that kind of
conservative because I am that kind of liberal." 30 The consequences of
these limits affect both presidents and programs they would pursue.
They are explored in the rich literature of the "corporate liberal"
perspective on 20th century history. 31 Laski anticipates no such
obstacles to political change; he overstates the efficacy of a popular
president infected with the reforming spirit.
Whatever the shortcomings of Laski's work, he at least thought it
important to grapple with the issue of how the political economy
constrains the scope of presidential initiative. Clinton Rossiter's
1956 book The American Presidency gained a far wider audience and much
more praise while providing less analytic content. As another major
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expansi vist theorist, Rossiter applauds the accretion of presidential
power since the founding of the nation, while describing in near-
worshipful tones the contributions of individual chief executives to
that increase. His sketches of the most influential presidents (e.g.
Washington, Jefferson, Lincoln, FDR) at times approach hagiography. Of
this tendency, we are forewarned: "I would be less than candid were I
not to make clear at the outset my own feeling of veneration, if not
exactly reverence, for the authority and dignity of the Presidency ." 52
Rossiter's influential text thus has a civics book quality about it,
which may, in part, account for its popularity . 55
Rossiter describes the president as a man wearing many "hats."
The hat imagery aptly summarizes the thrust of the book, for his purpose
is to explain the many roles a president must, by necessity, play upon
assuming office. This emphasis on the president's roles proved so
popular an approach that, at one time, it could be written that it
constituted "the most prevalent and academically respectable way of
viewing the presidency.... [I]t may be dubbed the received view of the
office." 5 * Rossiter cataloges presidential roles, or functions (he uses
the terms interchangeably), in order to draw attention to "the
staggering burden he bears for all of us." In all, ten major roles are
discussed. The first five roles comprise the "strictly constitutional"
functions of the office, and include chief of state, chief executive,
commander-in-chief, chief diplomat, and chief legislator. Many
provocative themes can be found here. For instance, being the head c
both state and government -- fusing "the dignity of a king and the power
of a prime minister" — carries with it complex issues of accountability
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of power. Likewise, the historically controversial commander-in-chief
position poses fundamental problems not only with Congress, and its
competing authority to declare war
,
but also with the people, who in the
nuclear age must face a president swollen to “nothing short of a
constitutional dictator'" in wartime. Yet as pressing as these issues
are, Rossiter makes no attempt to scratch below their surface. He is
enumerating, not analyzing.
Together these five roles give the president formidable political
muscle. Citing Harry Truman, Rossiter says the responsibilities "form
an aggregate of power that would have made Caesar or Genghis Khan or
Napoleon bite his nails with envy ." 33 But these do not exhaust a
president's arsenal. To the original five Rossiter adds five additional
functions he believes round out a realistic assessment of the
president's job: chief of party, voice of the people, protector of the
peace, manager of prosperity and world leader . 36 These roles have
arisen from historic exigency, not constitutional design. The manager
of prosperity role stems from the need for overall economic stability to
prevent depression, the role of world leader from our post World War II
stature, and so on. Nevertheless, he accords them equal status with the
constitutionally grounded functions.
Having briefly touched upon the ten presidential roles he then
steps back to see what they add up to. He finds a "seamless unity,"
"something more than the arithmetical total of all its functions," a
single office that is the presidency itself. He is almost giddy with
this finding: "I feel something like a professor of nutritional science
who has just ticked off the ingredients of a wonderful stew."
3/
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Sometimes the ingredients do not mix well with one another, however,
causing presidents to use their leadership to find the proper balance
between them. Rossiter shifts metaphors to make this point:
If the Presidency is a chamber orchestra of ten pieces,
all played by the leader, he must learn for himself by
hard practice how to blend them together, remembering
always that perfect harmony is unattainable .... 30
Such a blending of musical instruments, or stew, adds a tremendous
administrative responsibility to the already "monstrous" burden resting
on the president's shoulders. That burden is made more manageable by
the vast executive bureaucracy which has flourished in the twentieth
century. But it is not removed. The office remains a "one-man job."
Truman's famous sign on his desk -- "The buck stops here" -- captures
the essence of the presidency for Rossiter.
Despite great power and responsibility the president is not a free
agent. Rossiter follows his account of the president's roles with a
discussion of the limits that balance these powers, serving as
safeguards that "keep the President's feet in paths of constitutional
righteousness." He highlights seven major centers of power restraining
the chief executive. Congress, the Supreme Court, the federal
bureaucracy and political parties offer a check on the level of national
government, while individual states, free enterprise and public opinion
present other potential barriers. Most of the seven provide partial
restraint, or serve only as an irritant. The Supreme Court, for
example, usually ends up "rationalizing most pretensions" of presidents,
amounting to "one of the least reliable restraints" on executive
behavior. Free enterprise — broadly defined to include, among others,
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corporations, small businesses, consumer groups and unions — similarly
plays a modest part in checking the president. To be sure, a president
must seek the support of this "fabulous galaxy" of free enterprise
organizations. But beyond that Rossiter does not explain the nature of
the relationship involved, except to criticize the performance of labor
free enterprisers John L. Lewis ("the last of the robber barons") and
Philip Murray.
The two centers of countervailing power that actually play a
significant ongoing role are Congress and public opinion. Congress is a
"fiercely independent" institution that vigorously wields its many
weapons to check and confine presidential initiative. Summing up its
powers, Rossiter says:
C T 3 h e most reliable single limitation on the American
Presidency is the independent existence of a proud,
jealous, watchful coordinate branch. No President ever
lived who would not have agreed, reverently or ruefully,
with this statement. 39
If Congress is the most reliable constraining force, however, public
opinion constitutes, "over the long run," the "most effective check upon
the President." Granting the chief executive's power to shape public
sentiment, Rossiter thinks there is a point beyond which the public will
not be led. That point marks what he several times calls the "grand and
durable pattern of private liberty and public morality." By this he
intends to draw attention to the importance of ends and means that are
"characteristically American," or "fair, dignified, traditional, and
familiar," or "within the common range of expectations," namely ends and
means which "at least do not outrage the accepted dictates of
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constitutionalism, democracy, personal liberty, and Christian
morality.
"
4 ° While Rossiter is vague on what these terms entail, he
does single out those who contend that FDR should have nationalized the
banking system in 1933 as holding a view that would have fallen outside
an acceptable range of liberty and morality.
However powerful a check public opinion is, it most effectively
limits presidential initiative not in isolation, but when it operates
through one of the other major centers of restraint, as when the public
pressures Congress to act against the wishes of an administration.
Indeed, these institutional constraints are enfeebled and "often
useless" without the weight of public opinion to buttress them. But
even allowing for the efficacy of an aroused public voicing its opinions
through centers of countervailing power, Rossiter finds the ultimate
limit on the chief executive to be internally generated, not externally
imposed. Personal beliefs, conscience, and a sense of history together
form the human constitution that ensures a president will act in accord
with established norms. These sel f -1 i mi tat i ons
,
in conjunction with the
more formal barriers, thus keep the American presidency moving "with the
grain of liberty and morality." The imagery we are left with after this
exposition of the interplay of presidential power and its limits is
vintage Rossiter:
[T Ihe President is not a Gulliver immobilized by ten
thousand tiny cords, nor even a Prometheus chained to a
rock of frustration. He is, rather, a kind of magnificent
lion who can roam widely and do great deeds so long as he
does not try to break loose from his broad reservation.
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Rossiter's ensuing account of the history of the presidency
amounts to a celebration of those who have roamed widely and done very
great deeds. With George Washington in mind as the person who would be
chosen as the first U.S. president, the authors of the Constitution made
a series of key decisions enabling a strong executive to emerge from the
proceedings in Philadelphia. And while those basic contours of the
office remain unchanged, there have been shifts in the character of the
office that have left the presidential picture "a hundred times
magnified." These changes reflect the growth of the power and prestige
of the office, and its centrality to the process of making government
policy. Rossiter sees an inevitable upward trajectory for the status of
the chief executive, propelled by several exigent forces of history.
The growth of the state as a regulator of economic and social life
accounts for one area of enhanced executive authority. Americans
repeatedly turn to their president and "beg" him for help in solving
their many problems. Another force magnifying presidential power has
been the nation's "self-elevation" to the position of a principle global
power. The mandate of international relations guarantees that "as the
world grows smaller, he will grow bigger." Third, domestic and
international emergencies, ranging from strikes to full-scale war, add
to presidential status. The relative decline of Congress from its
nineteenth century grandeur represents a fourth factor. And finally,
the rise of the presidency as the preeminent democratic office -- the
most popularly elected office as well as the one most suited to serve as
a vehicle for the people's designs has meant that it would eclipse
all others in importance.
By themselves, none of these farces necessarily would have
strengthened the office if the challenges they ushered in were not met
by leaders willing and able to exercise authority with resolve.
Fortunately for the nation, according to Rossiter, we have been blessed
with exceptional presidents when the times called for them. Situations
and personalities have been synchronous. Here he echoes Laski's "the-
hour-has-brought-f or th-the-man " thesis. He counts eight presidents who
merit the adjective "great," and six other "notable" ones, who together
helped build the "office of freedom." His brief portraits of these men
offer tribute to their legendary achievements, achievements that
Rossiter stands in awe of as he glorifies them:
Each is an authentic folk hero, each a symbol of some
virtue or dream especially dear to Americans. Together
they make up almost half of the company of American
giants, for who except Christopher Columbus, Benjamin
Franklin, Daniel Boone, Robert E. Lee, and Thomas A.
Edison in real life, Deerslayer and Ragged Dick in
fiction, and Paul Bunyon and the Lonesome Cowboy in myth
can challenge them for immortality? Washington the
spotless patriot, Jefferson the democrat, Jackson the
man of the frontier, Lincoln the emancipator and
preserver of the Union, Theodore Roosevelt the All-
American Boy, Wilson the peacemaker -- these men are
symbols of huge interest and value to the American
people . 42
Myths and symbols certainly play an important role in any society.
No one would argue with that. But Rossiter nearly leaves the realm of
earthly existence in lavishing praise on these luminaries. Myths seem
to be an end in themselves when he writes, "The final greatness of the
Presidency lies in the truth that it is not just an office of incredible
power but a breeding ground of indestructable myth." Are there any
drawbacks to the preservation of a mythical aura surrounding our most
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elevated political figure? Apparently not. Even the presidents that
historians and political scientists routinely cite as the worst
Franklin Pierce, James Buchanan, Ulysses S. Grant and Warren Harding --
receive, as consolation of sorts, kind words: "a man of rich
experience, a gentle man," and so on . 43 This hero worship confirms a
"cardinal fact" of historical scholarship: "American history is
written, if not always made, by men of moderate views, broad interests,
and merciful judgments
.
1,44
The merciful judgments continue for the three figures Rossiter
examines at some length in a section on the modern presidency -- FDR,
Truman and Dwight Eisenhower. Presidential modernization entailed the
incorporation of five key changes (on top of the ones listed earlier)
over the quarter-century since Rossevelt first took the oath of office.
The first change is the further erosion of Congressional power vis-a-vis
the executive branch. New Deal economic management, in particular,
solidified expectations that the president would play a crucial role in
the legislative process, virtually becoming a "third House of Congress."
This blossoming responsibility was aided by the concomitant development
of radio and television, the second dimension of the modern office. The
"miracles of electronics" opened up channels of communication that put
the president in touch with the people in a more intimate and sustained
way. Regular press conferences were one immediate outgrowth of the new
technologies. Henceforth, the president would mold public opinion as
never before.
A third change is the increased use of the president as
"Protector of the Peace," one of the ten original roles that define the
37
office. The citizenry now demands the president be a "one-man riot
squad" able to go anywhere and do anything necessary to maintain
domestic tranquility. Although numerous applications come to mind, the
one Rossiter is most clearly pleased with is the power of president's to
intervene, with force if need be, to resolve labor disputes. 48 He
applauds the executive's willingness -- both pre- and post-Taft Hartley
Act -- to quell strikes, the gravest threat to liberty and morality from
Rossiter's perspective. Rounding out the modern alterations are
presidential efforts on behalf of civil rights and civil liberties, and
the conversion of the office into a bureaucratic structure of the
Executive Office of the President. The former development establishes
the president more firmly as "a friend of liberty;" the chief executive
has no choice but "to serve as the conscience and strong arm of American
democracy." The bureaucratic evolution institutionalizes the office,
surrounding the presidency with the personnel to carry out its
burgeoning duties.
The three modern chief executives overall fared well in this new
environment. Rossiter counts FDR and Truman among the aforementioned
"great" presidents, while Eisenhower falls in with the next echelon of
"notable" ones. Roosevelt's place in the pantheon of giants raises no
eyebrows. But Truman is a more debatable choice. Rossiter defends it
on the grounds that despite his many controversial decisions in foreign
affairs, none, not the use of atomic weaponry nor the Korean War, "has
been proven wrong, stupid, or contrary to the best judgment and
interests of the American people." Moreover, he had a "clear-cut
philosophy of presidential power" (the power to persuade people to do
38
things) and the commitment to use that power even while frankly
admitting his sparse abilities as a leader. Rossiter sees in him proof
of the democratic principle that an average person can fulfill the
obligations of the toughest job in the world. As for Eisenhower, while
certainly not an average person by any standard, the general ranks just
outside the "magic circle of presidential greatness." If he failed to
use the powers of the office to turn his vast popularity into real
influence, he did succeed in being conservative. Rossiter means this
literally — he methodically conserved the modern role of the government
in the new, managed economy, and conserved as well the expanded role of
the U.S. in the world. He was not exciting; he was a plodder of sorts,
an anti-intellectual whose contribution was not innovation, but
maintenance. He succeeded, in short, "on his own terms, and they were
never the terms of creative genius."
What are we left with, then, after Rossiter's discussion of the
roles of the presidency and the men who filled them? His own final
reflection is one of conservative (in the above sense of conserving the
status quo) contentment, expressing his "deep note of satisfaction" with
the office and predicting "a long and exciting future for the American
Presidency." His expansivist optimism rests on his belief that "all the
great political and social forces that brought the Presidency to its
present state of power and glory will continue to work in the future,
ensuring that "we will turn to the Presi dent ... for help in solving the
problems that fall thickly upon us ." 46 The strong, active chief
executive, reminiscent of the great ones who have come before, is a
certainty: "There is a Presidency in our future, and it is the
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Presidency of Jackson and Lincoln rather than of Monroe and Buchanan, of
Roosevelt and Truman rather than of Harding and Cool idge. 1,47 Persistent
and vigorous presidential leadership thus serves as both description and
prescription for Rossiter, who opposes any effort to weaken the
institutional centrality of the office. The stakes are simply too high:
tAlny major reduction now in the powers of the President
would leave us naked to our enemies, to the invisible
forces of boom and bust at home and to the visible forces
of unrest and aggression abroad. In a country over which
industrialism has swept in great waves, in a world where
active diplomacy is the minimum price of survival, it is
not alone power but a vacuum of power that men must fear. 40
The presidency Rossiter endorses — the office with which Americans are
"richly blessed" — represents "a choice instrument of constitutional
democracy." It is ascribed totemic qualities. To tamper with this
"peculiar treasure" in any fundamental way is to court disaster. "Leave
Your Presidency Alone" -- this is Rossiter's fundamental counsel.
Though Rossiter's stature in the field of presidency scholarship
remains strong, the evolution of discourse on the presidency veered away
from his approach with the publication in 1960 of Presidential Power .
perhaps the most influential book ever written on the topic and
certainly the most forceful statement of the expanisvist position.
Written by Rossiter's friend and colleague Richard Neustadt, the book
represents a self-conscious attempt to break with the hitherto dominant
way of conceptualizing the office. Rather than adopting a traditional
constitutional orientation to the presidency, viewing it as an amalgam
of formal roles to be carried out within a matrix of competing
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institutions, Neustadt sought to see it as a more unified whole with one
major purpose -- to wield power. He writes:
My theme is personal power and its politics: what it
is, how to get it, how to keep it, how to lose it. My
interst is in what a President can do to make his own
will felt within his own Administration .... 30
He has written what amounts to a prescription for presidential power
(his first working title for the book was "Primer for Presidents")
broadly defined as "personal influence on government action." Drawing
on case studies of the Truman and Eisenhower years, he proceeds by
examining examples of presidential weakness and contrasting them with
the type of executive behavior he believes could have resulted in more
effective policy outcomes. The latter are reinforced by examples of
successful presidential action in roughly similar circumstances, with
FDR often serving as the model efficacious actor.
For Neustadt, the essence of presidential power is the power to
persuade. The extent of this power depends upon the ability to
influence the behavior of people in government, with such influence
becoming the measure of presidential leadership. However, Neustadt sees
a problem with a president's power to persuade; it is not simply an
automatic ability acquired once in office. Formal constitutional
"powers" do not guarantee power in the day to day affairs of the
president. For a chief executive to turn formal power and status into
an operative political tool for achieving desired results, more must be
done than issuing commands from on high. Presidents must engage in
earthly give-and-take of the persuasive endeavor, in effect bargaining
with various constituencies which include executive officialdom,
Congress, party officials, citizens at large and citizens abroad.
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The connection between persuasion and bargaining is central to
Neustadt's thesis. He locates the imperatives of this nexus in the
constitution, which created a government of separate institutions
sharing powers. This relationship of reciprocal need among separate
institutional actors defines the parameters within which the president
must persuade. Of course, the authority inherent in the job enhances a
president's persuasiveness. An enormous amount of respect and esteem
come with the territory. Yet as Neustadt stresses, a president also
depends upon those who must be persuaded; their authority and power are
necessary for effective presidential leadership. Thus, in Neustadt's
view, the operation of government hinges on "relationships of mutual
dependence," As he summarizes:
Persuasion is a two-way street....
The power to persuade is the power to bargain.
Status and authority yield bargaining advantages.
But in a government of "separated institutions
sharing powers," they yield them to all sides . 31
Given an environment of pressures and counter pressures, of
interaction among influential people with differing vantage points, how
does a president wield influence and garner support for programs 9 How
does a president persuade? One method, least desirable from Neustadt s
perspective, is through command. As shown in the case of MacArthur s
dismissal, the seizure of the steel mills, and the dispatch of troops to
Little Rock, a president can on occasion command certain actions that
result in quick compliance. From a presidential perspective, these
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three cases involved orders which were self-executing. Yet despite the
fact that commands can work, Neustadt says they do so only under certain
circumstances. Conditions under which the necessary factors combine to
produce compliance are relatively rare. Moreover, cases of command
typically occur as a last ditch effort after all other options have
failed or been discarded, in sum constituting political failure rather
than success. Results may be produced, but the quality of the result is
strategically poor, often inconclusive and usually costly to future
programmatic aims. Neustadt concludes that anything accomplished via
the persuasion mechanism of command necessarily will prove to be
transitory, thus
Command is but a method of persuasion, not a sub-
stitute, and not a method suitable for everyday employ-
ment. 32
As a means of effective persuasion, Neustadt prefers the
aforementioned technique of bargaining. The need for bargaining in the
formulation of government policy stems from the underlying motive of
persuasion: self-interest . 33 Because policy actors have differing
outlooks and loyalties, a president seeking to persuade must convince
them "to believe that what he wants of them is what their own appraisal
of their own responsibilities requires them to do in their interest, not
his." People with divergent interests must come together and hammer out
policies that not only embrace their desired objectives, but also appear
in a form consonant with their individual situations. Truman s handling
of the Marshall Plan is used to illustrate the meshing of policy form
and content, the need for bipartisan policy agreement and the success
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such accomodation can produce. And this also serves as an example of
how a president can best protect the chances of achieving favorable
policy results. Such protection, Neustadt postulates, can be obtained
only through the choices a president makes. Power to persuade is thus
intertwined with choices, for "a President's own choices are the only
means in his own hands of guarding his own prospects for effective
influence." Vet to understand how a president can guard personal power
in bargaining relationships through specific choices, one must first
touch upon the two other key power sources: professional reputation and
public prestige.
For Neustadt, a president's professional reputation (reputation
within the Washington community) is a central factor in the exertion of
influence because the power to persuade depends upon what other people
who share governing power have come to expect of the chief executive. A
president's reputation is always evolving. Accordingly, attention must
be paid to presenting an overall image of "tenacity" and "skill."
Mistakes are inevitable, but the impression of recurring inconsistency
and poor judgment must be avoided at all costs. A president with an eye
toward establishing a durable reputation should seek to "maximize
uncertainties in future opposition, to minimize the insecurities of
possible support, and to avoid the opposite effect in either case." Of
course, a positive reputation in Washington does not guarantee effective
persuasion. But it can make life at the top much smoother. Neustadt
emphasizes that the responsibility for reputation is almost entirely a
president's own affair. Since words and actions can damage one 5
professional image, the responsibility is fraught with risks. The
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point, though, is that a president's reputation is not immutable. It
can change, as Eisenhower changed his in 1959 with the emergence of a
purposeful "New Eisenhower" following more than a year of equivocation
over budgetary matters. It is this potential to alter a reputation
through executive decisions which lies at the heart of a president's
opportunity as a reputation-builder.
Public prestige offers another measurement by which the Washington
community gauges a president's performance. Personal power depends on
the president's standing outside Washington as well as within. Neustadt
terms a president's popularity among the citizenry "a jumble of
imprecise impressions held by relatively inattentive men." Yet this
disparate collection of subjective judgments directly influences the
responsiveness of policy actors to the president's programmatic aims. A
president's prestige as an element of influence, Neustadt contends, is
comparable to that of his professional reputation -- neither one may
decide the outcome of a particular situation, but both may have an
impact on the possibilities in those situations and thus are pivotal to
power prospects.
To protect his or her public prestige a president must not merely
be concerned with people's perceptions of the presidential personality;
the image of the office itself, and what it ought to be, must be
protected. He emphasizes this connection between popular prestige and
people's notions of the role of the presidency because he believes the
private lives of citizens -- their personal dreams and anxieties
--
greatly color their expectations of the president. Popular discontent
weakens one's public image. Therefore, to protect public prestige a
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president must be attuned to their hopes and the objective conditions of
their real world existence, such as "paychecks, grocery bills,
children's schooling, sons at war" and other concerns of Main Street
America, Unable to control all these elements of people's lives, the
president must become a teacher of the public through words and, more
importantly, actions, in effect convincing people to "accept the hard
conditions in their lives, or anyway [to] not blame him." In short, to
have influence inside government, the president must "shape the
thoughts" of those outside government.
Given that tactical choices provide the most essential means of
guarding a president's three power sources -- bargaining relationships,
professional reputation and public prestige — Neustadt turns to an
analysis of how the chief executive can gain the greatest benefit from
these choices. His advice hinges on the simple proposition that a
president makes the most of available choices by first comprehending the
power stakes involved and acknowledging their implications. A president
must perceive the possibilities of power and influence: "Before power
can be served, it must be seen." 34 A president who senses power and
sees policy risks stands ready to decisively plan the future course of
government action. And here Neustadt definitely means for the president
to undertake these activities personally. These are not tasks for
advisers: "nobody and nothing helps a President to see save as he helps
himself." As the examples of Eisenhower's budget day fiasco in 1957 and
Truman's Korean War strategy shift in 1950 display, when a president
neglects personal power stakes the policy results can seriously erode
executive influence. Presidents should be wary of relying exclusively
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on the advice of experts and advisers, even when the issues are far
removed from their experience. Only the president is an expert in the
field of personal power. By developing "a consciousness of power
stakes" a president will protect self-interest, clarify vision and
improve the capacity to make choices.
Having discussed the philosophy behind, and importance of
presidential choice-making, Neustadt asks how a president actually
operationalizes his suggestions. A fundamental ingredient of self-help
for the chief executive is information. By information, Neustadt does
not simply mean the policy briefings and other routine data produced by
advisers. Presidents need all this, but also need more. They need to
stay abreast of "the odds and ends of tangible detail that pieced
together in his mind illuminate the underside of issues put before him."
Being generally informed is not enough for the power-seeking president.
Knowledge of the nitty gritty substance of policy formulation is the
key. This implies the president should shy away from delegating all the
dirty work of information gathering to advisers who report back only a
clean, capsulized version of reality. Presidents need the dirt too.
They ought to be their "own director of [their! own central
intelligence." As Neustadt explains:
Presidents are always being told that they should
leave details to others. It is dubious advice. Exposure
to details of operation and of policy provides the frame
of reference for details of information. To be effective
as his own director of intelligence, a President need be
his own executive assistant. He need be both, that is to
say, if he would help himself. BS
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Of course, time constraints incessantly impinge upon a president's
ability to secure such a broad view of government operations. But
Neustadt believes it is possible for a president to deal with time
pressure and still attend to personal power stakes. He grounds this
belief in the figure of Franklin Roosevelt and his competing advisers,
self-created deadlines and other administrative devices. Roosevelt's
use of power and extraordinary administrative success, according to
Neustadt, depended upon the development of his "interior resources,"
comprised of his acute sense of power, his abounding self-confidence and
his sense of direction. Any president who desires to both wield and
protect power, who seeks to be an influential leader, must marshal
interior resources effectively. And it helps if the president exudes
the hunger for the office -- and has as much previous experience — as
did Roosevelt.
Neustadt concludes his study of presidential power by stressing
the increasing need for the chief executive to bring to the office the
qualities of governmental experience and an intense drive for personal
power. Although he thinks that expertise and ambition, to be effective
components of power, must be kept in perspective by the proper
temperment, he still reduces presidential efficacy to the extremely
personal pursuit of power. The power-seeker must be able to accept the
inevitable frustrations of the job. But save for that qualification,
the chief executive's "unremitting search for personal power" remains
the engine of enlightened administration. And when it comes to American
presidents who have searched unremittingly for power, the exemplary case
for Neustadt (as it is for Laski and Rossiter) is FDR, the president
whose call for enlightened administration frames this chapter at the
outset. Of FDR, Neustadt writes:
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No President in this century has had a sharper sense of
personal power, a sense of what it is and where it comes
from; none has had more hunger for it, few have had more
use for it, and only one or two could match his faith in
his own competence to use it. Perception and desire and
self-confidence, combined, produced their own reward. No
modern President has been more nearly master in the White
House . 36
Elsewhere he commends FDR's qualities, his insatiable appetite for
power, as the cornerstone of presidential greatness, citing the fact
that he “wanted mastery," "wanted power for its own sake," brought a
"taste for power," to the job, and so on.
Just what a president is supposed to do with all this personal
power once the thirst for it has been quenched is not clear from
Neustadt's discussion. He does equate the determined quest for power
with the attainment of "viable" public policy, primarily because the
president's political vantage point is so broad he should naturally
pursue balanced, feasible policy directions. And he also argues that
"in the sphere of viability our system can supply no better expert than
a President intent on husbanding his influence -- provided that he
understands what influence is made of ." 37 But the terms "viable,"
"balanced," and "feasible" seem hopelessly vague. Indeed, the language
he employs to clarify such terms sounds reminiscent of Rossiter s
ambiguous words, particularly when he tells us the president should be
certain administration policy moves with "the grain of history," an
especially obscure phrase. Disappointment awaits anyone hoping to
discover an analysis of the ends of presidential power . 30 Neustadt has
49
collapsed questions of ends into the the quest for "viability."
Presidential power is thought of in purely instrumental terms. What is
doable is what should be done.
In sum, Neustadt wants his readers to follow him in placing their
faith in the president as the political system's "Great Initiator." The
job of the "President-as-expert" is to reconcile the seemingly
irreconcilable factors which the nation's problems entail, a task the
chief executive is suited to perform if an awareness of power stakes and
viable policy is maintained. While a president's expertise through
experience and consciousness of personal power provide no panacea for
the country's ills, they offer our best hope for "effective" policy. If
there is any danger in all of this it "does not lie in our dependence on
a_ man; it lies in our capacity to make ourselves depend upon a man who
is inexpert." "Inexpert" performers in the White House are what
Neustadt fears most. American democracy is addicted to expertise at the
top, expertise available only from a small group of "experienced
politicians of extraordinary temperment." Such proficiency ensures the
status quo will not be disturbed, for
[Presidential] expertise assures a contribution to the
system. The system, after all, is what he knows. The
danger lies in men who do not know it . 3,7
Neustadt ends his original edition of Presidential Power with
these thoughts on the need for expertise at the commanding heights of
the political system. Subsequent editions have added three chapters of
"Later Reflections," leaving the original study intact. His reflections
are just that -- reflections of what he said earlier. In no significant
way do they enhance or shed new light on his original thesis.
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The first extra chapter deals with the presidency of John F.
Kennedy. While acknowledging the difficulty of assessing a presidency
cut short by tragedy, Neustadt generally gives JFK high marks,
particularly for his handling of the Cuban missle crisis. He sees in
the crisis an affirmation of one of JFK's fundamental goals -- bottling
the "nuclear genie." Events leading up to the crisis, however, receive
little or no attention. The ficticious "missile gap," which expressed
and contributed to both the cold war atmosphere of American politics and
Kennedy's election campaign, is not mentioned. And the Bay of Pigs
invasion receives comment only as a "severe check" on the president's
public relations image, a check which in any event Kennedy overcame with
his "superb" treatment of its aftermath. & ° In this nearly contextless
missle crisis, though, Neustadt finds Kennedy's most enduring legacy,
contending that he paved the way for all modern chief executives
shouldering the daily responsibility for decisions that could put the
entire world in jeopardy. This burden moves the president even further
from the reach of ordinary citizens and reinforces Neustadt's basic
message:
Regardless of the dangers, presidential power, even
in this new dimension, still has to be sought and
used; it cannot be escaped. We now are even more
dependent than before on the mind and temperment of
the man in the White House .* 1
We remain just as dependent on the president when Neustadt next
adds a chapter, this time looking at Johnson and Richard Nixon. The
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disasters of their tenures were rooted principally in their self-
indulgence and insecurity. Changes in the domestic and international
setting they inherited have not altered Neustadt's basic premise "that
Americans cannot escape an active federal government because so many of
them want so much from it, and that activity in Washington calls for an
active President..." But in the wake of Vietnam and Watergate the
ability of the presidency to achieve its aims has declined. Hence, the
"gap between responsibility and capability grows wider." To close this
gap Neustadt looks to some combination of media technology and stronger
relations between the president and party leadership. "When we find a
President who handles television as well as [Theodore Roosevelt] did the
press," Neustadt notes, "let us encourage him to try to put his friends
in Congress, and encourage them to try to build a leadership he cannot
help but hear . 114,2
Jimmy Carter's presidency foundered in part because he could
master neither television nor Congress (and a Democratic one at that),
as Neustadt explains in his third and final supplemental chapter.
Moreover, he succumbed to the "hazards of transition" to the office,
wasting valuable time with misdirected planning which led, within the
first year of his term, to the resignation of his Budget Director Burt
Lance. The Lance affair badly damaged Carter's administrative image and
weakened his moral stature, upon which he had based so much of his
campaign. Yet Neustadt suggests that Carter was done in by something
bigger than any one incident or personal weakness. He argues that the
president was a victim of expectations, in particular the expectations
of Washingtonians. People expected too much of him, and continue to
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expect more than an^ president can deliver. But if this note of caution
in his work has the ring of special pleading on behalf of politicians he
personally supports, it is becasue the trajectory of his thesis has not
prepared us for such a revision. Indeed, Presidential Power confrihutpH
significantly to the kinds of expectations Neustadt begins to view as in
some way undermining the presidency itself. He is caught in a bind he
helped create and of which he is only dimly aware.
In a relative but real sense one can say of a President
what Eisenhower's first Secretary of Defense once said of
General Motors: what is good for the country is good for
the President, and vice versa. 63
This thought -- especially the "vice versa" — perfectly captures the
spirit of Neustadt's classic text. It is the expansivist clarion call.
The Restricti vist Reply
Neustadt's eleventh hour second thoughts about the wisdom of the
expansivist outlook give a hint that something went awry along the way
to the enchanted land of presidential government. By the late 1960's
and early I970's, defectors from this perspective were legion. It is
common for political scientists to credit the twin debacles of Vietnam
and Watergate with providing the impetus for the intellectual retreat.
Erwin Hargrove's comments on the "crisis of the contemporary presidency"
are representative of the changed climate in the aftermath of these two
events:
If this chapter were being writen in 1960 by a poli-
tical scientist of liberal persuasion it would surely
eulogize presidential power. But today [19741 the words
do not come.... Our optimistic assumptions about the
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happy fusion of power and purpose have been exploded. It
is not only that power has been abused but also that we
trusted too much in it. 64
Reflecting on the terms of Johnson and Nixon, Hargrove warns, "we must
not be beguiled again by men of power."
Others more explicitly sought to refute the expansivist notion of
presidential government as an enduring chapter in American political
history. "The 1970's marked the end of the presidential era in American
politics," writes Lester Salamon in an essay directly addressed to the
kind of position Burns endorsed so enthusiastically. He continues,
[TIhe illusory quality of presidential government
ceased being a cause for concern and became instead
something to be applauded. The reason: for a brief
period, the illusion of presidential government came
close to being translated into reality, and the
results turned out to be far different, and far more
frightening, than its champions had expected. &s
Clearly the times warranted some measure of rethinking on the part of
presidency scholars. In the face of presidential excess and abuse of
power, the idea that the reach of the office should be restricted gained
credence.
It would be shortsighted, however, to consider the restrictivist
orientation as simply a reaction to the strife of the 6Q's and 70 s. In
fact, its intellectual origins can be found decades earlier in the work
of Edward S. Corwin. Written in 1940, with numerous later editions, The.
President: Office and Powers expressed Corwin's concern that the office
had become dangerously personalized, its powers enlarged to the point of
resembling, on occasion, a "primitive monarchy." Corwin contends that
the deliberately loose grant of "executive power" in Article II of the
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Constitution has been stretched by the accumulated impact of the handful
of truly great presidents who have occupied the office, especially those
of the twentieth century. He thus finds that, "Taken by and large, the
history of the presidency is a history of aggrandizement." 6 * The fruits
of aggrandizement are passed on from strong chief executives to less
dynamic ones through the "accumulatd tradition of the office," hence
"precedents established by a forceful or politically successful
personality in the office are available to less gifted succesors, and
permanently so because of the difficulty with which the Constitution is
amended." 67 For this reason, the potential threat posed by such
presidents as FDR is not likely to diminish over time.
Corwin brings a legalistic approach to the study of the office.
He focuses much attention on Supreme Court cases which contributed to
the evolution of the president's constitutionally granted powers from
1787 onward. Concern for the ensuing expansion of the president's
various roles brings this volume in contact with Rossiter's work,
although Rossiter does not share Corwin's skepticism about the scope of
presidential power. We get, for example, a discussion of the president
in the role of "organ of foreign relations." Here we see the founding
fathers issuing "an invitation to struggle for the privilege of
directing American foreign policy," the struggle taking place between
the chief executive and Congress. While such power is formallly
divided, the president's portion has waxed inexorably for a host of
reasons, leaving the office with "the lion's share" of responsibility
for shaping the substance of foreign policy. The disparity in power is
even more pronounced during wartime as the president assumes the
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commander-in-chief role. Then the executive benefits from the accretion
of inherent powers lodged in the leadership position of a sovereign
state.
As a result of this growth in presidential prestige, people come
to view the chief executive as the architect of the nation's every
circumstance, "looking upon the Chief Executive as the author of peace,
prosperity, and good crops, or, in the alternative, of war, depression,
and famine." Even in light of the institutionalization of much of the
administrative dimension of the job, "the office remains highly
personal." For Corwin, personalization signals the dominance of a
conception of the office as an autonomous center of activity, with the
citizenry embod i ed in the executive. The casualty of this supremacy is
legislative power and the notion of the people being re-presented in
Congress. Ironically, the legislature has collaborated in its own
evisceration, delegating vast amounts of power and responsibility to the
president in the name of meeting the demands placed on the modern state
by the public. Presidential aggrandizement therefore encourages the
marasmus of the most cherished constitutional principle for Corwin, and
for all restrictivists -- the separation of powers.
Corwin insists upon the need to stabilize the relationship
between these two branches of government. The presidency has encroached
too deeply into American political life, a problem made no less
troubling by the knowledge that it has come, by and large, with the
blessing of popular opinion. While not certain the encroachment poses a
threat to personal liberty, he remains wary of its advance. It is this
sense of unease that restrictivists share. Corwin's writing thus led
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the way for what later became a parade of scholars seeking to restrain,
in some measure, the political dominance of executive authority. What
follows is an exploration of three representative members of this band-
wagon -- Arthur Schlesinger
,
Jr., Thomas Cronin and Theodore Lowi.
The first thing to note about Schlesinger is how fitting it is to
picture him climbing aboard a bandwagon in writing his renowned book The
Imperial Presidency
. He was not always given to cautious appraisals of
the scope of presidential power, serving as the "official historian" of
the Kennedy administration, to use Noam Chomsky's apt phrase connoting
his criticism of Schlesinger ' s generally effusive praise for Kennedy's
presidency and his uncritical attitude toward the administration's
foreign policy initiatives, especially in Vietnam. 60 For his part,
Schlesinger admits a degree of complicity in the furtherance of
expansivist notions of the office. Lamenting the "rise of the
presidential mystique," he faults political scientists and historians,
including himself, for giving "historical sanction" to an "uncritical
cult of the activist presidency" in postwar scholarship. We should
think of him, then, as a sort of born again restrictivist.
Schl esi nger ' s shift away from the expansivist school was prompted
by his revulsion against what he saw as the deformation of the
Constitution caused by the growth of presidential power, especially in
foreign policy. The specific deformation — the underlying theme of the
entire book -- is the extent to which postwar presidents have besieged
the separation of powers. While many factors contributed to the
historic destabilization of the institutional balance of power between
the president and Congress, they seemed to coalesce in a White House
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fueled by Nixon's "compulsive internal drives." Vietnam and Wategate
drew attention to the glaring decay of presidential accountability
which, under the intense pressure of worldwide crisis, created the
imperial presidency. Schl esi nger ' s only explicit definition of the
"imperial presidency" comes in an epilogue to a mid-1974 edition, where
he says that it "may be briefly defined as the condition resulting when
the balance between presidential power and presidential accountability
is destroyed." 70 It is absolutely crucial to note that what concerns
him throughout is the draining of countervailing centers of power (most
notably congressional powers) out of the political system. The problem
is an institutional one. The presidency has run amok. Hence the title
of the book tells the story: the office has become imperial, not the
nation's foreign policy or the political economy it supports.
Schl esi nger ' s work traces the history of changes in the balance
between the president and Congress, with the modern period marked by an
outright presidential "appropriation" of powers granted the Congress in
the Constitution. This appropriation is particularly striking in
foreign afairs, the aspect of political life that provided the "decisive
impetus" to the imperial presidency. However difficult it might be to
ascertain the intent of the framers, Schlesinger points out that they
surely intended to divide control over the war powers. Yet it is this
division that has come under attack since the early days of the
republic. What presidential power really amounts to, we are reminded,
is an outgrowth of practice . not theory. And the practice has been to
increase the occurance of presidential war.
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Actually the increase has not been a steady one. It can be seen
more accurately as a cycle of action and reaction: the president
engages in some type of military activity which leaves the office with
the upper hand in foreign policy matters, and then Congress tries to
recoup some of the power taken by the president. The key is that the
power lost by Congress is never completely recovered. And each new
presidential recoil against congressional reassertions of power elevates
the office in the conduct of international relations. The result is an
upward trend by fits and starts. As Schlesinger writes:
Nearly every President who extended the reach of the
White House provoked a reaction toward a more
restrictive theory of the Presidency, even if the
reaction never quite cut presidential power back to
its earlier level. 71
Thus we have the nineteenth century examples (there are dozens more) of
presidential war in the case of the bloody annexation of Texas, the
destruction of San Juan del Norte (Greytown), Nicaragua, and the Civil
War. Each of these assertions of presidential war-making power came at
the expense of a serious congressional role in these matters.
The case of the leveling of San Juan del Norte in 1854 is
instructive for what it says about both U.S. foreign policy (especially
given the Reagan administration's onging war against the Nicaraguan
government) and about Schlesinger s approach to his thesis. The U.S.
naval bombardment of the town came as an act of revenge after an
incident in which an American official was insulted. Not wanting to
back down to pressure from Congress and Britain, President Franklin
Pierce eventually defended this wanton destruction by defining the
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inhabitants of the town as, after all, only uncivilized barbarians of a
"pretended community." The incident speaks volumes about the American
attitude toward Latin America, and toward the rest of the world we
define as the Other when it suits our expansionary ambitions. It is an
antecedent of the kind of foreign policy the nation would carry into the
twentieth century as well. But for the purposes of Schl esinger '
s
analysis the incident serves only as another case where Congress was
denied a role in authorizing military conflict. The issue for him is an
institutional one.
Institutional jockeying continued after the Civil War, when
Congress "makes a comeback," asserting its power in the areas of treaty-
making and requests for executive information. But the Congressional
star fell once again with the Spanish-American War and the proliferation
executive agreements under William McKinley and Theodore Roosevelt.
Also, Congress generally took a back seat during the strong tenures of
Roosevelt and Wilson, provoking "the inevitable reaction" of
congressional resurgence between the time of the Versailles Treaty and
Pearl Harbor. With the coming of the Second World War, though, the
institutional ebb and flow begins to diminish, in part because of
unfavorable reaction to congressional neutrality legislation which had
tied Franklin Roosevelt's hands in the critical years leading up to the
war. In trying to act as a check of the executive, Congress instead had
acted as a "straight jacket" on the nation's foreign policy, leaving "the
verdict of history" to be one of congressional failure. "No one for a
long time after would trust Congress with basic foreign policy,"
Schlesinger writes. "Congress did not even trust itself ."
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Against this backdrop, the build up of presidential power in
foreign affairs became nearly irresistible. The bombing of Pearl Harbor
facilitated a major shift in FDR's conception of presidential power.
Prior to the war, he sought congressional collaboration for most of his
New Deal and foreign policy initiatives. But after Congress declared
war, he used his commander-in-chief powers to expand the unilateral use
of executive authority. As it had so often in the past, Schlesinger
asserts, “war nourished the presidency." Sch 1 esi nger ' s concern, of
course, is with the unilateral aspect of the president's power, since
its growth was accompanied by a corresponding decline in legislative
power. But as with his earlier articulation of this procedural
position, he forecloses many fundamental issues. For instance, his
preoccupation with purely tactical questions leads him to obscure the
importance of policies such as the decision to intern Japanese
Americans during the war (Schlesinger chooses to refer to their
"removal," a curiously sanitized word choice). Here a "shameful" policy
decision received the approval of Congress and the Supreme Court,
leaving in doubt the salience of his thesis on the centrality of the
separation of powers issue. Is the emergency power of the president the
basic question at stake when a segment of the population is put in
prison camps, or is there also a crucial question about the nature of
U.S. foreign policy and the ideology that underlies it at home?
Schlesinger confines his criticism to the first issue.
Indeed, Schlesinger consciously tries to sidestep questions about
the values and interests behind policy decisions of the government.
Thus in a section on postwar America he admits that in order to secure
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congressional passage of aid for Greece and Turkey, Truman used the
tactic of trying to "scare the hell out of the country" with appeals to
anticommunism and international peril. But some 30 pages later,
assessing the national climate in the wake of the Korean War and the
crisis atmosphere of threats to "national security," the fact that the
Soviet threat was to a great extent simply a promotional strategy aimed
at the American public is no longer of importance. Of the Cold War, he
writes:
It is not necessary here to argue whether crisis was
real or imagined and the foreign policy decent or
imperialistic. Surely all those adjectives applied
at one time or another.... But whatever the motives
and merits of American foreign policy in these years,
our present analysis requires us only to assess the
impact of that policy on American political institutions. 73
The resulting elevation of "national security" to a "supreme value"
certainly merits attention, as does the concomitant expansion of
executive prerogative to combat alleged threats. But since Schlesinger
can offer no evidence that Congress — the branch losing power in the
face of an inexorable executive power grab -- could have responded to a
different set of imperatives or would have offered a different, less
contrived account of Soviet foreign policy aims in particular and the
world situation in general, the willful dodging of "the motives and
merits of American foreign policy" weakens his argument considerably.
He ignores the deeper level of analysis for the sake of an exclusively
institutional focus.
Schlesinger continues to confine his inquiry to procedural
questions in his analysis of Nixon's presidency, especially his handling
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of Vietnam and Watergate. Fed by Kennedy’s "brilliance" during the
missile crisis, and Johnson s use of executive power to order troops
into the Dominican Republic and again to manufacture the circumstances
surrounding the Tonkin Gulf resolution, the presidency becomes
"rampant," "revolutionary," and an outright threat to democracy under
the sway of Nixon's "agitated psyche." "By the 1970s the title
Commander in Chief had acquired almost a sacramental aura," according
to Schlesinger, "translating its holder from worldly matters into an
ineffable realm of higher duty." 74 Nixon wrapped himself in the aura to
defend his unilateral assertions of power in Vietnam and Cambodia,
using the phrase commander-in-chief "as if it were an incantation." But
Schlesinger is not without his own enchanted language, with "separation
of powers" casting its spell of constitutional closure on the issues
involved. For it is, we must keep in mind, the "legal need to go to
Congress before leading the nation into war" that Nixon's presidency so
brazenly ignores. The presidential nature of Nixon's "presidential war"
offends Schlesinger most profoundly, not the war itself or the dynamics
that engender it. As Schlesinger frames the problem:
The Nixon theory of presidential war. ..had
effectively liquidated the constitutional command
that the power to authorize war belonged to the
Congress. Nixon had thereby erased the most solemn
written check on presidential war. 7 ®
Though clearly rooted in foreign policy, Nixon's assault on the
balance of power between the executive and legislative branches
eventually found domestic equivalents. His efforts to control
appropriations through impoundment and his enlargement of claims of
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executive privilege stand as two examples of Nixon's desire to "make
Congress as impotent in domestic affairs as it had come to be in foreign
affairs." Reinforced by a host of other historic forces tending to
transfer political power to the executive, Nixon's personal compulsions
drove him to seek ever-greater control of national priorities. He
sought, Schlesinger asserts, nothing short of a revolution in American
politics, its essence being "power to the presidency." What this would
have entailed was the establishment of a "plebiscitary presidency" —
since Nixon personified the majority of the citizenry, his own beliefs
about the best interests of the nation justified any course of action he
deemed necessary, accountability coming only at election time. This
type of personal rule renders any opposition inherently undemocratic.
And its logic legitimizes the types of illegal activities the
administration undertook in the Watergate affair.
Fortunately for the nation, Watergate eventually put a halt to the
advance of Nixon's revolutionary agenda. The other institutions that
are supposed to play a vital role in the polity -- the judiciary, the
press, Congress, and the executive agencies -- "all drew new confidence
as institutions from the exercise of power they had forgotten they
possessed." With constitutional vigor restored, the nation is still
left to grapple with the question of the relationship between democracy
and foreign policy. For Schlesinger this question boils down to an old
argument over "the location of the war-making power." The problem turns
on the precise distribution of power between the two branches who are
supposed to share this authority, with the distribution meant to ensure
that no one person exercises such monumental power.
I
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In searching for a solution Schlesinger provides a glimpse of a
critique that moves beyond the rigidities of his procedural orientation.
The answer, he finds, "lay not in machinery but in policy." Perhaps we
need to rethink the "messianic globalism" traditionally associated with
our foreign policy. Perhaps it is time for "a redefinition of American
interests abroad" to diminish America's "will to unlimited global
intervention." "If such things took place," he speculates, "then the
imperial heat would be off, and Congress would have the oppor tuni ty . . . to
reassert its role in the constitutional scheme ." 76
The feebleness of Schl esinger
' s commitment to such major foreign
policy revisions quickly becomes evident, though. To begin with, his
principle objection to American pursuit of empire is that it tends to
"deform and disable the Constitution," centralizing power where he
prefers to see power shared. And we learn that it was the Nixon
administration that fumbled the opportunity to do the basic rethinking
and redefinition necessary to change U.S. international objectives, as
if the major practitioner of the imperial presidency would be
predisposed to challenge the foundations of imperial logic and interest.
Finally he argues that to regain democratic control over foreign policy,
the "ultimate answer lay in the restoration of the constitutional comity
so badly breached by the imperial Presidency and so nearly destroyed by
the revolutionary Presidency ." 77 The rebirth of comity calls for such
measures as the revival of the State Department, the reassertion of
Congress as at least a junior partner in the formulation of policy, and
a loosening of the "secrecy system" that gives the executive branch such
a tight hold on information. Yet while these moves might help the
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president understand that "foreign policy was not his personal
property," Schlesinger gives us no grounds for reasonably expecting that
if it became shared property — with Congress or the State Department or
anybody else -- decisions would be based on anything other than status
quo assumptions about national security and the national interest which
have proven so compatible with the imperial presidency. His call for a
rethinking of "messianic globalism" thus seems purely rhetorical,
divorced as it is from any sustained, penetrating analysis of the
historic, systemic roots of such motives.
Looking to the future of the presidency Schlesinger foresees not
only the need for constitutional comity, but also the need to foster a
less deferential public attitude toward the chief executive. "tWlhat
the country needs today is a little serious disrespect for the office of
the Presidency," he contends, calling for "a decline in reverence" to
reverse the decline in presidential accountability. Seen in this light,
Nixon's dark tenure had a very bright side to it -- "Watergate was
potentially the best thing to have happened to the Presidency in a long
time." If the right lessons are learned, then the Nixon years will be
viewed as "a culmination" of American society's "compulsion toward
presidential power." The point is not to prevent the exercise of
presidential power, however. Rather it is to strike a balance between
an energetic chief executive and a constitutional one, for "the nation
required both a strong Presidency for leadership and the separation of
powers for liberty." If such a balance can be restored, Schlesinger
feels people will come to speak not of "the shame of Watergate," but
"the glory of Watergate." The glory, of course, lies in the conclusion
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that the nation s democratic institutions work. Bad guys eventually get
caught. Or as Schlesinger puts it:
It seems to me wholly possible that the historical
generalization to be derived from this epoch will be,
not that citizens are impotent and President's invincible,
but that Presidents who abuse their power will suffer
retribution. Retribution may be a long time coming. But
it gets there in the end. Ask Johnson. Ask Nixon. 70
Schl esi nger ' s misgivings about the relative growth of presidential
power and his advocacy of greater accountability and constitutional
balance are standard fare for the restrictivi st school of thought. His
special place in the literature comes from the urgency of his message.
The phrase "imperial presidency" became something of a rallying cry for
those concerned that the nation's institutional integrity was at stake
in the swirl of events of the early 1970's. It was one of his
subthemes, though -- the necessity of diminishing public reverence for
presidential authority -- that received fuller development in the
writing of Thomas Cronin, particularly his The State of the Presidency .
Published in 1975, Cronin's book posed a major challenge to orthodox
scholarship on the pr esi dency
.
79 He charged the academy with presenting
a standard, hopelessly idealized version of the office, which fostered
exaggerated public expectations about presidential efficacy. His
contribution to the restricti vist cause was to make a case for lowering
substantially those expectations.
Writing at a time of heightened public awareness of the dangers of
executive usurpation of power, Cronin sets out to explain "the
presidential puzzle." Noting a marked drop in public confidence in the
credibility of presidents, he warns of widespread cynicism and confusion
if the veil of illusions and misplaced hopes surrounding the president
is not lifted. From the outset he makes his pitch for realism:
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To understand the presidency, we need to
appreciate the limits of the presidency, the con-
straints on presidents, and the exaggerated ex-
pectations we visit on both. We overestimate powers
of the office, and underestimate the economic, social
and cultural factors that shape presidential perfor-
mance. BO
Healthy skepticism is in order if the office is to be brought back in to
some kind of reasonable focus. And he makes it clear that such a focus
should be that of a microscope under which chief executives and the
office they hold should be placed.
At the root of the puzzle Cronin finds a series of paradoxes born
of public expectations and demands which place presidents in no-win
binds. These binds have grown especially confining in recent decades,
as the public came to expect presidents routinely to live up to the
Rooseveltian image of bold, innovative leadership, while simultaneously
not overstepping the limits of acceptable constitutional behavior.
The modern (post-Franklin Roosevelt) presidency
is bounded and constrained by various expectations
that are decidedly paradoxical. Presidents and
presidential candidates must constantly balance them-
selves between conflicting demands.... C 1 3 1 could
well be that our paradoxical expectations and the
imperatives of the job make for schizophrenic presi-
dential performances. 01
Public expectations which are "exaggerated or hopelessly contradictory"
create a climate conducive to presidents attempting to reach too far,
thus leaving them subject to criticism when they inevitably come up
short
.
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Cronin cites a dozen such presidential paradoxes, with the idea
that "a more sophisticated and tolerant consideration" of the office
might lift a portion of the disabling burden from presidents' shoulders.
It is not necesary to delve into all of them; a sampling conveys the
thrust of his argument. For instance, the public demands a president be
"the decent and just but decisive and guileful leader." This sets up a
contradictory dynamic within which a president is torn between toughness
and tenderness: the role of the " ki ndhearted son of a bitch" is
difficult to pull off. Likewise, we expect an "inspirational but don't
promise more than you can deliver leader." This paradox leaves the
president hanging between the job of raising people's hopes and dreams,
and tempering them so that they are not shattered by reality.
Qverpromising seems to be the most frequent result of this paradox.
"The common man who gives an uncommon performance" is another paradox.
It calls for a folksy leader who can perform heroic deeds -- the
"uncommon common man." Apparently Truman successfully handled this
conflicting demand. Carter surely could not. Finally, there is the
traditional constitutional paradox that confers on the president the
dilemma of being both "national unifier and national divider." As head
of state and head of government, the president must at least try to
create the impression of rising above politics while leading a decidedly
political administration (and also serving as party chief). Again, the
president is left in a difficult position -- perched above the fray yet
standing up to his neck in it.
Together these and the other paradoxes constitute an imposing
challenge to presidential leadership. Asked to be all things to all
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people, the president has both too much and too little power to get the
job done. When public expectations are not met by our elected
"pseudomessiah, " we react politically with “the wrath of our vengence."
"It is almost ritual destruction," Cronin explains. 11 [ W ] e venerate the
presidency, but we destroy our presi dents.
“
BZ Cronin overstates the
fury of public retribution here, given the remarkable and troubling
unwillingness of public opinion to bury the corpse of the nation's most
resilient presidential Lazarus, Richard Nixon, whose books and presence
seem never to fade from the public eye. Yet Cronin's main point remains
useful: the political system is geared toward the coronation of a
person of superhuman qualities every four years. He locates the
responsibility for this distortion of reason in the minds of the people.
People constantly search for a "savior-hero." "The paradoxes of the
presidency do not lie in the White House," he asserts, "but in the
emotings, feelings, and expectations of us all."
One prime consequence of inflated public expectations is what
Cronin refers to as "the textbook presidency." The textbook presidency
is an interpretation of the office replete with myths about the
"benevolent, omnipotent, omniscient, and highly moral" chief executive.
A product of post-FDR political science, this "romantic -- benevolent
father, Big Daddy" version was extolled in college textbooks of the
1950's and 60's. Cronin examines more than 30 such books to glean the
common ingredients of this mythical scholarly model. He finds
surprisingly little variation on the pr esi dent-as-great-man theme.
What resulted very often was a storybook view that
whatever was good for our president must be the right
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thing. We were told the president is the embodiment
of all that is good in America: courage, honesty,
integrity, and compassion. We began to hail the power-
maximizing president. 03
Standard texts portray the president as the engine of national
progress, leading the people as their teacher and preacher, and
advocating a wide government presence to ensure prosperity and social
justice. The vision presented is that "if Americans could only
indentify and elect the right person, their loftiest aspirations would
be fulfilled." Some accounts even described the president as a person
physically transformed by election to the office, as in Theodore White's
classic Making of the President series. Cronin quotes White's 1969
impressions of the newly elected Nixon as vintage textbook orthodoxy:
He seemed, as he waved me into the Oval Office, suddenly
on first glance a more stocky man than I had known on the
campaign rounds. There was a minute of adjustment as he
waved me to a sofa in the barren office, poured coffee,
put me at ease; then, watching him, I realized that he
was not stockier, but, on the contrary, slimmer. What
was different was the movement of the body, the sound of
voice, the manner of speaking -- for he was calm as 1 had
never seen him before, as if peace had settled on him....
Now he was in repose, and the repose was in his speech
also -- more slow, studied, with none of the gear-slippages
of name or reference which used to come when he was weary;
his hands still moved as he spoke, but the fingers spread
gracefully, not punchily or sharply as they used to. 04
Rossiter and Neustadt both are grouped with White as purveyors of the
textbook conventions. as Summarizing this academic concoction, Cronin
highlights two dimensions which together describe the textbook ideal
type president. The "omnipotent-competent dimension" holds that the
president is the strategic catalyst for national progress, and that only
the president can fashion public policy to meet the crises plaguing the
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republic. On the "moralistic-benevolent dimension" the president is
viewed as the true personal and moral leader of the people, and if the
right person is found for the job, all will be well.
In hindsight the textbook perspective seems woefully inadequate,
even somewhat silly. And one would think that it would have foundered
on the shoals of the Vietnam and Watergate debacles. But Cronin thinks
this orientation is alive and well, if perhaps less assured. After a
period of disillusionment within the public, "the prevailing view once
again took hold that only the president can get things done, only the
president can lead legislatively, only the president can negotiate
effectively with other nations, and only the president can make the
country governable ." 06 Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter tried a more
austere presidency, Cronin thinks, but the voters repudiated their
attempts. Public expectations just will not let the larger than life
image of the president die, for
Americans still long for dynamic, reassuring, and
strong leadership. Watergate notwithstanding, we still
celebrate the gutsy, aggressive presidents -- even if
many of them did violate the legal and constitutional
niceties of our separati on-of -powers ideal . 07
Cronin attributes the persistence of the textbook model to several
mutually reinforcing factors . 00 An American sense of mission grew out
of our experience in World War II, resulting in the prevalent image of
the president as "leader of the free world" — an image enhanced to an
enormous degree by the solidification of nuclear weapons as an element
in the calculation of U.S. foreign policy. A second factor is the
enduring human tendency to believe in the ability of "great" people to
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guide a nation through difficult times. An important psychological role
is played by the president as a "national symbol of reassurance,"
leading Americans to place certain chief executives "on a pedestal
rather than under a microscope." The personal values of presidency
scholars come into play as a third force. Predominantly beholden to
liberal ideology, many authors trumpet the activist presidents,
particularly FDR. Congress has made a fourth contribution to the
resilience of the textbook view, yielding portions of its power to the
executive branch because of its ability to act faster and with more
unity than the much more cumbersome legislative body. Fifth, Cronin
contends that the natural desire for national stability insulates the
president from a great deal of criticism. Once elected, the winner
receives automatic deference as the nation rallies behind its new leader
in a "ritualistic unification." The modes of analysis employed are
another influence on the textbook perspective. Authors typically use
some combination of the public record, biographies, prior texts,
executive department staff memoirs and memos, interviews with Washington
officials, and newspaper and magazine articles — sources which are
likely to encourage a more positive picture of the president. Political
insiders, when not steadfastly trying to protect their president, often
will discuss mistakes and dirty laundry only if such information is off
the record. And finally, television has magnified the president
dramatically. It places in the president's hands tremendous powers
"over reality, perception, and over the whole way in which issues are
presented and discussed in America. Thus the textbook presidency has
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become a "prime-time presidency" as well, a tact that the Reagan
presidency has verified many times over.
These aspects of textbook orthodoxy have consequences about which
Cronin has serious reservations. One cost of such an exaggerated
version of the office is the extent to which it cheapens the quality of
citizen participation, or stifles it altogether. Many people come to
regard the president as "the national chaplain," therefore above
reproach. This inhibits the development of an active, involved
citizenry, since the president should be able to handle whatever
troubles arise. The flip side of such an attitude, of course, is that
it sets up people for cynicism and despair when a president fails to
measure up to our lofty expectations. And such reactions can weaken the
legitimacy of political institutions. The textbook imagery also affects
presidents, who run the risk, of actually believing the mythology of
presidential invincibility. Expecting reverence from the people, a
president's perspective on the world can become distorted. And White
House aides often reinforce this danger by shielding their boss from
outside influences. Both the Johnson and Nixon administrations have
been critiqued on the grounds that they eventually lost contact with
reality.®’
But of all the costs of the textbook phenomenon, Cronin is most
troubled by the publicity imperative it engenders — "looking
presidential" as he calls it. What follows from the need to look
presidential is a public relations "script," which emphasizes style over
substance, or "selling the appearance of leadership." This can entail a
number of elements, among them constantly cultivating the impression of
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doing something important, accentuating the sense of crisis, selecting
problems for their potential credit value, creating a statesmanlike
image and assailing the press if public confidence in the president
wanes or if it offers unfavorable coverage. The priorities of public
relations often lead presidents "to 'act,' to fake and to mislead as
they try to live up to the illusory notion that the right person in one
job single-handedly can solve the nation's problems ." 90 Moreover, when
manipulation of images is elevated to a high art form, "telling the
truth becomes dangerous," and hence a casualty.
Cronin concludes that the most fundamental issue raised by the
illusions surrounding public perceptions of the president -- reinforced
as they are by uncritical scholarship — is how the nation's political
leadership and its citizenry can be brought back into a healthier
relationship more closely approximating democratic ideals. Sounding a
bit like Schlesinger he stresses the need for a strong but accountable
president, with an informed, vigilant public an essential ingredient in
any meaningful notion of accountability. As he asserts, "The presidency
must not be allowed to become the only, or even the primary, instrument
for the realization of government of, by, and for the people ." 91 Social
change occurs as often from the active commitment of "militant
mobilizers" and "political prophets" as it does from "visionary
presidents." The contributions of "extragovernmental pressures" such as
movements for civil rights, women's rights, consumer and environmental
protection are valued for their consciousness-raising and their
challenge to vested interests -- interests to which presidents often are
beholden. For in order to get elected aspiring presidents must play by
the rules of the game, a game they get locked in to.
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One would like Cronin to explore the linkages between presidents
and these dominant interests, as well as the problems faced by mass
movements which hope to fundamentally alter some aspect of the status
quo. Such an examination would situate the president and the public
within a political, economic, and social context that clarifies the
structural dimensions of life. But he offers only these sketchy
impressions, almost as afterthoughts. His final point reiterates that
he is in no way denying the importance of dynamic presidential
leadership. On the contrary, presidential leadership remains at a
premium:
We shall, of course, need a strengthened and effective
presidency. We shall, of course, need brilliant,
talented presidents. But we need to deflate the notion
that presidents can provide all or even the major amount
of our national leadership . 92
Hence, Cronin urges people to take the political initiative, looking
less to Washington for solutions to problems. He proposes that a
balance be struck between presidential leadership and citizen activity,
lowering our expectations of the former and raising our faith in the
later.
The work of Theodore Lowi , the last restrictivist thinker I will
discuss
,
has a close affinity to the ideas of both Schlesinger and
Cronin. Like Cronin, he fears that public expectations of the president
have surpassed by far any reasonable chance of being met. And like
Schlesinger, he senses that the entire political system is out of
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balance, weighted too heavily toward the president. Indeed, he argues
that the combination of these factors actually has changed the very
nature of the American political system, nearly creating as a general
condition what Schlesinger saw as only a dangerous possibility under
Nixon -- a plebiscitary republic, led by a plebiscitary president.
"Already we have a virtual cult of personality revolving around the
White House," he observes darkly in the preface of his 1985 text The
Personal President
. The book traces the rise of the personal
presidency, assesses its impact on political life, and offers a way to
overcome the "inherent pathologies" it has created. And as a recent
publication it provides an indication of where the restrictivist
perspective might be heading as its proponents look to analyze the
office in the 1980's and beyond.
Lowi contends that the dramatic expansion in the powers of the
presidency since the New Deal cemented a connection between big
government, strong presidents and democracy. The connection is
tantamount to a "redefinition of democratic theory with the presidency
at its core." President-centered politics created an entirely new
social contract whereby the president provides services to the people
while the people, in return, identify directly with their leader. "This
is the personal presidency," Lowi explains, "an office of tremendous
personal power drawn from the people -- directly and through Congress
and the Supreme Court -- and based on the new democratic theory that the
presidency with all powers is the necessary condition for governing a
large, democratic nation."’' 3 But the personal presidency carries high
costs, for it breeds frustration by its nature. Unavoidable barriers
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prevent presidents from making good on all their promises to the
electorate, yet to the extent that they fulfill any of them,
expectations climb even higher. Presidents are left trying to fashion
the appearance of success. The outcome is a no-win situation, much like
what Cronin delineated. "The harder presidents try to please their mass
constituency, the more alienated that constituency becomes," according
to Lowi
,
and the situation arises regardless of who holds office. 94
It was not always like this in American politics. Throughout what
Lowi terms the "traditional system," from 1800 to 1933, Congress reigned
as the dominant national institution. Patronage handed out by
congressmen and committees was the glue that held everything together,
as policies were framed to provide resources for distribution to
clients. In this "patronage state" the president was of secondary
importance. The patronage state went into decline by the late
nineteenth century, though, as public pressure for government action
mounted, first in the state capitals but eventually in Washington. It
was moribund by the arrival of the New Deal. And since FDR's time
"every president has been exceptional, as compared to presidents under
the traditional system." Roosevelt did not give up the patronage
state, however. Rather he added to it what Lowi calls the "regulatory
state" and the "redistributive [welfare] state," whose new functions
"finally brought the national government into a directly coercive
relationship with the people." A new criterion for judging the success
-- even the legitimacy -- of government was established as the ability
to deliver services became a test of government effectiveness.** With
the president supplanting Congress as the central institution of the
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ever-expanding federal government, a new sense emerged that "the
president is the government."
Roosevelt s adept use of the available communication technologies
of the time helped ossify this revolutionary attitude. Lowi sums up his
legacy in the concept of the plebiscitary presidency, indicating that
FDR achieved his goals through "direct mass political methods." It was
not novel for presidents to assume such great power. Schlesinger, for
example, amply documents the accretion of power to the chief executive
in wartime. What was new was the combination of national security and
economic security as a dual rationale for a sustained government
presence. In the absence of vibrant political parties -- manifested by
the spread of split-ticket voting, the rise of the independent voter,
and the like -- the presidency seeks to carve out its own personal,
independent constituency which further weakens the party structure. The
public, for its part, vigilantly watches the executive branch to see
that agencies come through with the promised services. Lowi offers this
observation on what he terms the resulting "Republic of Service
Delivery"
:
CSlince the president has become the embodiment of gov-
ernment, it seems perfectly normal for millions upon
millions of Americans to concentrate their hopes and
fears directly and personally upon him. It is no
wonder that the United States has developed such a
tremendous stake in the "personal president" and his
personal capacity to govern.
The proliferation of presidential primaries has augmented the
focus of the political system on the chief executive. With party
leaders a marginal player at best, candidates individually compete to
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amass delegates who really have nothing in common with either the
candidate or each other, save tor their pledge ot support. The base of
support that comes out ot this process bears little resemblence to a
genuine coalition. Lowi compares it to a "flux," a word used in physics
to describe independent, unrelated particles revolving around a
temporary center ot gravity. The plebiscitary president is not actually
"made," however, until atter the primaries, during the campaign when
television exposure magnifies the politician's persona and shapes the
presidential mystique. The specialness of people deemed worthy of the
office comes to the fore at this time. Celebrity status and isolation
(the candidates increasingly want to appear to be "above" party, managed
by their personal campaign organizations) coalesce to form the
presidential personality, which Lowi sees as "a combination of Jesus
Christ and the Statue of Liberty: Bring m^ your burdens. Bring me your
hopes and fears. Bring me_ your search for sal vati on . "
*
7
Once such demigods reach the White House Lowi finds they all
behave essentially the same way. This is not to say that presidents all
have the same psychologicl composition. Obviously their characters
cannot be identical. But Lowi marvels at the surprising degree of
regularity in their behavior despite character divergence. The
continuities are institutionally reinforced. All presidents strive to
keep the programmatic intiative, and further, to restrict it as much as
possible to the White House proper, as opposed to the larger cabinet.
Thus it is common to hear about "the president's program, the
president's budget, the president's administrative initiative"
-- again,
personalizing and centralizing the responsibility for government. Lowi
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posits that the resulting dynamic sets up job demands and public
expectations which are "pathological, paranoid, and perverse." He adds:
The president is the Wizard of Qz. Appearances
become everything....
The more the president holds to the initiative
and keeps it personal, the more he reinforces the
mythology that there actually exists in the White
House a "capacity to govern." 98
It is precisely this capacity to govern that Lowi thinks has been
drained from the political system by the onset of the plebiscitary
presidency. The loss affects both domestic and foreign policy.
Domestically, the presidency is based on the assumptions of liberalism.
Liberal presidents want to expand the scope of government intervention.
Increasingly, though, Lowi sees liberalism as an unrestrained set of
values, a philosophy unable to establish priorites among competing
claims for government programs and thus, unable to say no to any groups
seeking support. Such indiscriminant expansion of government has
influenced — captured, actually — the presidencies of avowed
conservatives as well as liberals. Hence we have the example of Nixon,
the hard-nosed Republican, presiding over the growth of a host of
regulatory programs. Likewise, Lowi places the even more conservative
Reagan in the same category, calling his espoused desire to get the
government off the backs of the people "completely phony." On this
reading, all Reagan has done is shift the priorities of the government
from social spending to defense expenditures. "Reagan has done nothing
to alter the liberal presidency," according to Lowi. "In fact he has
embraced and confirmed it. He has in fact been as carte blanche as the
liberals....'"99
81
As -for foreign policy, Lowi identifies several "syndromes"
afflicting presidents regardless of their political stripe. The "star
syndrome" compels the White House to resist most resolutely any sharing
of foreign policy initiatives. Similarly, presidents succumb to the
" ant i -d i p 1 omacy syndrome," relying heavily — and in crisis situations
almost exclusively -- on the Secretary of State, special assistants for
national security or special envoys, at the expense of developing an
independent professional foreign service trained in diplomacy. Most
importantly, presidents face "the oversell syndrome" (lying in state).
They simplify and dramatize appeals to international challenges they
perceive, overselling every threat and always finding "a commie in the
woodpile." The danger here is that if proclamations of threats mount,
the president may end up locked into a position where, because "results"
are expected, military escalation is the only course of action.
When weighing the costs and benefits of the plebiscitary
presidency in foreign and domestic policy, Lowi turns up mainly costs.
The expectations placed on the president virtually guarantee the
cultivation of deceit. Moreover, since the presidency and the state are
viewed as essentially synonymous, any opposition to the president's will
can be construed as to some extent unpatriotic. To remedy the
situation, Lowi concludes with an appeal to restore the balance between
the president and other institutions -- particularly Congress and
parties. Restoring the balance would bring the presidency back down to
earthly dimensions, an absolute necessity as far as Lowi is concerned.
Interestingly, Lowi does not share Schl esi nger ' s optimism that Watergate
stimulated a fundamental move toward this end. Watergate did not
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cleanse the political system; it did not teach us lessons about the
ultimate workability of the constitution. On the contrary,
[Nlo substantial direct lesson can be learned •from
Watergate except not to engage in illegal activities
or be caught doing so. ...In every respect other than
the extent of illegal activities, there is a Watergate
of some kind everyday in the life of a president
.
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Lowi faults Schlesinger for emphasizing the personal dimemsion of
Watergate and the imperial presidency. He rejects the view of Nixon as
"aberrant, illogical, or psychopathol ogical . “ Personal usurpation of
power was not the issue. In fact he thinks Nixon was operating in a
"consistent, logical, and normal" manner under the plebiscitary
assumptions of the office. Those assumptions hold that the president is
state personified, that the powers of the office should match its
crushing responsibilities, that the president should not be bound by
normal legal restrictions when the state is at risk, and that opponents
of the president are disloyal. Acting on these assumptions, Lowi
writes, "then his [Nixon's] actions, including his crimes, are entirely
consistent and rational, quite possibly motivated by the highest sense
of public interest." Lowi is not being soft on Nixonism. But he is
trying to foster appreciation of the fact that the modern plebiscitary
presidency must routinely cope with enormous, unrealistic pressures from
many quarters, including "the greatest source of everyday pressure on
the presidency -- not the Soviet Union, not world leadership, but the
American people and their expectations ." 101
Dealing with these expectations requires reform and Lowi proposes
such measures. First, though, he dismisses as inadequate the War Powers
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Resolution of 1973, the Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, and
several older plans such as the proposal for one six-year term and a
presidential cabinet. Real reform, as he sees it, requires the
establishment of a responsible multiparty system. Enumerating nine
myths about the existing two party system, he contends that "nothing
about the present American party system warrants the respect it
receives." 102 Enacting changes which would facilitate a multiparty
system (he thinks the most workable number would be three) would have a
number of advantages, most notably reviving parties as meaningful
institutions. This might be accomplished by retaining single-member
districts while changing the requirement for victory from the current
plurality standard to an absolute majority, thereby requiring run-offs
or second elections. His point, however, is not to lay out the
details of a new set of party rules but simply to argue that the
rei nvi gorati on of parties would be a big step toward “building down" the
presidency. Multiple parties, Lowi says, would reduce the need of
parties to appear to be all things to all people. They would be
expected to have a more limited, hence more realistic scope of coverage
which would mean that "presidential candidates would no longer have to
appear omnicompetent."
A multiparty system would give the presidency a base
both in Congress and in a party. It would also bring
the presidency back toward human scale by providing
an adequate, democratic basis for real collective
responsibi 1 ity. 103
Collective responsibility is the key concept here. Restr icti vi st
scholars share a common desire to take some of the burden off the
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president's shoulders by parceling a portion of it out to Congress,
parties and other institutions. It is hoped that this would tame the
tendency toward fixation on the president — whether currently conceived
of as "imperial," "textbook" or "personal."
Lowi's prescription for change seems provocative for its
commitment to creating the space for the institutional airing of
political alternatives ("Why, a couple of the parties might even be
radical!" he exclaims at one point). He assumes, at least implicitly,
that the policy alternatives currently available are in some way
insufficient. But the value of his proposals depends upon a much closer
examination of the reasons whv presidents have so much difficulty
getting things done. What structural forces inhibit the fulfillment of
a president's objectives? How are those objectives decided upon? What
ends
.
if any, are given policy priority and what does this tell us about
the competing interest groups he claims vie for government favor? It is
to such questions — questions largely ignored by expansivist theorists
and given only a surface treatment by r estr i cti vi sts -- that I now turn
my attention.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE STRUCTURE OF THE PRESIDENCY
The life of the nation has grown infinitely
varied. It does not centre now upon questions
of governmental structure or of the distribu-
tion of governmental powers. It centres upon
questions of the very structure and operation
of society itself, of which government is only
the instrument.
-- Woodrow Wilson
The Idea of Structure
Woodrow Wilson's cogent 1912 observation belies his conventional
intent in moving beyond governmental structure. This slice of campaign
rhetoric -- taken from his speeches and subsequently compiled in book
form -- introduces a critique of the rise of monopoly corporations in
the American political economy around the turn of the century. 1 His
attempt to redirect people's attention to the structure underlying the
operation of governmental institutions involved, at times, very harsh
words for the giants of U.S. capitalism, as this classic Progressive Era
indictment of monopoly power shows:
The masters of the government of the United States are
the combined capitalists and manufacturers of the
United States. It is written over every intimate page
of the records of Congress, it is written all through
the history of conferences at the White House, that the
suggestions of economic policy in this country have come
from one source, not from many sources. The benevolent
guardians, the kind-hearted trustees who have taken the
troubles of government off our hands, have become so
conspicuous that almost anybody can write out a list
of them. 2
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But the venom Wilson reserved for big manufacturers, bankers, the great
railroad combinations and other trusts should not, of course, be
mistaken for a general rejection of the business ethos or the basic
structural arrangements of the political economy. He sought to preserve
all of that. What he opposed — what progressives opposed, in word if
not deed, as a movement -- was the pernicious effect of monopoly on
market competition and business opportunities for smaller enterprises.
"I am for big business, and I am against the trusts," he added, drawing
a distinction which reveals the limits of his examination of "the very
structure and operation of society itself." He elaborates on this
distinction in a passage that fetishizes big business:
Big business is no doubt to a large extent necessary
and natural. The development of business upon a great
scale, upon a great scale of cooperation, is inevitable,
and, is probably desirable. But that is a very different
matter from the development of trusts, because the trusts
have not grown. They have been artificially created;
they have been put together, not by natural processes,
but by the will, the deliberate planning will, of men
who were more powerful than their neighbors in the
business world . . .
.
3
Big business is natural, even organic; trusts are a contrived impediment
to the natural forces of the market. With this understanding it becomes
clear how Wilson could campaign on a platform calling for "the
emancipation of business" which would usher in "The New Freedom" of
capital, of free enterprise, of individuals' human energies, and still
often have the flavor of a progressive, or even a populist, politician.
For Wilson, then, his focus on the structure of society beneath
the mere governmental structure entailed an essentially conservative
reading of the political economy. He admits as much in an explanation
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o+ what it means to be a "progressive," stating that "if I did not
believe that to be progressive was to preserve the essentials of our
institutions, I for one could not be a progressive ." 4 As a consequence
it can be said that Wilson had a thin notion of structure, or better yet
a shallow notion. Were trusts the lone cause of skewed economic policy
in the halls of Congress and conferences in the White House? Or must
politics in capitalist society necessarily favor the interests of
capital over the interests of others? Would the elimination of monopoly
and concomitant preservation of big business cure "the problem," or
would this simply leave different, perhaps less self-conscious elites as
"the masters of the government?" Did Wilson's version of pr ogr essi vi sm
really look, forward, or was it actually a lapse into a supposedly
pristine past when markets, and the government, were free of coercion
from mammoth combinations of capital?
Obviously many other questions could be posed concerning Wilson's
position. The point, though, is to draw attention to the idea of
including an explicitly structural dimension in one's analysis of
political, economic and social phenomena. And further, to note how
muddled the concept of "structure" can become, even when correctly
treated as something more than simply the way government institutions
are arrayed, as with Wilson. Structural analysis, in short, has not
received adequate attention in the discipline of political science as a
whole, nor in the specific subfield devoted to study of the presidency.
The latter area is notable for its blind spot when it comes to the
structural relationship between the political economy and the chief
executive.
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James MacGregor Burns' writing on the presidency is a case in
point. Burns' role as a leading exponent of the expansivist theory of
the presidency has already been discussed in chapter one. His book
Presidential Government is regarded as one of the very best treatments
of the subject. For Burns, the problems confronting the presidency in
its necessary (in his view) drive for expansion of its purview are
mainly structural in nature. This point was forcefully argued in his
well-known work The Deadlock of Democracy , and has been renewed in his
recent book The Power to Lead: The Crisis of the American Presidency
.
The basic premise of the latter text is that presidential leadership
(and leadership at other levels as well) today faces a severe crisis.
"The roots of the crisis lie in structural problems that have been noted
since the start of the system two hundred years ago," he contends. "The
symptoms of the crisis take the long-observed form of political
disarray, institutional stalemate, and governmental ineptitude and
i mpotence. " a
This is familiar turf for Burns. He is redeploying his argument
that the constitutional system of divided powers inherited from the
framers makes unified, programmatic government a rarity in the U.S., and
that the solution to this dilemma requires consideration of a more
parliamentary-style reshaping of power to render centripetal the forces
that currently pull apart governmental authority. In particular, often-
antagonistic relations between the executive and legislative branches
must be harmonized, while concurrently reviving the role of political
parties as vital centers of debate and disciplined action. The problem
"structural" for Burns in the sense that itfor the presidency thus is
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is embedded in the very structure of institutions either erected in the
Constitution or flowing out of the founding period. He refers to those
advocating a wholesale adoption of a parliamentary system in the U.S. as
structuralists. And he terms his own more modest version of
strengthened parties, collective leadership and constitutional reform
"gradual structuralist."*
To be sure, there is nothing wrong per se with probing the
institutional machinery of government for flaws and speculating on how
to remedy them. Burns has made a lifetime of valuable contributions to
our appreciation of the high price paid for the fragmented allocation of
constitutional powers. Whatever political direction one would like the
nation to take -- and Burns clearly favors Democratic presidents
(supported by principled parties) advancing a liberal agenda -- an
understanding of how and why institutions function the way they do
obviously enhances the prospects of beginning the journey. Where Burns
comes up short is in his preoccupation with government structures. For
him, analysis of the president (or any other component of politics) is
confined to an understanding of institutional structure and proceses,
and the constitutional theory undergirding them. Such a focus is too
exclusive, the examination too shallow. The equation of structure with
political institutions leaves uncovered myriad issues of fundamental
importance to making sense of the presidency. It neglects the fact that
the office itself is situated within a deeper structure of power and
privilege which shapes and constrains those who occupy it, regardless of
whether or not the president operates in greater, or lesser, cooperation
with Congress. Questions addressed by the structure-as-institutions
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perspective certainly are not unimportant. They simply do not confront
a host of alternative questions that shed light of a different hue on
the office.
Burns, it should be noted, is not alone in his treatment of the
presidency as comprehensible through an exploration of government
structures. Political science generally has not had an easy time
figuring out how to study the office, or how to theorize about it . 7
When the discipline has thought in terms of structure it has done so
almost exclusively in terms consonant with those of Burns. So, for
instance, we get books devoted to the crisis in American politics that
explore the "structural matters" and contemplate "structural change,"
with "structure" referring to the institutional division between the
president and Congress . 9 Proposals for constitutional reforms to unify
divided government typically flow from such studies. Similarly, we get
surveys of research approaches which cite various perspectives on the
office — empirical, legal-constitutional, psychological and
institutional are common ones -- with structural concerns discussed as a
variant of the institutional orientation .'7 Or, we see responses to the
growing cry to make presidency research more empirically grounded, which
designate "structural variables" as elements describing the
constitutional composition of different political systems (in the case
of comparative studies), such as type of executive, party systems, power
of dissolution, re-eligibility for office, and the like .
10
Again, the importance of these issues is not in question. All of
them can be useful in furthering our understanding of the office.
However they stop short of locating it within a broader and deeper
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setting of the political economy and the social and ideological
structures within which institutions operate. They tend, almost
uniformly, to offer atheoreti cal
,
descriptive accounts of political
mechanics. Such limitations are evident, as well, in the major works of
those theorists discussed in chapter one as representing expansivist and
r es t r i c t i v i s t schools of thought. This is the case even though some of
them implicitly, and at times even explicitly, display a Wilsonian
regard for the force of a structure beneath government institutions.
Harold Laski illustrates the problem nicely. As noted in the
first chapter
,
Laski includes some elements of a broader structural
analysis in his book on the presidency. He refers to the need of chief
executives to maintain the confidence of the business community, and
sees political parties as captured by properied interests. Both of
these insights suggest a structure of economic power more fundamental
than the office itself. But the points remain on the level of
suggestion. They are sprinkled throughout his work, never fused into
anything approaching a coherent argument. His most critical insights
thus trail off into vagarity while the president appears as someone able
to transcend whatever obstacles to effective action emerge. The
potential for a more meaningful structural analysis is lost, curiously
abandoned. For such potential to be realized, Laski would need to face
squarely the implications of business power. The structural approach I
am advocating would ask Laski whether the president is in fact compelled
to value the interests of business above all others, how such compulsion
actually manifests itself, and what this implies about the quality of
democracy in the U.S.
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Much the same may be said of Clinton Rossiter's work. An
expansivist like Laski, Rossiter is most comfortable simply enumerating
and celebrating the chief executive's diversity of roles, a job he does
very well. Yet even he alludes to real structural constraints. His
repeated references to "private liberty and public morality" as
restraining a president's course of action imply, but do not explore,
substantive limits placed on the office by public opinion. Moreover,
his famous metaphor of the president as "a kind of magnificent lion"
also includes boundaries to presidential roaming, since the chief
executive is warned against trying to "break, loose from his broad
reservation." The nature of this reservation, though, is left
unexamined, perhaps because Rossiter assumes it as a given, an
unassailable truth. But whatever the reason, precisely at the point
where thin notions of structure draw away from inquiry -- where
cherished commitments to "free enterprise" or conventional defenses of
America's national interests abroad are asserted -- deeper structural
analysis forges ahead.
Arthur Schl esi nger ' s restrictivist critique of the imperial
presidency runs into a similar problem of depth. One cannot help but be
impressed with the scope of Schl esi nger s genealogy of presidential-
congressional relations in foreign affairs. His grasp of the
constitutional issues involved in the changing cycles of executive and
legislative balance of power is impressive. But for all the depth he
incorporates into his account of presidential usurpation of power, he
forecloses a host of other questions that penetrate more deeply into the
dynamics of the office. The rationale behind American foreign policy,
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in general and specifically in Southeast Asia; the economic, political
and ideological dimensions to traditional definitions of U.S. "national
security concerns; the authenticity of frequent postwar invocations of
the threat of communism; the morality of U.S. behavior in Vietnam, and
at home in defense of that behavior abroad -- such issues are not
addressed, and in some cases are dismissed, in Schl esi nger ' s elucidation
of the imperial presidency. All complex, deeply troubling questions are
reduced to their singular effect on the central (for Schlesinger) issue
at stake, the constitutional balance of power between the White House
and Congress. The causes of the imperial president thus boil down to
congressional timidity in the face of challenges to its institutional
integrity, or trail off into accounts of Nixon's psychology. Such a
theoretical strategy reinforces conventional foreign policy assumptions
and doctrines by confining analysis to tactical, in this instance
institutional, questions. And it assumes -- wrongly, on a structural
reading -- that a more active, resistent Congress would have made
national security judgments based on criteria different from those of
the aberrant Nixon. Left unexamined, such an assumption is a
particularly weak, peg on which to hang a theory of the presidency.
The proclivity of expansivist and restrictivist theorists to
either ignore outright, or mention in passing without investigating in
depth, structural questions that implicate the office in an ensemble of
political, economic and social relations should be clear at this point.
We need only think of Thomas Cronin's observation near the end of his
The State of the Presidency:
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The reality is that all too often on the long road
to the White House our sometime-to-be-presidents become
the servants of what is, rather than the visionary
shapers of what could be. In the long process of work-
ing their way up and learning to operate within the
system they become rewarded for playing along with the
dominant interests and for playing within the tradi-
tional rules of the game. 11
These pregnant sentences hold out the promise of, but do not in fact
reflect, an analysis of the presidency that fully considers structural
issues beyond governmental institutions, even though Cronin skillfully
exposes many myths surrounding the office, and even though he does make
mention of some "extr agover nmental pressures" that influence the
president's policy agenda. In sum, structural concerns are not wholly
absent in mainstream theories of the presidency. They simply are so
marginal, so underdeveloped, that they appear only as afterthoughts, not
meriting close elaboration.
A brief example will help illuminate the difference between
mainstream approaches to the presidency and an approach that puts
structural concerns at the forefront. Consider President Ronald
Reagan's decision to seek $100 million in lethal aid to the rebels (the
contras) attempting to overthrow the Sandinista government in Nicaragua,
part of his ceaseless six-year campaign to oust a regime he views as a
great menace to U.S. national security. Spanning the spring and summer
of 1986
,
this initiative received considerable coverage in the media and
involved Congress actively as the body whose approval of the money was
needed to complete the program. What, if anything, can we learn about
the presidency from this one presidential initiative? Expansivist and
restr i cti vi st theories probably would draw fairly similar lessons.
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Rossiter's orientation would direct our attention to Reagan's role
as chief legislator, guiding Congress in its lawmaking duties. Or, he
might point to the aid package as a manifestation of the president's job
as commander-in-chief, developing our military strategy. Similarly, he
might see Reagan wearing his "hat" as world leader, warning the western
world of the dangers of communism encroaching into our territory and
threatening our freedom. His framework would be very congenial to the
Reagan program since its ostensible goal is to protect the liberty and
assert the morality of U.S. objectives. If he dissented at all it would
be because of the Reagan administration's decision to ignore the World
Court's ruling against the U.S. mining of Nicaraguan harbors, thus
flouting the rule of law which Rossiter cherishes highly in his work.
But this does not bear directly on the aid question, and Rossiter might
well support the administration against the Court anyway, since its
legitimacy has been denied by U.S. officials.
Neustadt's expansivist analysis would focus on the tremendous
persuasive ability of the president. As he has so often during his
first and second terms, Reagan deftly exercised his power to persuade
within the Washington community (though his success in the public at
large is more questionable), winning support for the military funds,
after much debate, in both the House and the Senate. His victory
reconfirmed his professional reputation as "the great communicator."
Neustadt might ponder why it is President Reagan seemingly always wins
his case on issues related to Nicaragua (or Central America in general),
and accordingly might study his information-gathering systems within the
executive branch, his personal power drive, his mastery of television as
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a medium of communication, and the like. And most certainly Neustadt
would wonder more generally about Reagan's ability to use Rooseveltian
means to achieve decidedly un-Roosevel ti an ends. Overall, like
Rossiter
,
Neustadt would see Reagan's victory on contra funding as at
least a short-term triumph of the governmental bargaining process led by
a powerful president, although since the ultimate outcome of the U.S.-
sponsored fight against the Sandinistas is in doubt, the "viability" of
administration policy cannot be determined. 12
Restrictivists might consider the contra aid bill as an example of
balanced executive-legislative interaction. Reagan did get his way on
the measure. He did act powerfully to protect his version of the
nation's national security interests. But the bottom line for the
restrictivists would be that the president worked his will in concert
with the coordinate branch of government. Like the expansivists,
restrictivists would have to concede that the process was sound.
Certainly some degree of caution would creep in to their analysis.
Schlesinger and Lowi both might be concerned that President Reagan's
method is highly personal, tending toward plebiscitary in style. Lowi
especially would be likely to voice concern that Reagan had too much
power to set the entire agenda for contra aid, linking approval or
denial of aid to approval or denial of his administration's overall
goals and, indeed, linking approval or denial to congressmen's sense of
patriotism (an aspect of what Lowi calls the "oversell syndrome"). As
an issue of the balance of power between Congress and the White House,
though, restrictivists -- regardless of their personal view of the
contras -- would have to agree that the process was reasonably balanced.
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Congressional opponents had ample opportunity to voice their vociferous
opposition to the program. And supporters succeeded in making the case
that contra aid would help preserve democracy in "our own backyard." A
bipartisan commitment was affirmed.
Given the factors orthodox theories might explore, how would a
truly structural view of the presidency handle this case? First of all,
structural inquiry would put the issue of contra aid in the perspective
of the history of U.S. relations with Nicaragua, noting repeated U.S.
interventions there to assert our will in the name of preserving our
concept of "democracy" and "freedom." It would assess those claims of
preservation against the kind of political, economic and social life
Nicaraguans have had since our involvement there, noting the generally
abysmal level of political freedom and material sustenance gained under
the regimes supported by the U.S. Next, a structural view would examine
the economic context of our historic interaction with Nicaragua, to
locate our relationship with this third world nation within the overall
U.S. strategy toward the world economy. A structural orientation also
would assess the nature and uses of anticommunist appeals to engender a
domestic climate receptive to the goals of U.S. policy, appeals invoked
repeatedly and long before the Sandinistas achieved their victory over
Somoza's forces in 1979. Relatedly, the geopolitical assumptions
corresponding to such appeals would receive attention, especially the
premise of a zero-sum superpower struggle which fuels assertions of the
Soviet threat in Central America. Finally, touching all these concerns
but in a sense rising above them, a structural analysis would open to
question the whole notion of "national security" as used to defend the
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conduct of U.S. policy in relation to the contras. 13 This is the policy
foundation of President Reagan's approach to the issue and, as such,
merits closest scrutiny.
A full accounting of the structural view would, of course, involve
a lengthy development of all these points, contrasted with the mode of
analysis expected in the expansi vist-restrictivist debate. I am not
pretending to undertake such an endeaver here; the second part of this
chapter goes into the structural interpretation in much more detail and
chapters three and four are case studies intended to apply it. What I
would suggest, though, is that having combined these lines of inquiry, a
structural position would conclude that what is remarkable about
President Reagan's handling of the contra aid bill is not so much his
mastery of Congress, or his continued success at drawing from the well
of persuasion. The remarkable aspect is not that he could win approval
of $100 million for rebel forces regarded as murderers, rapists and
thugs — "freedom fighters" in Reagan's parlance of persuasion — by
virtually every respected international human rights monitoring group
and a sizable number of U.S. allies. What i_s_ remarkable is the degree
of continuity between the policies pursued by the Reagan administration
and those pursued by every administration since the mid-nineteenth
century. Presidential consistency of purpose and strategy in regard to
Nicaragua would be the structural insight. And as for the orthodox
concern for the balance of power between the president and Congress, the
crucial point here is how Congress has accepted the values and
assumptions that all president's have had toward Nicaragua, regardless
of whether any given president was more or less plebiscitary in
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character. In the case of contra aid, of particular note is the extent
to which even the most forceful and articulate opponents of the
president 5 position -- Senator John Kerry, (D.- MA) is the best example
-- accepted his basic premises regarding the nature of the Sandinista
regime, their "betrayal" of the revolution and the geopolitical
implications of further Sandinista leadership. 14 in sum, while a
structural reading of contra aid would not dismiss the contributions of
expansivist and restrictivist theories of the presidency, it would give
primacy to other factors and ask a host of different questions.
From the preceding discussion we can distill the elements of a
broader critique of conventional approaches. Specifically, there are
three interrelated deficiencies in the expansi vi st-restr i cti vi st debate.
The first shortcoming of mainstream theories is hyperinstitutional i sm.
The two variants seek to explain government institutions largely by
studying their internal composition, their political-constitutional
dynamic, and the balance of power between them. Often this leads to
analyses that are mainly descriptive in nature, with too little regard
for the importance of what I am calling structural dynamics. 13 Second,
conventional accounts of the presidency stress means over, and almost to
the exclusion of, ends. They view the office i nstr umental 1 y , focusing
on how to make it "work better," instead of investigating the
fundamental reasons why it works the way it does, and subjecting the
goals of the presidency to rigorous inquiry. Such approaches at least
implicitly assume the goals of presidential leadership to be, ipso
facto, beyond question and reconsideration, thus ruling out the
structural possibility that the pursuit of those very ends may produce,
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or contribute to, the profound troubles all analysts see plaguing the
office. Ira Katznelson and Mark Kesselman's comment -- aimed
specifically at Neustadt's thesis on presidential power as the unifying
ingredient of executive authority -- thus seems generally applicable to
the entire debate between expansivist and r estr i cti vi st positions:
In our view, Neustadt is correct in stressing the
need to understand the overall coherence of presidential
activity. Yet he does not specify what ends are served
by the successful exercise of preidential power. Unless
one can supply an answer, the exercise of presidential
power appears meaningless, like a dog chasing its tail . 16
Third, the expansivist-restrictivist spectrum offers an exceedingly
narrow range of debate. A president is located, analytically and
normatively, somewhere between the poles of relative activity and
relative restraint. Such a cramped intellectual space provides little
room for perspectives that question the assumptions upon which previous
theories have rested. Some scholars have noted that the difference
between the two schools is more apparent than real, a shift in emphasis
rather than substance. They are, in fact, two sides of the same coin.
As Bruce Miraff has argued concerning what some call "revisionist"
theories of the presidency, "This supposedly 'revisionist' literature is
soft at the core; despite their disillusionment, most presidential
scholars cannot conceal the fact that they are still in love with the
Presidency ." 17 He adds that since such theories are rooted in an
uncritical analysis of the office, and cling to the illusion of the
president as an historic agent of progressive change, they "will survive
no longer than the arrival of the next liberal in the White House
." 10
Genuinely structural analysis avoids such pitfalls by broadening the
scope of debate currently confining the conventional approaches.
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Structure, the State and the Presidency; The Missing Links
Mainstream political science has been reluctant to acknowledge the
challenge posed to its theoretical enterprise by alternative views of
the presidency. Theorists on occasion will briefly mention a structural
approach. Sometimes such an approach receives a modicum of respect,
albeit while being woefully underdeveloped and inadequately contrasted
with the preponderant mainstream theories. At times a solid structural
contribution is noted, but subsequently ignored in what should be its
most salient capacity as a basic challenge to the reigning orthodoxy
and, further, jettisoned as an avenue warranting future exploration. 1V
But more common is intellectual invisibility. For instance, in his
recent work Lowi -- while perhaps the widest ranging theorist still
operating within the parameters of the debate between the two hegemonic
schools of thought -- employs what he terms an "institutionalist
approach" to the presidency. This approach is in accord with the
conventional structure-as-institutions position within the discipline.
He makes his case for proceeding along institutionalist lines by
asserting its superiority to the other available model, the
"psychology/character approach." 20 The impression he leaves is that
these two approaches exhaust the realm of the possible as far as
studying the office is concerned. Elsewhere I have argued that the
psychological approach, which gained a wide following among presidency
scholars in the early 1970's, fits easily within the expansivist-
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restrictivist range of debate . 21 The point here, though, is simply that
Lowi seems to bar the emergence of truly structural perspectives.
An ironic opening can be found, though, if one looks beyond Lowi's
stated institutionalist framework. For while on the one hand, his work
confirms the widespread, historic invisibility of critical orientations
within the presidency literature, it also supplies some of the matter
out of which a structuralist approach could materialize. In making his
argument that the presidency has grown too personalized, untied from its
traditional institutional moorings, Lowi contends that the American
people have come to hold gargantuan expectations of the office. These
expectations place enormous pressure on the president to solve the
nations's problems. Recognizing this burden, modern presidents quite
logically have sought to claim power commensurate with such awesome
responsibility and in the process have assumed -- regardless of their
political party -- that the office is "tantamount to the state ." 22 This
view of the president as "state personified" raises a number of vital
questions. What is the state? What is the nature of the relationship
between the state and the president? How does the state constrain the
presidency? Can the president influence and shape the state as well?
One could come up with other queries. Interestingly enough, Lowi
pursues none of them. The equation of state and presidential power
evidently raises no important issues beyond those of the institutional
balance of power between the president and Congress. The nexus between
state power, private power and the president remains a dark area. A
structural theory of the presidency throws open this dark area to the
light of critical inquiry. It accepts Lowi's position on the state-
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presidency connection and draws the inference that if the president is
the state personified, then it must embody the goals of the state. The
presidency must marshal its power to pursue ends consonant with state
power. Therefore, theories of the state must be brought to bear on
theories of the presidency. An encounter needs to take place. But
herein lies a problem for conventional theories of the presidency.
Traditional theories of the presidency share a common foundation
(whether acknowledged or not) in the pluralist theory of democracy
.
23
Pluralism holds that the social order is best understood as a collection
of multiple, voluntary interest groups competing over a variety of
policy areas. Through these groups, or acting as individuals through
the use of other democratic freedoms such as elections, representative
institutions, civil liberties and the like, citizens can become involved
in political life. The role of the state is to serve as an umpire, a
neutral referee that sets the ground rules for group conflict and for
the continued vitality of political rights. Beyond the maintenance of a
relatively stable setting for bargaining and compromise, the state has
no specific purpose, no intersts of its own. Democratic government, by
definition, serves the interests of the people. The policy process is
thus viewed as a reasonable approximation of the "public interest";
power is diffuse so that no one group has an undue influence on the
government. For pluralists, then, the nature of the state has not been
the focus of sustained analysis. To find such attention to the state as
an object of inquiry, one must move beyond scholarship wedded to the
concerns of liberal democracy and into the orbit of the Marxist and non
Marxist left . 24
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It is here that we find the state situated in the framework of the
larger social order. The state is not viewed as a neutral judge
presiding over the relatively fair, and immanently open democratic game
of group competition. Rather, the state is intimately involved in
making and protecting what Cronin referred to above (though vaguely,
without any accompanying analysis) as the "rules of the game." These
rules are analogous to understanding the operation of the political
economy, understanding, in short, the articulation of democracy and
capitalism. To have such an understanding, and to give it primacy in
explaining the social order, is to bring a structural perspective to
bear on whatever is being studied. In this case, the presidency is
being explored. But with a structural analysis, the presidency can only
be explained within the broader, more enduring interaction of the
democratic state and the capitalist economy.
Joshua Cohen and Joel Rogers, for example, provide an excellent
account of structural analysis in their book On Democracy . 23 For them,
the workings of American politics cannot be seen as just the outcome of
the exercise of constitutionally-granted political rights, whether by
individuals or groups. Those rights and civil liberties, absolutely
essential to any kind of genuine democracy, are severely limited by the
capitalist context of our "capitalist democracy." As Cohen and Rogers
point out, "the political rights granted to all citizens, workers among
others, are formal or procedural, and not substantive. That is, they do
not take into account in their own form and application the inequalities
in the distribution of resources, characteristic of capitalism, which
decisively affect the exercise of political rights and importantly
limit
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their power of expression. " 2 * Such "resource constraints" give the
owners of capital enormous structural advantages in the gathering of
information about, and the coordination of, their shared interests,
contributing to substantive political and economic ineguality despite
formal political equality of rights.
Moreover, the structure of capitalist democracy encourages people
to seek fulfillment through the satisfaction of short-term material
gain. Such "demand constraints" powerfully encourage calculations of
economic rationality as the normal way of thinking, a logic that
privileges, by necessity, the interests of capital before the interests
of all other groups in society. Because of the inherent link between
the control of investment decisions, production and employment, the
accumulation of private profits must be the condition upon which the
interests of all members of society rest. It is likewise the basis of
capital's power over state policy -- a kind of veto power over public
policy that has come to be known as "capital strike ." 27 The authors
conclude, "Under capitalism, therefore, the welfare of workers remains
structurally secondary to the welfare of capitalists, and the well-being
of workers depends directly on the decisions of capitalists ." 20 And
this condition for national politics has ramifications for the world
arena as well, since the accumulation of capital requires the state to
pursue certain fundamental foreign policy goals. Within this milieu,
then, citizens' motivations, their horizons, are structurally
constrained to the pursuit of short-term material gain, rendering
irrational the demand for longer-term political and economic struggle
against capitalist democracy, or for a system based on other forms of
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human motivation. This is hardly a set of conditions conducive to the
pluralist notion of democracy as the open competition between groups,
involving free and equal citizens.
This digression into the work of Cohen and Rogers is intended to
show how much deeper a notion of structure can be found in critical
accounts of the political economy. The institution of the presidency
only makes sense, on a truly structural reading, if located within the
environment of capitalist democracy, an environment which the state
defends and extends through the exercise of public authority and power.
Theories of the state enrich our comprehension of this environment and,
hence, further our knowledge of the presidency. Generally speaking
there are three approaches to theories of the state that have vied for
preeminence within left scholarship. These can be classified as
instrumentalist, str utur al -f unct i onal i st
,
and social struggle
theories. 2<? Despite their important differences, these approaches do
shade into one another at times. What follows is a brief discussion of
these points of contact and diversion.
Instrumental theories of the state are most often associated with
the work of Ralph Miliband and G. William Domhoff, although both are
heavily indebted to the path-breaking career of C. Wright Mills and his
studies of the "power elite ." 30 The essence of the instrumentalist
perspective can be found in its its explosion of the pluralist paradigm
through a careful detailing of the influence of members of the corporate
capitalist class on the activities of government. Domhoff makes the
case directly:
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Contrary to this pluralist view of power ... there is
a social upper class in the United States that is a ruling
class by virtue of its dominant role in the economy and
government.... C T 3 h i s ruling class is socially cohesive,
has its basis in the large corporations and banks, plays a
major role in shaping the social and political climate,
and dominates the federal government through a variety of
organizations and methods. 31
Instrumentalism holds that the capitalist class dominates state
policy in two ways. On the one hand, members of the ruling class have
inside influence by virtue of the direct participation of class members
in the state apparatus. Class participation hinges on a complex set of
interlocking relationships between members of the corporate community,
the banking sector and the government. 32 The state is, in this sense,
the instrument of corporate capital. On the other hand, the dominant
class has outside influence through a network of policy planning
organizations that shape the range of acceptable thought on the leading
issues of the day. This context of "reasonable" thought is reinforced
by a secondary aspect of outside control, the conferal of large sums of
money to political candidates through the proliferation of business-
related political action committees. 33 In this outside sense, capital
expresses its will through the state.
Instrumentalists do not argue, however, that elite domination of
the state is total. As Domhoff explains, corporate domination means
"the ability of a class or group to set the terms under which other
classes or groups within a social system must operate." 3 * Within these
terms, some social mobility occurs. Non-ruling class people do
occasionally work their way up through the class system, but at the
price of being assimilated into the norms and beliefs of the upper class
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along the way. Domination also does not negate the importance of
interclass and intraclass conflict over state policy. But to the extent
such conflicts exist, they "do not involve challenges to the rules that
create privileges for the upper class and domination by its leadership
group ." 33 It is, in short, conflict within a shared consensus, a
consensus to a significant extent manufactured through class power.
Structural-functionalist theorists consciously defined themselves
in opposition to instrumental theories. Within Marxian thought, a
classic debate occurred between Miliband and Nicos Poulantzas
.
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Poulantzas contended that Miliband placed far too much emphasis on the
social backgound of state members and the direct links beteeen corporate
and state officials. By contrast, he argued, the relationship of the
state to the capitalist class is an objective one.
The relation between the bourgeois class and the State
is an objective relation. This means that if the
function of the State in a determinate social forma-
tion and the interests of the dominant class in this
formation coincide
,
it is by reason of the system it-
self ." 37
He went on to assert that the state serves as a "factor of cohesion" in
a social formation, reproducing the conditions necessary for capital
accumulation. This is the function of the state, a function performed
independent of whether members of corporate capital actually have direct
or indirect influence in government. And he argued further that “the
capitalist State best serves the interests of the capitalist class only
when the members of this class do not participate directly in the State
apparatus, that is to say when the ruling class is not the politically
governing class ." 3B The state, Poulantzas contended, is "relatively
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autonomous from any class or class fraction. It performs its function
of maintaining capitalism and its system of power because objective
structural constraints compel it.
Other stur ctur al -f uncti onal theorists have tried to specify how
and why these structural constraints operate. Fred Block cites two
prime "structural mechanisms" that limit the options of state managers.
Both constraints rely on pressures other than the individual or
collective designs of capitalists. One constraint is the need to
maintain a high level of "business confidence." Governments must do
everything in their power to ensure that businessmen have confidence in
the stability of the country's "general pol itical /economic climate."
Investment decisions of firms, the level of employment and inflation,
tax rates and many other factors are linked to the overall health of the
economy. And it is that health which is essential to the existence of
any regime, since economic decline could spark an accompanying decline
in business confidence and the withdrawal of productive investment.
Without such investment, no government can hope to function from a
position of strength, or even remain in power, for long. Notice that
this threat of "capital strike" does not assume a class conscious elite.
"[T]he chain of events can unfold without any members of the ruling
class consciously deciding to act 'politically' against the regime in
power ... si nee decisions made by individual capitalists according to
their own narrow economic rationality are sufficient to paralyze the
regime. . . . " 3,?
Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis concur with Block's position,
stating the case for capital's "veto power over public policy" this way:
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The power of capital -- its command over state
policy -- thus derives not so much from what it does
but from what it might not do. As in many other
situations, power resides with the party that can
effectively (and without great cost) withdraw re-
sources and thereby inflict large costs on an
opponent
.
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The mobility of capital is at the root of its power. The "freedom to
move" wherever the business climate looks most promising gives capital a
power which labor can approach only under extraordinary circumstances.
Concerning the different nature of capital and labor, and hence, their
different kinds of power, Bowles and Gintis add:
Capital is owned by people and alienable from them; it
can be invested or withdrawn or sent around the world
by nothing more than the touch of a computer keyboard.
Labor is embodied in people. The withdrawal of labor
services from employer requires an alternative source
of income, which workers generally lack.. The withdrawal
of labor from an entire economy requires the costly and
often jarring and politically or culturally obstructed
physical movement of the workers themselves. 41
To return to the second, and secondary, structural constraint noted by
Block, class struggle also impinges on the options of state managers.
Concerted pressure from below can force state managers to expand the
state's role into areas that reduce the hardships of the economy for
various constituencies. Such reforms are most likely to occur in
periods of economic crisis or postwar reconstruction. But as crisis
conditions diminish, the impetus for further changes wanes and what
reforms have been enacted serve, ultimately, to rationalize the system.
This dimension of Block's structural-functionalist argument shows
an affinity with the third approach to state theory, the social struggle
school. Social struggle theories recognize the importance of the
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state's need to secure and maintain business confidence, often referred
to as the accumulation function (promoting the accumulation of
capital). 4 ^ But they also see this functional requirement conflicting
with the need for state policies to be legitimate in the eyes of the
public. If the state favors the interests of capital to the extent that
people no longer can endorse the systemic bias toward business, causing
widespread disaffection — whether overtly-articulated or more implicit
— from the established order, citizen allegiance to state institutions
and goals can weaken . 43 The state therefore walks a fine line. It must
balance its capitalist accumulation function and democratic legitimation
function. This opens up a space for social struggle to have an impact
on the outcome of state decisions. The state at times may be forced to
do things that are dysfunctional to the accumulation process, a point
Bowles and Gintis make to critique the structural -functional i st tendency
to assume the state always reproduces the conditions for capital
accumulation. Bowles and Gintis contend that the relationship between
the capitalist economy and liberal democratic state can best be
understood as "a contradictory rather than a functional totality ." 44
The contradictory nature of this articulation of state and economy
means that the state does more than just respond to crises generated by
capitalism, as str uc tur al -f unct i onal i st assume. It "is integral to the
production of a crisis as well as to its resolution." 4 ® Bowles and
Gintis cite the success of social struggle on many fronts in the postwar
period as forcing the state to make concessions to, among others, the
labor movement — costly concessions that seriously limited the
profitability of capital by increasing the "citizen wage" (socialized
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consumption) and reducing the negative impact of the reserve army effect
on wages. In this way the state helped create the crisis of capitalism
which was manifest in the early 1970's and whose effects are still with
us today. Popular pressure thus must have a place alongside other
factors in explaining the operation of the state. The state helps set,
as well as protect, the "rules of the game" governing liberal democratic
capitalism. And Bowles and Gintis believe that both instrumental and
s t r uc t ur a 1 ~f un c t i on a 1 i s t theories of the state do not appreciate the
fact that those rules can change.
There are important differences in emphasis and particulars
between instrumental, str uctur al -f unct i onal i st and social struggle
theories of the state, and I am in no way trying to resolve them here.
But despite these differences they share a common premise that the basic
structure of capitalism profoundly and inseparably influences democratic
political life. All the elements of these theories -- the class
background of state actors, the role of the policy planning network, the
functional imperative of accumulation, social struggle and the tension
between democracy and capitalism — are vital to what I am broadly
calling structural analysis. While the literature on theories of the
state is large and growing, the number of analysts who have attempted to
use such theories, or elements thereof, to uncover the dynamics of the
presidency is modest by comparison. 46 Two efforts do stand out, though,
as offering a promising structural blend of these scholarly areas. Both
Miroff and Alan Wolfe explicitly examine the specifics of presidential
policy-making to glean insight about the nature of the office. They ask
what presidents have done and why. And in seeking answers they explore
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the relationship between the goals of the presidency and the goals of
the state.
Miroff's study of the Kennedy administration, Pragmatic Illusions ,
debunks the myth of JFK as a progressive chief executive and the larger
myth of the office as a progressive institution in the twentieth
century. Focusing on foreign and domestic policies (the Berlin crisis,
the Cuban missile crisis, the Alliance for Progress, Vietnam, the New
Economics and civil rights), Miroff concludes that Kennedy's tenure was
essentially conservative in character and substance:
Kennedy's presidential record cannot ... sustai n his
reputation as a progressive. Behind the image of the
popular hero lies the reality of service to established
power and established values. 47
Kennedy's leadership style was premised on the liberal belief in
pragmatic, hard-headed adherence to objective facts, free from the taint
of ideology. This illusion of pragmatism, of being above the fray --
reinforced by the veneer of empirical social science so fashionable in
the 1950's and 1960's, and highly touted by the corporate executives
Kennedy brought into top administration positions -- concealed the
thoroughly conventional intent of Kennedy's policy objectives. These
objectives, according to Miroff, in no way departed from the basic, and
politically-laden, goals of liberal ideology, goals all president's must
endorse in their role as the "central figures in the maintenance of
established socioeconomic ar r angements .
"
40
Despite JFK's lofty rhetoric, then, Miroff maintains he held to
the earthly interests of the status quo. Those interests were supported
by the economic and ideological context of the American political
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economy. Within that context, the principle domestic function of the
Kennedy presidency -- and, to extrapolate, all presidencies -- was the
"stabilization of corporate capitalism." Miroff elaborates:
It has not mattered greatly that recent Chief Executives
have been relatively unlearned in economics; the imperatives
of giant corporations who dominate the American economy
impose themselves on the Presidency with a force that
cannot be misunderstood.... The complex partnership between
the White House and the corporate community thus transcends
personalities and party lines . 419
Activity on the foreign policy front complements the stabilization of
domestic corporate power by facilitating an accommodating climate for
international capital. The expansion of U.S. military power and the
concomitant perpetuation of Cold War assumptions about the threat of
communism are crucial features of this objective. Toward this end,
Miroff contends that the president can be much more openly assertive in
style than in the sphere of domestic policy, even though the chief
executive is the most visible national voice on virtually all important
public questions.
What Miroff leaves us with is a picture of the president (Kennedy,
or any other) as the "chief stabilizer" of political and economic order
in the U.S. He probes the structure of power in the U.S. and finds two
major intertwined areas -- the domestic economy and its international,
defense-related equivalent — where the president serves as the dominant
supporter of systemic maintenance .* 0 In contrast to Miroff, Wolfe looks
at successive administrations from FDR onward to discern the underlying
imperatives they faced. His work is at once broader in the sense of
covering more presidents, and broader in the sense of containing a more
123
highly developed account of the phenomena he finds. But in his basic
assertion that "there are only two issues at work in American politics
most of the time: economic growth and military strength," he is in
substantial agreement with Miroff
.
31
Wolfe arrives at this conclusion by tracing the development of
American democracy and the relationship of the presidency to it. Late
eighteenth and early nineteenth century debates about the nature of
democracy -- crystalized in the competing visions of America held by
Jefferson, who favored republican government, and Hamilton, who was an
early advocate of modernist expansion and commerce — were settled at
the turn of the twentieth century. Searching for a means to rationalize
the unsteady growth of capitalism, Progressive Era presidents solidified
the Hamiltonian conception. The impetus for the victory of nationalist
economic expansion was the need to tame the unsteady rhythm of the
industrial economy. The chief tool for the job was a strengthened
presidency at the helm of a state with its reach broadened to an
unprecedented degree. Wolfe posits the presidency as "the major
instrument by means of which modernizing elites have sought to overcome
or remove obstacles to the expansion and revitalization of American
capitalism ." 32 People increasingly put their faith in the institution
of the presidency as the surest available solution to the maladies
facing them.
By the time of FDR and the exigencies of depression, a political
bargain of sorts had been struck between the electorate and the chief
executive. The people got reforms and a measure of security from
uncertainty, while the president got political support for the increased
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purview of the state. "Implicit in the bargain that made the
Rooseveltian formula possible were two conditions," according to Wolfe,
"continuous economic growth at home and persistent U.S. hegemony
abroad ."* 3 The conditions fed into each other. Our national security
and economic security were indissolubly united -- hence the welfare-
warfare state.
Wolfe devotes an entire book to exploring the effect of these twin
postwar imperatives on American political life. He develops the history
of what he terms the "growth coalition," a collection of centrist
liberals (pragmatic to the core) spanning the Truman years through the
end of the Johnson administration. These recycled elites, and the
policy planning organizations with which they were affiliated, fashioned
a strategy whereby hard political choices could be avoided by spreading
the benefits of solid economic performance. Political challenges from
social democrats seeking to expand the welfare state, and free market
conservatives trying to contract or eliminate it, could be circumvented.
For as Wolfe asserts, "instead of making a political choice, America
opted for an economic surrogate ."* 4 Wolfe exaggerates his case here,
for the pursuit of corporate expansion under the umbrella of a worldwide
military presence certainly is_ a choice. It is a choice to endorse the
priorities of business, which in turn had reached an accommodation with
the realities of state intervention into the economy. But his major
point, that growth and empire constituted the primary policy objectives
for postwar presidents seems useful. And it is clear that such goals
appeared to them as largely technical issues, revolving around questions
of means, not ends.
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The price paid for this "Faustian pact" with growth politics was
high. And in Wolfe's account of how differnt administrations dealt with
various policy areas we get a sense of how the fixation on growth as the
basic end of politics subverted anything truly resembling the public
interest. Whether in the case of public housing that essentially tore
down buildings for urban renewal, or health care policy that built
hospitals without improving health care delivery, or foreign aid for
"development" which sacrificed humanitarian concerns for the sake of
economic indicators, growth politics often undermined the very ends it
was purported to achieve. And herein lies Wolfe's larger lesson. The
fact that real domestic economic growth did occur in the postwar period
served to obscure the fact that purported reforms, especially those of
liberal presidents, were conceived in a way that was bound to expose
them as woefully inadequate once growth abated.
Such a scenario did transpire, beginning with Nixon's presidency.
All the circumstances which contributed to the growth of American power
were subject to eventual diminishing returns. In particular, as the
long wave of economic expansion underlying U.S. postwar hegemony came to
an end in the late I960' and early 1970's, the presidency faced mounting
pressure. Presidents accustomed to being a "cheerleader for economic
growth" domestically, and a "cheerleader for American Power"
internationally suddenly had very little to cheer about. As Wolfe
writes: "The American presidency requires economic growth to work; when
economic growth cannot be generated, the presidency cannot work." ss
State crisis and the crisis of the presidency are bound together. And
their collective fortunes are tied to the health of the political
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economy, whose basic needs shape the needs of government. Difficulties
with the generation of growth, and challenges to hegemony, put the
office, and the state, in a bind, leaving the nation at what Wolfe calls
an " i mpasse . 11
Presidents Carter and Reagan both assumed an office under seige
from the conditions sketched above. I now turn my attention to their
presidencies, with the hope that an analytic approach informed by the
work of Miroff, Wolfe and the theorists of the state can offer a richer
account of the institution than that available within conventional
frameworks. What follows are two case studies that probe the structural
dynamics of the central imperatives of economic growth and national
security, as reflected in the presidents' policy toward occupational
safety and health, and the MX missile. Both issues are important in
their own right, potentially affecting the quality of everyone's lives.
But my foremost concern here is to see what these issue areas can teach
us about the nature of the chief executive. To borrow from the
language of empiricism, my case studies thus will serve as something
like “independent variables." Insight into the presidency, and the
forces that constrain it, is what I am after. Hopefully this
examination will extend, deepen and refine the tools of structural
inquiry so as to provide a fuller explanation of the American
presidency. And in so doing I will take seriously what Woodrow Wilson,
at the outset of the chapter, called attention to -- namely, "the very
structure and operation of society itself, of which government is only
the instrument.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE PRESIDENCY AND ECONOMIC GROWTH:
THE CASE OF OSHA UNDER THE CARTER AND REAGAN ADMINISTRATIONS
I think OSHA can be a great program. The concept
is good. I intend to enforce the law rigidly,
but I also hope that we can have an acceptance of
the OSHA program by the business community. But
there would be no backing down on the concept or
the purpose of the law concerning OSHA. I just
want to make sure that it is administered with a
maximum amount of support from labor and of industry.
-- Jimmy Carter 1
My idea of an OSHA would be if government set up
an agency that would do research and study how
things could be improved, and industry could go to
it and say, 'We have a problem here and we seem to
lose more people by accident in this particular
function. Would you come and look at our plant
and then come back and give us a survey of what
should be done?'
-- Ronald Reagan 2
On April 1, 1986 the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA) proposed the stiffest penalty in its 16-year history. The fine
of nearly $1.4 million was assessed against Union Carbide Corporation
for "willful disregard for health and safety" at its Institute, West
Virginia plant. 3 The Labor Department accused the corporation of
widespread "constant, willful, overt violations" of safety and health
laws at the facility which manufactures highly toxic phosgene gas
violations including the customary practice of asking employees to
133
detect the presence of the potentially deadly gas by sniffing the air
after alarms indicate a leak.
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At first glance, it might appear that the imposition of such a
large penalty indicates vigilant enforcement of the nation's safety and
health statute. However, such an appearance would be deceiving. In
reality, under the Reagan administration QSHA has become an anemic
regulatory agency, its feebleness perhaps surpassed only by the soap-
operatically embattled Environmental Protection Agency.
In the case of the fine levied against Union Carbide, for example,
the entire proceeding was handled not by the QSHA director (officially
called an Assistant Secretary of Labor for Occupational Safety and
Health), but by Labor Secretary Bill Brock, along with an interim head
of the agency. The reason: at the time, there was no official
administrator of QSHA, and there had been none for almost a year. OSHA
was awaiting Senate confirmation of its third director in six years,
John A. Pendergrass of the 3M company. 4 His two predecessors had
succeeded in substantially reducing the scope of the agency's standard-
setting and enforcement functions, immersing the already beleaguered
agency into even deeper controversy.
From the very beginning of his presidency, Ronald Reagan made OSHA
a primary recipient of administrative animus and ridicule. His agenda
had as one of its central tenets an assault on social regulations as an
impediment to economic growth. And of all the social regulations he
and the business community -- despised, OSHA was singled out as the most
intrusive, the worst of the worst. As the editors of Business Week put
it. OSHA "touches more individual companies than does any other arm of
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government except the Internal Revenue Service." 3 Business resentment
of that alleged intrusiveness helped elevate "regulatory reform" and
deregulation to a privileged position within the economic policy
debates of the late 1970's and 1980's generally, and to the status of an
eternal verity within the Reagan camp.
Widespread counterattacks against the OSH Act and other social
regulations did not simply commence with the advent of the Reagan years,
however. There were many precursors. The story of the rise of
regulatory retrenchment and the overall rightward shift in economic
policy thus must include an account of the relative positions of
business and labor during the economic tumult of the mid-1970's.
Moreover, and of paramount importance for this project, the Carter
administration's attempt to fight inflation and promote economic growth
in a period of deepening economic crisis must be understood. How these
goals influenced the Carter administration's policy toward occupational
safety and health, the extent to which Carter's tenure laid the
groundwork for the Reagan years, what all of this says about the office
of the presidency -- such issues are the concern of this chapter.
The picture that emerges is one of a contingent presidency
constrained by the imperative of economic growth, one of the twin
imperatives of the office. The dynamic interplay of state power and the
pursuit of a vital economy, as viewed through the lens of OSHA policy,
will provide the substance out of which I will build my case for a
structural approach to the study of the presidency, as discussed in the
preceding chapter. It is my contention that neither of the conventional
orientations to the presidency — the expansivist and restricti vi st
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perspectives -- offer as rich or as revealing an account of the office
as does structural inquiry. Bearing in mind, then, that the structural
approach operates at the intersection of the instrumental, structural-
functional and social struggle components of theories of the state, I
now will focus on the query: how would a structural approach to the
presidency look at the imperative of economic growth as it affects the
Carter and Reagan administrations?
A Brief History of the Occupational Safety and Health Act^
The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 was the child of
political and social struggle. Born amid the domestic turmoil over the
Vietnam War, the "War on Poverty," and the nascent environmental
movement, the OSH Act is most profitably viewed as an outgrowth of a
general climate of enhanced receptivity to governmental reform. This
climate produced not only OSHA, but a host of "new regulatory agencies,"
such as the EPA, the Consumer Product Safety Commission and the National
Highway Transportation Safety Board. The mere existence of the law thus
stands as a testament to the power of structural imperatives to affect
the actions of state actors, particularly the president. The policy
agenda of that era was shaped, in great measure, by the confluence of
social forces advocating an aggressive federal role in the area of
workplace safety and health. Chief among this coalition of forces were
labor unions, rank-and-file agitation, the environmental movement, and
public interest pressure (especially the work of Ralph Nader).
7
Together they kept awareness of a workplace safety and health crisis
and death statistics from the mid-1960's onward, coupledsoaring injury
with rising sensitivity to the incidence of health-related problems
associated with the use of toxic substances -- prominantly in the public
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eye
.
The role of workers merits special note, for it was within a
tradition of struggle that they, sometimes with union support and often
without it, pressed for passage of the OSH Act from 1968-1770. The mine
workers' effort bears greatest notice because it was their determination
to enact basic health and safety reforms that helped galvanize the
national health and safety movement. Their three-week wildcat strike in
the West Virginia coal mines in February, 1969, including a march on the
state capital, following as it did the tragic Farmington, West Virginia
mine explosion which killed 78 miners, provided the impetus for not only
the 1969 Coal Mine Health and Safety Act, but for the OSH Act as well.
Most active among organized labor were the United Steelworkers of
America, the Oil, Chemical and Atomic Worker's Union and the United Mine
Workers. The ensuing union lobbying and public information effort on
behalf of the OSH Act was without precedent in U.S. history.
Within this milieu of ferment, a conservative president such as
Richard Nixon could only hope to channel existing energies in a
direction that might prove beneficial to his political fortunes.
Preventing the passage of a health and safety law was simply out of the
question when he assumed office in 1969. Such a law was, by then, high
on the list of Congressional priorities. And Nixon, it should be
remembered, was the first new president in over a century to win office
without his party controlling at least one house of Congress. His
interest in maintaining his political legitimacy, then, dictated that he
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not oppose the inevitable. Moreover, Nixon was ambivalent about the
legacy of New Deal and Great Sociey programs. While certainly
conservative on many issues, he harbored animosity toward much of big
business and what he considered the "Eastern establishment," and he also
longed to be thought of as a "modern man ." 0 As political scientist
Charles Noble has argued, "Although President Nixon appeared to be an
opponent of the welfare state at the time tof debate over the OSH Act],
his administration oversaw what can only be perceived, in retrospect, as
the second phase of the Great Society.
Nixon's options were further limited by the general lack of a
coherent business strategy to deal with the prospect of an OSH Act . 10
Rather than taking a leading role in crafting a piece of legislation to
suit their needs, businesses of all sizes generally opposed the statute
as unfairly weighted toward supplementing the power of organized labor.
With capital unwilling to accept an expansive role for the Department of
Labor in the health and safety area, they forfeited their chance to
guide the outcome of legislative negotiations. In addition, there was
no leading business organization to champion the cause of reform from
the perspective of "enlightened" capitalists, as the corporate liberal
variant of instrumental theories of the state would posit . 11 Thus, the
task of articulating the prime capitalist response to the law was left
to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, whose shrill, reactionary laissez-faire
rhetoric was out of step with the prevailing ethos of responsible public
policy. Business disorganization left Nixon with no credible group of
industry allies upon which to rest a case for an alternative approach to
the issue.
139
For his part, President Nixon did propose three different versions
of the bill which would have been much more favorable to the interests
of employers than the version which ultimately passed. White House
efforts centered on the strategy of dividing the authority over health
and safety matters so that the Labor Department would not be unduly
strengthened, and keeping provisions of workers' rights to a minimum.
In this sense, the Nixon administration tried to mobilize the state to
perform a coordinative function that business could not pull off
collectively. But his attempts did not bear fruit. A strong version of
the OSH Act finally passed, with the Labor Department obtaining the
standard-setting and enforcement powers most conservatives had feared.
Responding to what his Secretary of Labor termed "a new national
passion, passion for environmental improvement," Nixon signed the
landmark bill on December 29, 1970, hailing it as an example of "the
American system at its best." 12
The bill itself stands as the first comprehensive federal effort
to deal with workplace safety and health. It is far-reaching, even
potentially radical — depending on how it is interpreted and the vigor
of its enforcement — in its provision of a universal right to a safe
and healthful workplace. 13 Intended to "assure safe and healthful
working conditions for working men and women," the act makes it the
"general duty" of every employer to "furnish to each of his employees
employment and a place of employment which are free from recognized
hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious
physical harm to his employees." 14 In the bitterly contested health
area, the law goes as far as saying that in setting health standards
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dealing with toxic materials or other harmful agents, QSHA "shall set
the standard which most adequately assures, to the extent feasible, on
the basis of the best available evidence, that no employee will suffer
material impairment of health or functional capacity even if such
employee has regular exposure to the hazard dealt with by such standard
for the period of his working life." 13
The law establishes a tripartite institutional apparatus to meet
its goals. QSHA, located in the Labor Department, promulgates rules,
sets safety and health standards, and oversees enforcement. It is the
organization that has the most power and has drawn the most criticism.
Its research arm is the National Institute for Occupational Safety and
Health (NIQSH)
,
located in the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare (now called Health and Human Services). The third body, the
independent Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (OSHRC),
adjudicates all disputed enforcement actions. The law also provides for
a vast expansion of employee rights, including the right to participate
in workplace inspections and standard setting, and the right to have
access to information about potential safety and health dangers.
Writing more than a dozen years removed from the heady days of
regulatory explosion, Herbert Stein, chairman of Nixon's Council of
Economic Advisers from 1972-74, views the passage of the act as an
example of governmental excess. He attributes the administration's
inability to moderate the scope and expense of such social regulations
to the momentum of "a tide of Congressional demagoguery and
sentimentality plus bureaucratic zeal," contending that "the juggernaut
of environmental regulation proved not to be controllable by the Nixon
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administration. 11 16 His words implicitly attest to the power of social
movements to pressure the state for concessions on important issues.
Nixon surely was constrained in many ways. But he also used passage of
the act to help his chances of siphoning off the support of labor unions
and workers from its traditional home in the Democratic party. This
blue-collar affiliation with the Democrats was viewed by some analysts
at the time as soft, and Nixon quite consciously set out to include
workers, considered to be conservative on may social issues, within his
"silent majority." Therefore, the OSH Act had a positive political side
for the president; it was not simply a grudging concession to popular
pressure.
Moreover, no one, least of all Richard Nixon, foresaw the economic
crisis of 1973-75 on the horizon. In 1970, concern for the overall
health of the U.S. economy was not nearly as salient as other social and
foreign policy issues. The public and politicians generally assumed the
economy could support additional regulatory measures. The argument that
social regulation constitutes a substantial impediment to economic
growth did not serve as a major organizing tool of QSHA opponents. All
of this changed, of course, as the economy experienced sustained
downturn, the recession of 1974-75, and the onset of the previously
unheard of phenomenon of stagflation. 17 As the unprecedented long wave
of postwar expansion came to a rather abrupt halt -- dramatized by the
oil price shock, but manifested in numerous other developments of lesser
visibility -- government and corporate leaders began to rethink the
issue of social regulation. The perspective that emerged reflected the
roughly mid-decade shift to the right in the balance of political
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forces. 1 " Corporate capital and policy planning organizations initiated
a campaign to fight excessive social regulation as a costly, burdensome,
irrational way to achieve public policy goals. Calls for "deregulation"
have proliferated during the last decade. Economic decline thus
afforded big business the opportunity to mount the kind of coherent
attack on social regulation that it lacked from 1968-70.
Here a digression is needed to note the important distinction
between two kinds of activities that are often placed together in the
category "government regulation:" economic and social regulations. 1 '7
Economic regulation involves an attempt by the state to stabilize market
conditions within a given industry. Most such efforts to rationalize
market behavior -- through regulation of prices, rationalization of
competiton between firms, reduction of risk and the creation of a more
predictable market environment -- occured before the 1970's. The
interstate Commerce Commission of 1887, the first such agency, was a
regulatory program aimed at the railroad industry. The Civil
Aeronautics Board, the Federal Communications Commission and regulation
of the airline and banking industries are all examples of economic
regulation. Often such market-smoothing measures were welcomed by, if
not substantially written by, businessmen. In the context of economic
regulation, then, the call for deregulation means either partial
reduction, complete withdrawal, or rewriting of government regulatory
activity. 20 Often the "regulated" industry will oppose deregulation
becasue it will hurt the market position of its leading firms by
increasing competition.
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Social regulation, by comparison, seeks to alter the non-market
behavior of corporations, notably to correct for market failures or
externalities" of production, such as air or water pollution, or unsafe
working conditions. Unlike economic regulations, social regulations cut
across industry lines, restricting the freedom of large numbers of
different businesses to injure third parties (workers and consumers, for
example). They grew out of a sense of fairness and justice, to achieve
social objectives. Here government is involved in the production
process itself, affecting a firm's production and investment decisions.
Such regulations invade the terrain of the capitalist firm and are
widely seen by companies as an unwarranted invasion of privacy. In the
context of social regulation, although the call for "deregualtion" is
heard, the more commom charge is regulatory excess or overr equl ati on
.
Virtually no one would publically advocate the elimination of EPA or
OSHA. But the claim that government has overr egul ated in these areas is
common, to both political parties and to both liberals or conservatives.
And strategies for reducing the alleged inflationary impact of social
regulations — which could be termed "social deregulation" or, more
humorously "de-overregulation -- are now routinely received with favor
by businessmen and politicians . 21
Within the overr egul ati on thesis, the cost of social regulations
has become a convenient scapegoat for the overall decline in the
performance of the economy. The cost of regulation as a major obstacle
to economic growth is, at best, a spurious claim, which will be examined
in greater detail later. A more likely cause of the intense hostility
of business toward social regulations -- and especially toward OSHA
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lies in their nature as intrusions into property rights, their violation
of the inner sanctum of business. 22 Economic crisis provided the
condition for corporate capital to make OSHA a lightning rod for
opposition to the whole array of social regulations enacted in the early
1970's. OSHA unified corporate thinking on this issue, helping to
undermine, within changed economic circumstances, the basis of its
support from the state. And because so much else had changed by mid-
decade -- organized labor, for example, has not won a significant
legislative victory in the U. S. since the OSH Act -- OSHA policy
retrenchment became the order of the day. The constraints on the state
had shifted aver time from being primarily generated by the need to
respond to social struggle, to being preoccupied with the functional
provision of economic growth. Into this radically altered climate of
economic uncertainty, corporate mobilization and labor defensiveness
stepped Jimmy Carter.
The Carter Presidency: The Internal Tension
From the beginning of his presidency, Carter was of two minds on
the issue of occupational safety and health regulations. On the one
hand, he carried with him a desire to retain some degree of the
traditional Democratic attachment to the concerns of organized labor.
This included a commitment to enforcing the QSHA statute. As he
remarked to a gathering of Labor Department employees in the first weeks
of his administration:
I think that of all the beneficial legislation that
has been passed by the Congress in recent years, the one
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that has the best prospect of Improving the lives of
American workers and the one that had the most adverse
acceptance has been the OSHA program. 23
He went on to praise OSHA as "a great program."
On the other hand, having inherited an economy in trouble from a
long-term growth standpoint, he wanted to please the business community
and, in particular, allay their fears about the threat of inflation. In
the early months of his term, Carter's remarks also reveal his
ambivalence toward OSHA. "We need to have, though, some sensitive
approach at the delivery end of the OSHA program," he continued in his
talk cited above, stressing the need for "a minimum number of
regulations" and a "maximum amount of common sense." 24 A few months
later he decried as "unnecessary and burdensome" OSHA safety regulations
implemented over the preceding seven years, saying that the agency would
now "develop and enforce effective standards for occupational health
without repeating the excesses of the past." 23 Controlling OSHA's
regulatory excesses surfaced again as a theme in July of 1977 at a
public meeting in Yazoo City, Mississippi, where he assured small
businessmen that while the OSH Act is "a good piece of legislation,"
enforcement has at times gotten too fiesty. "It's important that in the
working places we protect the health and safety of employees," he
asserted, "but the OSHA program is going to extremes." 26 He illustrated
the extremes with a story about overly detailed OSHA safety regulations
for ladders and stools, concluding that the federal government ought to
withdraw from such details and focus on the provision of occupational
health. The president's early ambivalence toward OSHA would only
increase as his presidency encountered mounting economic pressures.
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In his attempt to reconcile these competing concerns Carter
pursued a strategy of centralizing the regulatory process within the
executive branch, where his economic advisers heavily influenced the
regulatory process. This approach led to the formation of two distinct
camps within the White House on questions of QSHA regulations. And
these camps periodically warred over occupational safety and health
policy decisions. 27 The internal administrative tension was played out
between what I will call the economic technocrats and the OSHA
supporters
. Briefly put, the economic technocrats included members of
such groups as the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA)
,
the Council on
Wage and Price Stability (CWPS)
,
and the Office of Management and Budget
(0MB), along with their informal working group known a the Regulatory
Analysis Review Group (RARG). Greater regulatory cost-effectiveness was
the goal of these agencies charged with assisting in the White House
review process of regulatory oversight. In order to rationalize health
and safety regulations, emphasis was placed on economic incentives for
safety regulations, and increasing use of cost-benefit analysis as a
general guide for health standard-setting.
OSHA supporters within the administration, on the other hand,
included the Secretary of Labor and Carter's OSHA director, Eula
Bingham. This alliance contended that the OSH Act does not call for
cost-benefit analysis of any type and resolutely defended OSHA
regulations, existing and proposed, against its use. Bingham, in
particular, pushed for stronger standards, especially for occupational
health, her field of expertise. As for safety, OSHA supported vigorous
enforcement practices through such measures as more accident inspections
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of workplaces (both initial as well as follow-up inspections), greater
fines for violations, and the like. However, in a concession to the
economic technocrats, and to common sense, OSHA did eliminate about a
thousand of the nitpicking safety standards for which it had been chided
by business groups since its inception.
The internal discord between these two camps commenced in the
spring of 1977 and continued throughout Carter's term. Before examining
this tension in detail, though, some background on the debate over OSHA
safety standards will help put the issue in perspective. The crux of
the debate over occupational safety issues is a disagreement between
those who favor the enforcement of safety standards and those stressing
the use of an injury tax approach to economic rationality. This
disagreement turns on the question of whether safety regulations or the
unfettered market is best able to prevent disabling or deadly accidents.
In 1971 OSHA adopted en masse some 4,400 existing "national
consensus standards" set by the American National Standards Institute.
Previously viewed as merely a nuisance, incorporation into the OSH Act
as "the word" on safety gave the ANSI standards enhanced visibility and
importance. QSHA's critics did not hesitate to make an issue of the
frivolous nature of some of these safety rules. 20 It is, after all,
tempting to ridicule the 140-odd regulations pertaining to wood step
ladders or specifications for the shape of toilet seats as needless
government nitpicking. In defense of OSHA it can be said that the ANSI
standards appeared to be an efficient, quick way for the agency to make
its mark. Unnecessary standards could be weeded out later and more
relevant safety rules could be promulgated as needed. Perhaps more
148
important, though, was the political mileage QSHA derived from meeting
organized labor s desire to actively involve safety inspectors to get
tough with companies that fail to comply with baseline regulations.
The problem with the enforcement of safety standards has been that
this approach has failed to significantly affect the industrial injury
and death rate. Indeed, in OSHA's first few years of operation, the
national job injury and death statistics actually rose, and it is
difficult to find a correlation between OSHA's enforcement activities
and changes in the injury statistics. 2,y Labor's evaluation of 0SHA“s
impact centered on the agency's lack of adequate numbers of inspectors
and the low level of fines levied. This interpretation has some
plausibility given that through 1975 QSHA had so few inspectors that the
average employer could expect to see one every 66 years, and the average
fine was only $25 per violation. 30 The deterrent effect of such meager
efforts would appear minimal, and both the probability of inspection and
size of fines has not risen appreciably. Recognizing such limits on
OSHA's resources, supporters of safety standards have either pushed for
higher budgets to finance more inspectors issuing stiffer penalties or,
more commonly, advocated that the agency target its efforts on accident
inspections and on "general schedule" (ie. routine) inspections in high
injury rate workplaces. This strategy is not without problems, however,
for it still must ensure that fines are high enough to deter dangerous
workplace organization and practices. Likewise, provision must be made
to prevent employers from understating their injury statistics when OSHA
devises its targeting scheme, since employer self-reporting is the basis
for injury data.
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Opponents of safety standards have noted the failure of injury and
death trends to decline with a predictable "I told you so" attitude.
They propose instead a system of injury taxes to provide incentives for
firms to bear all the costs of accidents resulting from the production
process. This is the familar cry of the market approach to economic
management -- "internalize the externalities" -- raising the marginal
benefits of injury prevention by raising the costs of accidents
.
31
American Enterprise Institute (AEI ) economist Robert Smith, a leading
critic of OSHA, advocates such an approach, viewing it as a way to
achieve economic rationality, especially efficient resource allocation,
while minimizing (if not obviating altogether) the weight of moral
issues, trade-offs among policy objectives and distributional
questions . 32
Yet, however "natural" the injury tax appears (natural, in the
sense of being more market-like) it has several political drawbacks
which underscore the tension between economic rationality and political
feasibility. Organized labor has vehemently opposed injury taxes for
fear that they would not supply enough incentive to prevent injuries,
hence by implication some injuries will be allowed to occur. Labor
leaders characterize such taxes as "a license to maim." Injury taxes
might also replace a union's power to call in safety inspectors, and in
nonunion plants they might lead employers to replace workers with bad
accident records. In addition, unions see any weakening of mandatory
standards and enforcement procedures as an encouragement to favor risk-
taking workers over risk-averse workers, an ethically questionable
practice. Ironically, many businessmen also are wary of injury taxes,
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noting that once established tax rates could be subject to politically-
motivated fluctuation, perhaps becoming a source of general revenue
rather than a method of internalizing social costs. One final argument
against tax plans highlights the potential they have for engendering a
layer of government bureaucracy to monitor corporate compliance with
injury reporting requirements. While such monitoring would be necessary
for any serious tax plan -- given the motivation to fudge occupational
accident reporting, inherent in the microeconomic "free-rider" problem
— it also defeats one of the purposes of such market measures, namely
getting the government "off the backs" of business. 33
The stakes involved in the dispute within the Carter White House
over these kinds of occupational safety issues were evident in the first
internal flare-up, which occurred as a result of a May 27, 1977
memorandum to the president on OSHA reform. Signed by Charles Schultze,
chairman of the CEA, Stuart Eizenstat, director of Carter's Domestic
Policy Staff, and 0MB director Bert Lance, the memo calls for "major
changes" in OSHA, arguing that "serious consideration should be given to
totally eliminating most safety regulations and replacing them with some
form of economic incentives." 3 * While the ostensible reason for the
elimination of safety standards was to free OSHA resources for use in
tackling health problems, an QMB issue paper attached to the memo made
it clear that the economic advisers were calling for retrenchment in
that area as well, of which more below.
The memo, which Carter accepted in its entirety, provides clearer
reasons why the technocrats saw OSHA reform as a top priority for the
new administration, the primary one being the link between OSHA reform
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and the broader effort to apply economic incentives to all social
regulatory agencies. This link meant that QSHA reform would not be
confined to the purview of the Labor Department. "Social regulations
have pervasive impact on the economy," the memo continues, "and those
concerned with economic policy and your anti
-i nf 1 ati on program should be
involved.
"
3S Noting that QSHA supporters would be concerned, if not
outraged, by the proposed "reform" measure -- which included a
recommendation to establish an interagency taskforce on QSHA reform --
Schultze and the others stressed the importance of keeping foremost in
mind the growing perception of the agency as an economic burden.
QSHA is, as you know, the leading national symbol of
overregulation; not to act decisively would be
perceived outside the labor movement as a retreat
from your commitment to major regulatory reform. 3,b
Ironically, for the economic technocrats the perception of OSHA was as
crucial as the agency's actual impact on the economy. The credibility
of Carter's reform program as a major component of his strategy for
economic growth was at stake. QSHA had, in short, enormous symbolic
value. It was a symbol aimed at securing business confidence -- a
symbol of the administration's determination to fight inflation and
create prosperity.
This frontal challenge to one of QSHA's principle areas of
interest was not presented as an attack on the agency. Rather it was
couched in terms of making the agency more cost efficient. Nonetheless,
it generated immense internal conflict, which eventually became public
when someone in the Labor Department leaked the memo to the press. The
administration devoted considerable time and energy to damage control in
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the ensuing months. 37 The primary objection to the “reform" campaign of
the economic technocrats was its suggestion that QSHA rely in large part
on stiffening payment of compensation to injured workers as a means of
motivating employers to provide safe workplaces. Such incentive plans
place the active prevention of injuries in a secondary position, and
have all the aforementioned problems associated with injury taxes as
well.
It was, of course, coincidental that while the Carter
administration was taking its lumps (mainly in July) over the QSHA
reform strategy, the AEI was busy preparing the premier issue (July-
August, 1977) of its bimonthly journal Regulation , a publication which
would provide a forum for the very ideas that Carter was finding so
controversial. The AEI was a leading conservative policy planning
organization in the coordination of the business case against OSHA,
helping to create a climate receptive to the corporate perspective on
the relationship between government and economy. 30 Regulation was one
of AEI's carefully conceived tools for use in this ideological offensive
against social regulations, an offensive fought within industry,
government, academia and the mass media in the name of liberating market
capitalism. Given its ideology, the journal might more appropriately
have been titled Deregulation . As we will see, President Reagan
selected many of his top economic advisers from the ranks of the AEI and
Regulation ' s staff.
It is revealing to point out that Carter's economic technocrats
--
above all Schultze -- bought into much of AEI's overregulation argument.
The organization even excerpted in Regulation Schultze's paean to the
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free market, his Brookings Institution study The Public Use of Private
Interest
,
in which he opines that "Market-like arrangements not only
minimise the need for coercion as a means of organizing societyj they
also reduce the need for compassion, patriotism, brotherly love, and
cultural solidarity as motivating forces behind social improvement." 3 '9
This happy thought accords well with the economic ethics of the Reagan
administration, whose views the Carter economic advisers foreshadowed.
While there were important differences between the two administrations,
there were substantial and fundamental areas of agreement. The major
difference was the existence of genuine supporters of QSHA within the
Carter White House to counterbalance the views of the technocrats.
Reaction to the May 27 memo eventually subsided and few concrete
results ever came from it. The Interagency Task Force on Workplace
Safety and Health that it recommended — approved by Carter and co-
chaired by Labor Secretary Ray Marshall and 0MB director James T.
McIntyre — produced recommendations (released in the summer of 1978)
that had little real impact on 0SHA. 40 For the remainder of the year,
relative calm prevailed on the OSHA front. The agency did propose its
comprehensive carcinogens policy in the fall, but the major CWPS and
RAR6 criticism of it came in 197S. By the end of 1977 a relaxed Carter
thus could stand before a meeting of the Business Council and joke: "I
understand this is where I was supposed to come to restore business
confidence." 41 Peppered with deferential, almost fawning, remarks to
the leaders of corporate America, Carter's address focused on conveying
his personal sense of confidence in the course of the nation, and
especially the economy. He stressed the "remarkable harmony within the
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various departments of the government, even singling out Charles
Schultze by name as a trusted private voice on economic affairs. And as
if to underscore the theme of harmony and confidence, the president
brought along Eula Bingham to make the point that his administration was
reducing "unnecessary paperwork and regulations and intrusion into the
business lives by Bovernment. " The president added that "Dr. Bingham
has brought forward revisions in those administrative procedures that
have helped to remove this burden on your shoulders." 42 QSHA and other
regulations were being pared back, the administration was in harmony on
its basic goals, the economy was experiencing "no serious or major
imbalances or distortions" -- all in all it was, officially, a rosy
picture for the president's first year in office.
If the president seemed to forget the contentious internal debate
over OSHA reform, he would not be afforded that luxury in 1978. In
March of that year he signed Executive Order 12044, codifying the shift
toward emphasizing increased use of cost-benefit analysis as a general
guide for regulatory standard-setting — most importantly, for this
study, in the area of occupational health. 43 Entitled "Improving
Government Regulations," the order required an assessment of the
economic impact of regulations because, as Carter put it, "we want to be
sure that they don't contribute to inflationary costs." Specifically,
E.O. 12044 mandated that all new "significant regulations" be proposed
only after assurance could be given to White House reviewers that
alternative approaches had been carefully considered and the "least
burdensome" of the acceptable alternatives had been selected. Moreover,
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regulatory analysis was required for all regulations projected to have
"an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more."
The intent of this regulatory centralization was to ensure that
new regulations be cost-effective. The administration did not
explicitly call for cost-benefit tests as the method of regulatory
analysis until one year later in proposing its Regulation Reform Act of
1979. 44 But cost-benefit criteria were used as standard operating
procedure. As Kitty Bernick, Assistant Director of the Domestic Policy
Staff, described the use of such analysis:
The idea is that the agency C OSH A ] should be informed of
the costs and benefits of its actions but not that the
substantive statute should be overruled by such analysis.
Our point is that cost-benefit analysis is a useful tool,
but it is not the only factor the decisionmaker can consider. 43
The 0MB was nominally in charge of overseeing the White House review
process, but in practice the agency delegated responsibility for the
program to a rather loose coalition of CWPS, RARG and the CEA, with 0MB
providing input on occasion. This group, it should be noted, had no
veto power over proposed regulations. But the implementation of its
oversight activity did spur the internal administration battle once
again, this time extending the debate over economic incentives and the
appropriateness of cost-benefit techniques to the health area, a much
more heated arena of conflict than that of job safety. While this
conflict arose over health standards for benzene, arsenic, DBCP,
acrylonitrile and lead, it was the controversy surrounding the proposed
revision of the cotton dust standard that received the most attention.
The dispute over cotton dust generally was indicative of the
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others, except tor the intensity of hard feelings it invoked. Its
inclusion here draws attention to the level of in-fighting and
bureaucratic maneuvering within the institutional confines of the
executive branch involving conflict which eventually worked its way
up to President Carter himself. Conventional accounts of the presidency
would be likely to focus exclusively on this intra-institutional
discord, drawing lessons about the personal and political impediments to
the smooth implementation of a president's program. The need for better
management of the policy process is the kind of insight we could expect
to be derived from such a mainstream inquiry. While there may be some
value in such institutional, process-oriented insights from the cotton
dust story, conventional accounts omit the more important structural
point that, as we will see, the imperative of economic growth eventually
consumes other domestic policy agenda items, in this case QSHA policy,
relegating the administrative give-and-take to a secondary (though not
unimportant) status.
The cotton dust case revolved around DSHA's plan to release its
final standard on permissible levels of exposure to cotton dust, which
causes a respiratory disease known as byssinosis or "brown lung." First
proposed in 1976, QSHA's standard was subject to a lengthy period of
public comment and written opinions on how best to achieve reductions of
cotton dust concentration in workplaces in all segments of the industry
-- ginning, milling, yarn and fabric manufacturing, and waste
processing. ** QSHA's final standard was to be a revised version of this
original standard. In a late May memorandum to the president, Eizenstat
and his Domestic Policy Staff aide Simon Lazarus warned him rather
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starkly of the consequences of endorsing a revised cotton dust standard.
If a version suitable to the economists was endorsed, organized labor
and other OSHA advocates "will explode." Mentioning Labor Department
rumors of Bingham's "vague resignation threats," Eizenstat and Lazarus
asserted that in the event of the promulgation of a more cost-effective
option, "the resulting propaganda -- alleging that you care more about
cotton industry profits than workers' health -- could be ugly." 47 y e t
the alternative, from the economic technocrats' perspective, was worse:
"On the other hand, permitting OSHA to promulgate could damage the
credibility of your anti -i nf 1 ati on commitment and of Charlie's
[Schultzel Review Group process." 40 This type of linkage would surface
repeatedly on this issue.
By June of 1978 the disagreement between the OSHA supporters and
the economic technocrats had narrowed to one over the cost of reducing
cotton dust concentration in the ambient air of workplaces in just the
yarn producing segment of the industry. In brief, Labor Secretary
Marshall and Bingham favored mandating plant-wide engineering controls
(such as ventilation equipment), while Schultze and Eizenstat argued for
performance standards that set target goals for dust reduction to be met
in any way the industry saw fit. In practice, Schultze admitted,
performance standards would allow heavy reliance on personal protective
equipment, namely respirators worn by employees. The lone virtue of
respirators is their low cost. Indeed, virtually everyone agrees that
they are the most cost-effective way to reduce exposure to airborne
pollutants. The problem is, as Marshall and Bingham contended, an
enormous body of evidence exists to show that, for a variety of reasons,
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respirators are demonstrably ineffective in keeping harmful substances
out of workers' lungs.- The technocrats' response was a very vague
"that can be worked out." For them the bottom line was that the
proposed standard's reliance on engineering controls confronted industry
with excessive costs, placing a "major burden of uncertainty on the
industry." And perhaps most important for Schultze, as head of both the
CEA and RARG, "the credibility of our anti -i nf 1 ati on and regulatory
reform effort requires some modification -- even if only a modest one --
in the draft OSHA Ccotton dust] regulations." 30
Once again sensing the symbolic value of OSHA regulations to
Carter's larger economic program, Schultze decided to challenge the
agency's new cotton dust standard. It was, to him, a matter of
preserving the mettle of the administration's anti -i nf 1 ati on commitment.
Unable to convince Marshall to modify the OSHA regulation in a direction
favorable to the position of those engaged in the regulatory review
process, a meeting was called for June 7 to take the issue directly to
Carter. In attendance were the president, Vice President Mondale,
Schultze, Eizenstat, Bingham and Marshall.
An exhaustive accounting of this important meeting is not
necessary. The upshot is that after hearing Bingham deliver what
Eizenstat describes as an "impassioned discussion" of engineering
standards, President Carter "much to our surprise. .. seemed to embrace
this alternative and to push Charlie [Schultze] to accept it. 31 The
exact degree of warmth of Carter's embrace immediately became an issue,
however. Participants seem to agree that the president suggested a
compromise plan that would have phased in a new cotton dust standard in
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two stages over a four year period. But after that, disagreement and
misunderstanding abounded. Schultze interpreted the meeting as
resulting in a compromise regulation which, while requiring engineering
controls to be installed on an industry-wide basis at the end of the
four year period, would have allowed firms to receive an extension
beyond four years for economic reasons. More importantly, he thought
there had been consensus on allowing firms to develop performance
standards using alternate means of protecting workers (eg. respirators)
if they could demonstrate their plan was at least as effective as more
costly engineering controls. This would, of course, be a vindication of
Schultze's orientation toward health regulations.
Bingham and Marshall, by contrast, interpreted the meeting as
vindication for their position. They judged Carter's reaction to their
proposals as a "reversal" of his earlier stand and a "victory" for them
— and said so publically at a post-meeting press briefing. The
newspapers played the story as a major Labor Department victory and a
"turnabout" on the president's part, with him "apparently reversing an
earlier decision." One account of the affair, appearing in the New York
Times , carried this passage that particularly upset the White House
staff
:
As for the inflationary impact of regulations, Dr.
Bingham commented that "my ignorance of economics is
comparable to the ignorance of the Council of(sic) Wage
and Price Stability and the Council of Economic Advisers
of industrial safety and health." She added that the
Occupational Health and Safety Law mandated the pro-
tection of workers and said nothing about inflation . 82
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Acting on her understanding of the June 7 meeting, Bingham two days
later signed a new cotton dust regulation which Schultze and Eizenstat
viewed as in "flat contradiction" of the principles agreed to. They
were angry at provisions for OSHA to cite firms for noncompliance before
the four years had expired, the difficulty of firms obtaining a waiver
under the rules, and the lack of a provision for firms to show they have
an equally effective alternative to engineering standards. They
informed the president that they "consider this a flagrant and
deliberate attempt by OSHA to frustrate an express agreement reached
directly with you." 33
From the perspective of the White House review team, the cotton
dust decison was an absolute disaster. As Eizenstat expressed it to
Carter's chief administrative assistant Hamilton Jordan:
The way in which this has now come out makes it
look like the Administration is not serious about
fighting inflationary regulatons. . . . Barry Bosworth
tCWPS director] is depressed about what this means for
the regulatory process — as is Charlie. It will make
everyone less likely to tackle these tough regulatory
issues in light of the results of this debacle. SA
Surveying the damage done, Lazarus wrote to Eizenstat of the importance
of "modifying the perception that the President reversed himself," and
of "re-establishing CEA's and the White House's authorization to review
this and other regulations." Clearly for these advisers, the legitimacy
of the White House review effort was on the line. And the first step
toward regaining that legitimacy was to dispell "the notion of discord
within the administration that OSHA has generated." 33 This notion
proved difficult to dispell.
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In fact, in December of 1978, Bingham was still something of a
loose cannon on the Carter ship, this time in regard to OSHA's lead
standard. Speaking before a United Steelworkers' conference on lead
regulations, the OSHA director reemphasized her personal commitment to
stringent workplace health rules. Executive branch insiders were upset
about her remark that "Marshall and I have been through the palace guard
once to see him [Carter ] about a standard [for cotton dust! and we are
ready to do it again. " a * She was especially critical of economists --
the strong implication is administration economists — who argue that
health and safety regulations are inflationary. Suggesting that the
lead standard was being delayed within the administration, she
commented, "These economists never look at the working men and women I
look at." "I prize men and women more highly than the GNP," she added,
charging that many industrial leaders and economists "are complacent
about cancer in the workplace." Bingham concluded by urging the
unionists to lobby Washington and the administration to "free the lead
standard." Roughly one year after Carter spoke to the Business Council
about the harmony within his staff, discord reigned over the
relationship between OSHA regulations and economic vitality.
Despite Bingham's convictions, the end of 1978 marked a major
domestic policy shift for Carter's presidency. As structural analysis
highlights, his presidency henceforth was held hostage to the
unsuccessful quest to promote economic vitality and restore business
confidence. Therefore, while OSHA did successfully fend off the
economic technocrats' challenge to the cotton dust standard, the agency
actually issued no new health standards after January of 1978 and
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existing proposals continued to be subject to the scrutiny of economic
cast-effectiveness tests, often with more success than in the cotton
dust case. In effect, Bingham and OSHA won the battle but lost the war,
a war whose importance eclipses the specifics of administrative turf
battles.
0MB and CEA tightened up regulatory review considerably after
1978, seriously blunting OSHA's earlier activism. As political
scientist and OSHA specialist Charles Noble has pointed out:
Particularly after 1978, OSHA found it difficult to set
new health rules or intensify enforcement. But the
shift in agency strategy is clear in standard setting
and, to a somewhat lesser extent, in enforcement. 37
The shift toward greater use of White House review of regulations and
overall retrenchment in OSHA activity was not prompted so much by the
power of the technocrats' arguments, as by rising fear over economic
downturn. Specifically, by 1979 Carter's concern over economic growth,
especially as threatened by rising inflation, became a major domestic
policy preoccupation, lasting the duration of the second half of his
term. Noble points out that there is a strong correlation between
changes in the business cycle and changes in White House regulatory
policy. As the economy worsens, regulatory initiatives become harder to
justify. This relationship is confirmed by the Carter experience.
Restoring economic growth and fighting inflation are ubiquitous
objectives in administration documents and public pronouncements of the
period. The level of administration anxiety over the economy is clear
in the words of Treasury Secretary Michael Blumenthal, who wrote to t.ie
president in late May of 1979 that attention needed to be focused on
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how best to sell publicly a policy of long-term economic austerity.
"
SB
He attached to his presidential memorandum another memo he wrote tor the
Economic Policy Group Steering Group, in which he outlined his thoughts
on how to accomplish this task. Basically, Blumenthal saw Carter's
entire presidency, and his re-election chances, hinging on convincing
the public to accept continuation of tough and austere macroeconomic
policies, requiring sacrifices by many." He strongly believed that
American's would swallow the bitter pill of deterring liberal spending
programs, deferring expensive environmental and health and safety
regulations, and other (nine in all) painful executive economic
decisions if a program of economic austerity was infused with a spirit
and an exciting theme "that engages the imagination and deep convictions
of the people." And he offered the theme of America's economic
preeminance in the world as such a theme. America could be number one
again, he reasoned, if a "frank appeal to national pride" was carefully
crafted, "creating genuine excitement and commitment for economic
policies that would other wise cause him [Carter] great political
problems." He elaborated:
This new approach attempts to lend shape, color, and
excitement to the general interest — by associating
it with widespread anxieties about our economic
position in the world and about our productivity and
economic discipline at home. A "strong economy" has,
I believe, the same political potential as a "strong
defense.
Blumenthal was dismissed as Treasury Secretary only a few months
after writing these words -- in the wake of Carter's July retreat to
Camp David and subsequent fabled "crisis of confidence" television
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address. 60 But his thoughts on the psychology of damage control --
getting the body politic enthused about austerity — perfectly captures
the domestic dilemmas confronting Carter as the economy headed into a
tailspin. Public confidence, as well as business confidence, was
waning. Eizenstat echoed Blumenthal s strong economy /strong defense
theme in a confidential memorandum to President Carter in March of 1980,
at a time when, coi nci dentl y , the Labor Department and organized labor
were reduced to trying to defend OSHA against a series of bills in
Congress that would have made the most dramatic cuts ever in the
agency's jurisdiction.
In his memo, Eizenstat warns that "we truly are on the verge of an
economic crisis which is as severe for the country as the foreign policy
crises you have been dealing with over the last several months." 61
Citing a "growing national sense that things are out of control," he
urges Carter to "get out and let people know you are the general in
personal charge of this war" — the war being the war against inflation
and general economic malaise. Like Blumenthal, Eizenstat believed the
psychological dimension to economic decline was crucial. If people
expected routine rises in the inflation rate, they would get them.
Carter, it seems, needed to break the psychic grip of hard times through
judicious exercise of presidential leadership. As we know, the results
of the 1980 election, in part, attest to his failure on this score.
But more important for this study, within this context it is no wonder
that OSHA initiatives of all kinds, for the most part, languished. They
were overwhelmed by the force of the structural imperative of economic
growth
.
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The Reagan Administration: Unity in Opposition
President Carter established the centralization of regulatory
policy as the administrative norm. This effort was not a smooth one;
there was a certain contradictory nature to it as different wings of the
administration worked at cross-purposes. Yet while not given the legal
authority to single-handedly squelch new regulations, the White House
reviewers were able to have a substantial impact on the regulatory
environment. When coupled with the overriding problem of economic
crisis, the impact was nothing short of chilling. It should come as no
surprise, then, that things got tougher for OSHA after 1981, since
Ronald Reagan was welcomed to Washington by an economy in even worse
shape than the one Carter had inherited. As a candidate for president,
Reagan had expressed his relaxed concept of OSHA -- quoted at the outset
of the chapter but worth repeating -- in these terms:
My idea of an OSHA would be if government set up an
agency that would do research and study how things
could be improved, and industry could go to it and say,
'We have a problem here and we seem to lose more
people by accident in this particular function. Would
you come and look at our plant and then come back and
give us a survey of what should be done?' 4* 2
Notice here the omission of any notion of workers or organized
labor actively using OSHA as a resource to protect their interests,
although the law expressly establishes workers' right to "safe and
healthful" workplaces. Notice also the passive role for the nation's
primary guardian of workplace safety and health. On this reading of
OSHA's purpose, industry assumes the active role, going to the agency
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when it suits the needs of business. This is part of what came to be
known as Reagan's "voluntary" approach to OSHA. There is a peculiarly
uneven quality to his notion of voluntarism, though, as one safety
specialist has pointed out:
No one in the Reagan administration has ever proposed a
"voluntary" approach when it comes to food stamp fraud or
illegal immigration. "Law and order" in these areas is a
brisk, menacing enterprise that has thousands of federal
enforcers vigilantly patrolling their turf for violations
of the law. 63
To understand why the situation is so radically different when it comes
to OSHA enforcement, we can begin by looking at Reagan's very first
address to a joint session of Congress. There he outlined the basic
components of his economic program that remain relatively unchanged
today
.
In his February 18, 1981 speech outlining his economic recovery
program, President Reagan attempted to sum up the nation's dire economic
predicament. High on his list of culprits was overregulation, "a mass
of regulations imposed on the shopkeper, the farmer, the craftsman,
professionals and major industry that is estimated to add $100 billion
to the price of things we buy and it reduces our ability to produce. H4,A
The result of this "virtual explosion in Government regulation during
the past decade," has been "higher prices, higher unemployment, and
lower productivity growth." It was quite a damning indictment. He went
on to make "a far-reaching program of regulatory relief" one of the four
pillars of his recovery package.
Reagan's speech is instructive for at least two reasons. First,
he prominently cited the figure of $100 billion for the costs of
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regulations and has done so on numerous occasions. This figure —
sometimes increased to upwards of $115 billion, or even $126 billion --
is the handiwork of Murray Weidenbaum, leading AEI economist and the
first chairman of the CEA under Reagan, who calculated the number from a
1976 study. Weidenbaum's purpose was to charge that regulations in
general are too costly, and that social regulations in particular make
up the lion s share (roughly four-fifths) of the excessive cost.
Neither charge has stood the test of close scrutiny. Many subsequent
analyses have exposed these calculations as devoid of any real value,
essentially mythical. 65 And more telling, the figure is derived without
any regard for the benefits of social regulations, as even Business Week
-- a publication hardly unsympathetic to Weidenbaum's ideas -- had to
concede. 66 All costs and no benefits -- that is the view of social
regulations espoused by Weidenbaum and President Reagan. And that the
facts speak otherwise has not deterred them from continuing to use this
fabricated claim. Given Weidenbaum's penchant for less than rigorous
economic analysis, perhaps this should be expected. After all, it was
his "visceral computer" that concocted the mendacious "rosy scenario"
economic forecast in 1981, exposed as a fraud by one of its principle
perpetrators, former 0MB director David Stockman. 67
The second important element of Reagan's talk was its insistance
that rampant regulation was responsible for a host of macroeconomic
ills. This claim is an outgrowth of the mid-decade mobilization of
business against social regulations. It reflects a strategy shift on
the part of corporations and many think tanks, such as AEI. As
mentioned earlier, the OSH Act and related statutes originally were
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justified by the microeconomic principle that the market failed to hold
individual firms accountable for all the costs of production, such as
the "external" costs pollution or hazardous work conditions. Regulation
was viewed as a vehicle for inducing companies to bear all the costs of
doing business, and disputes revolved around different methods of
providing such inducement. In other wards, some regulation could help
make the market fairer.
Increasingly, however, OSHA opponents deployed the macroeconomic
argument that the law fueled a greater kind of market failure -- that it
inhibited the operation of the market system as a whole. Thus, OSHA
threatened the general interests of society, not just the narrow
interests of a given firm, or industry . 68 The Carter administration
made this kind of argument in its insistence on the connection between
OSHA regulations and rising inflation. But the Reagan economists
associated the law with a much wider variety of maladies, the list being
almost limitless. And it did so with dizzying frequency, with the
assertion of regulations as manifestations of the evils of "Big
Government" appearing in seemingly every domestic speech the president
delivers. But as with Weidenbaum's cost figure, the connection between
OSHA and broader economic decline is wildly overdrawn . 6,9 This is why it
is essential to point out the symbolic value of White House regulatory
reforms, as I did with the Carter administration. As a symbol of
over r egul at i on
,
OSHA's impact is enormous; as a substantive,
quantifiable drain on economic growth, its impact is considerably more
modest. Yet again, this has not stopped OSHA's detractors from making
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their case against the agency. Even some presidency scholars have
accepted the Reagan position uncritically. 70
With regard specifically to OSHA
,
President Reagan's attempt to
remedy the problem of overregulation with his "voluntary" approach has
taken shape in the form of the pursuit of a "cooperative" regulatory
strategy. His first, and longest-standing (of the three), OSHA director
Thorne Auchter proclaimed the advent of this new attitude to the New
York Chamber of Commerce and Industry in September of 1981:
OSHA has always been in an adversarial position. This
adversarial spirit has hampered the effective functioning
of the agency long enough .... The OSHA of today is a
cooperative regulator. 71
Raymond Donovan, Reagan's first Secretary of Labor, underscored this
ongoing change of attitude at the agency in his submission of The
President's Report on Occupational Safety and Health for 1982
. stating
that OSHA had "continued its campaign to change the focus of the Agency
from one of adversarial enforcement to one of cooperative assistance." 72
In practice this orientation has been "cooperative" in a double sense:
OSHA has been cooperative internal 1
v
.
in its relations with the economic
technocrats of Reagan's regulatory review team, while at the same time
being cooperative externally with the business community it seeks to
unfetter from government instrusions. Understanding the two dimemsions
of OSHA's cooperativeness is the key to grasping the relationship
between Reagan and OSHA.
Reagan resolved the internal tension that plagued the Carter
administration by appointing an OSHA director who was openly hostile to
This point cannot be overemphasized. As head of thethe program.
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agency, Auchter 5 credentials as a small businessman, whose company
reportedly had many OSHA violations, were a -far cry from those of Eula
Bingham, an eminent industrial toxicologist. Whereas Bingham made clear
from the outset her desire to have OSHA and its research arm at NIOSH
deeply probe the dangers of occupational health hazards, Auchter began
his tenure at the agency by challenging its previous efforts in this
regard. Two of his initial acts upon assuming his post serve as stark
illustrations; both involve the health issue which proved so contentious
in the Carter administration -- cotton dust.
First, he shocked organized labor by ordering the destruction of
100,000 booklets pertaining to cotton dust because he found the cover,
showing a gravely ill textile worker, "offensive" and "obviously
favorable" to labor. 73 He justified his act of censorship (which later
included withholding distribution of several films and slide shows
pertaining to workers' health and safety rights) with reference to his
oft-stated desire to keep OSHA "neutral" with regard to business and
labor. For him, that meant espousing market-oriented, laissez-faire
ideology as the best way to provide protection for the nation's
workforce. It was the manifest failure of this type of approach, of
course, which led to the need for an OSH Act in the first place.
Nevertheless, such market "neutrality" meshed well with the aims of the
technocratic side of the administration at 0MB and the CEA, agencies who
now worked in relative harmony with their QSHA-Labor Department
counterparts to promote deregulation.
Auchter's second major act complemented this attempt to reverse
the "adversarial spirit" at OSHA. He threw the Supreme Court into
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disarray by issuing a "notice of proposed rulemaking" announcing that
OSHA was disavowing its position against cost-benefit anlaysis in the
cotton dust case the textile industry's legal appeal of the Carter
administration s 1978 cotton dust standard. In a highly unusual move,
the OSHA chief pulled the government's lawyers off the case as they had
argued it (along with union lawyers) two months earlier and instructed
them to re-examine the cotton dust standard to "evaluate the feasibility
and utility of relying on cost-benefit analysis in setting occupational
health standards. 1,74 Auchter, in effect, asked the High Court not to
decide the case and instead allow the Labor Department to reconsider it
in light of President Reagan's new cost-benefit policy, thus switching
the government's stance on cotton dust rules in the middle of the
judicial proceeding. And while the court eventually ruled against the
textile i ndustr y-Reagan administration position in June of 1981,
upholding the Carter administration's QSHA standard, this specific
decison has not prevented QSHA, QMB and other regulatory reviewers from
embracing cost-benefit criteria generally as a major component of their
campaign against over r egul ati on
.
73
The Reagan administration's endorsement of cost-benefit analysis
in the cotton dust case is symptomatic of its larger purpose in
promoting economic analysis of regulations. Reagan fostered internal
administrative cooperation most markedly by further centralizing
executive oversight of OSHA and other social regulations, putting 0MB in
charge of White House review via Executive Order 12291 in February of
1981. 76 This measure went far beyond Carter's centralization effort,
giving the 0MB the power to rewrite or veto rules as they are being
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formulated. E.O. 12291 has as a general requirement the stipulation
that "regulatory action shall not be undertaken unless the potential
benefits to society for the regulation outweigh the potential costs to
society." Only regulations "involving the least net cost to society"
can be promulgated. The order also established a Task Force on
Regulatory Relief, headed by Vice President George Bush, to assist 0MB
in weeding our "burdensome" regulations, monitor industry views on
regulatory matters, and urge executive agencies to cut back certain
regulations by requesting QMB to undertake regulatory reviews. In
practice, though, 0MB wielded much more influence on OSHA matters, and
the Task Force has since been disbanded.
Above all, the major outcome of the executive order was to mandate
strict cost-benefit analysis as an explicit rule for regulatory
decisions. This represented an important shift in emphasis: while
President Carter's executive order encouraged cost-benefit criteria as a
guide to analysis, President Reagan enshrined them as a rule of
operation. 77 CEA chairman Weidenbaum made the case for the widespread
use of cost-benefit analysis this way:
Benefit-cost analysis is inherently a neutral concept,
giving equal weight to a dollar of benefits as to a dollar
of costs. Those who quiver at the thought of subjecting
their favorite program to such analysis may know more than
we do. Do they inherently fear that the regulatory activity
would flunk the most elementary benefit-cost test? 70
For some, Weidenbaum's words might have an air of reasonableness at
first blush. After all, who could oppose a "neutral" concept. And if
one does oppose the technique, perhaps they are trying to hide
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something. On closer inspection, however, his words can be seen as
transparent ideology, pure and simple.
There are a host of problems associated with cost-benefit analysis
generally, and most of them belie the claim that it is merely a neutral
technique. One major area of uncertainty involves the problem of how to
quantify the benefits of alternative regulatory strategies. In the case
of OSHA, this entails placing a dollar value on human life or various
lifesaving programs, in order to determine of a level of "socially
acceptable risk." Economists have devised analytic techniques for
determining levels of socially acceptable risk, all of which use cost-
benefit calculation to impute dollar values to non-marketed things such
as human life. Perhaps the most widely accepted of such measurements is
the "wi 1 1 ingness-to-pay" criterion, which seeks to gauge how much money
a worker would be willing to pay for marginal decreases in his or her
exposure to a health hazard on the job. However, this economic device
is fraught with technical and ethical amb i gui ty . 7 ’
In the first place, people typically are not fully informed about
all the risks involved in such decisions. Secondly, the workers in
question may not have alternative job prospects, throwing off any true
measurement of their willingness. Third, wi 1 1 i ngness-to-pay assumes
there is no difference between how people value certain things in
private individual transactions and how they might value those same
things in decisions for the larger public. Fourth, same people believe
that to put a value on something cheapens its worth, and thus might
claim that life has an intrinsic value that is priceless. Finally, to
the extent that occupational health is viewed as a r i ght, it may not be
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deemed socially acceptable to put a price on it, even it the costs
outweigh the benefits. This point was driven home succinctly by a
steelworker who commented at an OSHA hearing that the Emancipation
Proclamation was not subjected to an inflationary impact statement. 00
For these reasons and others, the ambiguity surrounding efforts to
determine acceptable risk cannot be clarified simply by the use of
economic calculations.
Indeed, the uncertainties in the area of benefit calculation are
so great that when the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment
(OTA) studied various estimates for the implied value of a life, they
found no fewer than a dozen. And they varied so widely that the choice
of one over the others would itself be a highly political act,
dramatically altering the outcome on the benefit side of the equation.
Estimates are based on no greater certainty on the cost side of the
equation either. Industry estimates of the cost of compliance with OSHA
health regulations are notoriously exaggerated -- the classic case being
the chemical manufacturers dire predictions of the imminent collapse of
the industry if OSHA's standard for vinyl chloride was implemented in
the early 1970's. Ultimately the regulation was adopted and the
industry has since flourished, its predictions of economic ruin and
technological infeasibility enormously overstated. 01
All this is to say that cost-benefit analysis, far from being a
neutral tool, easily can serve as a weapon with which corporations
combat the often glaring need to clean up health hazards in the nation s
workplaces. The Reagan administration aides this effort internally with
its emphasis on the use of respirators as the cost-effective alternative
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to plant-wide engineering controls. The aforementioned inadequacies of
respirators notwithstanding, they remain the preferred method of
compliance with OSHft health standards for big business. James C. Miller
HI
»
^-director of the AEI's Center for the Study of Government
Regulation, a member of Reagan's QMS and executive director of the
administration's Task Force on Regulatory Relief, expressed his view of
prevalent worker complaints about the inconvenience and discomfort of
respirators (among the many drawbacks of them), this way: "Perhaps we
should rename the agency the Occupational Safety, Health and Comfort
Administration." 32 Auchter responded with similar disregard for the
concerns of workers: "Well, employers are asked to do things under the
government's safety and health act and under OSHA regulations that are
not always comfortable for them." 33 The equation of monetary discomfort
on the part of business with the physical discomfort of workers displays
a particularly callous attitude on the part of Reagan technocrats and
regulators. This is especially true when, as was the case with the
cotton dust standard, the lives of an estimated 74,000 textile workers,
at risk of contracting brown-lung disease, are at stake.
In the final analysis, then, the cost-benefit criteria so beloved
by both the OSHA-Labor Department side and the economic technocratic
side of the Reagan administration serve to augment their conservative
political agenda. As an economic tool of the Reagan presidency, cost-
benefit analysis is used to conceal political ends behind reams of
seemingly objective data. But the objective appearance is an illusion.
And the illusion has a cynical hue when we consider that the Reagan
technocrats at 0MB have seen to it that the budget for NIOSH -- as
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QSHA's research arm, the one government agency capable of generating
reliable, non-corporate data for cost-benefit studies -- has been
dramatically reduced between 1981 and 1985. 8 « This forces OSHA to rely
even more heavily on industry-dominated economic analysis at precisely
the time when a premium is being placed on cost-benefit analysis. The
conclusion reached by the OTA after an exhaustive review of the
literature on cost-benefit criteria and economic analysis in regard to
OSHA policy decisions thus seems especially salient here:
CWlhere moral, political, and cultural values -- not simply
economic ones -- are at stake, we need to make moral,
political, and aesthetic judgments. Cost-benefit analysis
does not replace these "subjective" judgments with "ob-
jective" or "neutral" ones. Rather, it distorts or ig-
nores the noneconomic values it cannot handle. 83
Or as Mark. Green bluntly put it during the Carter years, in words even
more appropriate today, "Given the current state of economic art,
mathematical cost-benefit analyses are about as neutral as voter
literacy tests in the Old South." 8 *
By increasing the use of cost-benefit analysis while tightening
the centralization of OSHA policy in the executive branch, the president
further insulated the policy process from outside pressures. As one
analyst -- who served as both Deputy Director of CWPS under Carter, and
as a consultant to OSHA for Reagan -- has favorably commented, "By
reviewing regulations before they are formally proposed, [Reagan si 0MB
can limit the role of external political actors." Along these lines he
added, "the criteria being applied to new regulations will be less
transparent and the possibilities of informed public participation more
limited." 87 This essentially anti -democratic impulse -- "negotiations
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between the White House and the [regulatory] agencies have gone
underground" — jibes well with the president's larger strategy of
isolating organized labor as a political force. Labor obviously has far
less access to personnel and processes in 0MB than it does in the Labor
Department. Moreover, by subjecting OSHA regulations to greater
economic rationality, the hope is that the introduction of new
regulations will be inhibited.
The inhibition of new regulations is but one part of President
Reagan's strategy for promoting external cooperation on the OSHA front,
the second dimension of his cooperative approach. During his
presidency, OSHA has dramatically reduced its ability to do the job it
was empowered to do, leaving business feeling good about cooperation,
while labor feels concern for workers has been drastically slighted. As
a leading agency on Reagan's oft-noted regulatory "hit list," OSHA has
cut back, in a variety of ways on the number of general schedule health
and safety inspections, the number of follow-up inspections, the
frequency and amount of fines levied for violations, and workers' right-
to-know about information on occupational hazards. aB
For instance, under Auchter the agency began exempting companies
from inspections on the basis of their lost workday injury rate (called
on LWDI -- basically the injuries that result in days away from work
and/or days of restricted work activity). If a company's LWDI falls
below the national average for manufacturing industries, they are in
effect guaranteed inspectors will not set foot inside. This is
justified as a targeting program that rewards "safe" workplaces, even
though "OSHA has never published any statistical study showing that an
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adequate relationship exists between lost workday injury rates and the
hazardous conditions at a workplace."- Such "paper inspections," as
they are called (they rely on examination of company injury logs), are
fraught with pitfalls, not the least of which is their reliance on
businesses to faithfully and truthfully record injury data. The
incentive (and means) to fudge on these numbers has been noted earlier.
But with a cooperative approach, such problems are not seriously
considered
.
Auchter also has championed the use of "informal conferences"
during which OSHA area directors can reduce the severity of fines and
citations and receive extensions on hazard abatement deadlines. While
both inspection targeting and informal conferences were used with
greater caution in Bingham's OSHA, under Reagan they have become
mechanisms for avoiding the teeth of the agency. And attempts by
Reagan's OSHA to claim credit for the decline in injury statistics
during the first few years of the administration are overdrawn, if not
cynical, given that slowdowns in economic growth are a well-established
causal factor in injury rate declines, and the U.5. economy exeperienced
a sustained drop in the business cycle from 1979 through 1983. 90
Of a perhaps more serious nature in the area of external
cooperation with the business community, OSHA has cut back on the
pr omul agati on of new health standards. Only two new major OSHA rules —
covering ethylene oxide and farmworker field sanitation -- were issued
in Reagan first term, and bath of them occurred only after intense
wrangling and court pressure. OSHA likes to boast that it will propose
a host of health regulations within its own regulatory timetable. But
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to date, virtually all proposed standards would weaken existing
regulations, not develop tough new standards. Often the delay in
issuing regulations has been a function of the agency's own insistance
on the use of regulatory review and cost-beneft analysis -- an approach
promoting "paralysis by analysis." OSHA now pursues health regulations
at a glacial pace. While there are less than two dozen OSHA exposure
limits for hazardous and toxic substances, there remain more than 2,000
known and suspected carcinogens used in the workplace. If President
Reagan's ideological orientation toward social regulation endures, the
outlook for the welfare of the nation's workforce, on this score, is not
bright.
We now can better understand how, as discussed at the outset of
the chapter, the Reagan administration could reach a juncture whereby in
1986 it could issue a record penalty against Union Carbide Corporation,
yet still not have such an action be indicative of the vigor of a
healthy agency. Auchter gave OSHA a direction, albeit a negative one.
Since his departure in 1984, the agency has been adrift. Even if
Pendergrass, Reagan's latest (and third) OSHA director, is "rekindling
OSHA" as one publication speculated, it will not return to the level of
activity under Bingham. 91 And the agency certainly will not, in its
current configuration, escape the fluctuation of presidential expansion
and contraction of its activity, a fluctuation most dependent on the
executive branch's assessment of the prevailing economic climate and,
especially, the prospects for economic growth.
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Conclusion; The Triumph of Structure
Aftor examining the policies of Carter and Reagan, the picture we
are left with is one of both divergence and continuity between their
strategies toward OSHA. The divergence lies in the genuine commitment
to workplace safety and health on the part of Carter's OSHA apparatus.
The agency certainly was relatively more active, and in some respects
arguably more effective, during his term. But it also was in deep
conflict with another part of the administration, and eventually the
concerns of that economic-technocratic side took precedence over the
concerns of the other side. Indeed after 1978, the Carter approach
begins to look like it is paving the way for Reaganism, as worried
attention to the generation of economic growth virtually overwhelms all
other domestic priorities. Alan Wolfe's structural insight into
Carter's macroeconomic policy is applicable here to his OSHA policy as
well; "In pursuing a centrist strategy, Carter learned that in an age
of austerity the center shifts to the right. "‘* 2
The solidification of centralized and insulated OSHA policy stands
as a chief continuity between the two presidencies. In a sense,
President Reagan simply sustained and deepened this weakening of OSHA
with his vocal advocacy of deregulating the workplace. During his
presidency the structural imperative of economic growth is nearly the
only issue on the domestic agenda. With his business-dominated approach
to OSHA, the concerns of workers are minimalized and, at times,
trivialized, OSHA has not disappeared, although that might be a goal in
the President's heart of hearts. More effective is a strategy that
keeps the agency on the books, but renders it essentially impotent.
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This allows QSHA to be figuratively invisible, while not having
literally vanished.
The desire to promote economic growth and satisfy the business
community thus has effectively torpedoed the pursuit of vigorous safety
and health enforcement for the foreseeable future. OSHA appears caught
in a cycle of liberal presidents -- who want to retain some health and
safety regulatory programs, but who also need economic growth for
political survival — and conservative presidents, who focus almost
exclusively on the growth side of the equation. Such a cycle will
always tend to subordinate the need for safe and healthful workplaces to
the needs of the economy, ensuring that commitment to OSHA will only be
as strong as the priorities of business will allow. For as Noble has
correctly observed:
CT]he relationship between the development of the White
House review program and changes in the economy suggests
a clear relationship between presidential concern for
business confidence and the subordination of social reg-
ulation to White House review.’ 3
Having been burned in the early 1970's, corporate capital is not likely
again to fall into a state of disorganization over social regulations.
As for the presidency as an institution, the fundamental point
seems to be the contingent nature of the office, dependent as it is on
the dynamic interaction of state power and economic vitality. The
extent of the dependency becomes clearer when the structural constraints
on the state shift from accomodating social struggle to the generation
of economic growth, as they had by the time Carter assumed office. His
roughly mid-term rightward shift attests to this fact. President Reagan
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happily moved with the tide, all the while helping to quicken and
intensity its speed. This, then, is the overriding domestic continuity
of the Carter and Reagan years -- a continuity which reminds us that the
liberal democratic state is in the bind of being publicly accountable
for the performance of a private economy over which it has only a very
limited set of tools for achieving public purposes. ** in the case of
QSHA policy, if those purposes hang in the balance, the lives of workers
quite literally may as well. This is the structural bind of the
presidency. Political science -- above all, presidency scholars --
would do well to devote greater attention to the exploration of this
bind as it envelops the chief executive.
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CHAPTER FOUR
NATIONAL SECURITY /NATIONAL INSECURITY:
THE MX MISSILE CONFRONTS TWO PRESIDENCIES
I discussed my disappointment with the weekly memor-
andum on MX mobile basing. It was a nauseating prospect
to confront, with the gross waste of money going into
nuclear weapons of all kinds.
— Jimmy Carter 1
I do know that the debates that are going on about the
MX, I think they're a lot of wasted rhetoric and we
ought to get on with it.... We need it.
-- Ronald Reagan 2
The attitudes of Presidents Carter and Reagan seemingly move in
opposite directions. Jimmy Carter longs to be thought of as a man of
peace and global cooperation. A cursory glance at the record of the
first two years of his presidency lends credence to such a judgment.
Among the achievements of his administration during that period were the
signing of the Panama Canal treaties, the Camp David summit on Middle
East peace which culminated in the Camp David accords, and the
announcement of normalization of relations with the People's Republic of
China. And specifically concerning the nuclear threat, he can claim
credit for halting production of the B-l bomber, deferring production of
the neutron bomb, and reaching an agreement on a framework for the SALT
II Treaty. Particularly in this latter area of nuclear weaponry,
President Carter prided himself on thinking the sobering thoughts and
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feeling the human fear of the nuclear threat. The "shadow over the
earth, a= he calls it in his memoirs "That horror was constantly on
my mind." 3
Historian Gaddis Smith thus is generally on the mark with his
assertion that "President Carter and some of his advisers were readier
than any of their predecessors to stare directly at the reality of
nuclear weapons," to "think deeply" about the implications of national
security in the nuclear age. 4 A reasonable case can be made that on
some level President Carter was considerably more thoughtful about and
knowledgeable of nuclear weapons issues than his successor as well. As
the quotes which frame this chapter suggest, Carter did give sustained
consideration to the moral and human dimensions of the multifaceted
nuclear dilemma, even staffing his administration at the highest levels
with advisers whose own views on the issue varied substantially.
Moreover he refrained from engaging in the kind of mindless, callous,
yet revealing, Cold War fantasies evident in President Reagan's famous
(for a day) quip: "I've signed legislation which outlaws the Soviet
Union. The bombing starts in 5 minutes."
For his part, Ronald Reagan has shown much less care than Carter,
often adopting his familiar bul 1 -i n-a-Chi na-shop attitude toward this
most vital issue. He staffed his various national security-related
agencies uniformly with well-travelled Cold Warriors. And as a
barometer of the depth of his own ignorance of the technical side of
strategic weaponry, he admitted having occupied the presidency for more
than two-and-a-hal f years before realizing that roughly three quarters
of the Soviet's entire strategic nuclear arsenal is concentrated in
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land based missiles -- an elemental
-fact whose importance cannot be
overemphasized when analyzing national security policy and arms control
in general, and the MX missile in particular
.
3
The difference between the two presidents, then, can be construed
as marked on such basic issues as nuclear weaponry and national
security. President Carter began his tenure with an inagural address
pledging "perserverance and wisdom in our efforts to limit the world's
armaments to those necessary for each nation's own domestic safety," and
movement "this year a step toward our ultimate goal -- the elimination
of all nuclear weapons from this Earth ." 6 He also early on urged a
commitment to "replace bal ance-of -power with world order politics," and
advocated the need to jettison our "inordinate fear of Communism" in
thinking about foreign policy . 7 For such views he often is popularly
portrayed as a relatively dovish chief executive, compassionate, morally
committed, and yet ultimately weak. By contrast, Reagan is viewed as an
exemplar of the tough, power-conscious, defense-minded president, a hawk
in hawk's clothes. His firm, denunciatory approach to the Soviet Union,
which colors all of his administration's national security policies, was
articulated in his first presidential press conference:
Now, as long as they do that [promote world revolu-
tion] and as long as they at the same time have openly and
publicly declared that the only morality they recognize
is what will further their cause, meaning they reserve
unto themselves the right to commit any crime, to lie, to
cheat, in order to attain that, and that is moral, not
immoral, and we operate on a different set of standards, I
think when you do business with them, even as a detente,
you keep that in mind . 8
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Only now, in the wake of the revelations of the Iran-contra scandal, are
the American people coming to see how well much of Reagan's glib
characterization of Soviet conduct describes U.5. behavior in the world.
auch facile weak v. strong" comparisons of the two presidents
gloss over or ignore outright the absurd quality of ideas of "weakness"
and "strength" when applied to presidents who have at their finger tips
the capability to destroy life as we know it on this planet in a matter
of hours, if that long. As Alan Wolfe has written, the U.S. is a
superpower, having literally accumulated super amounts of power. ’ in
the nuclear age, no president is militarily "weak." More importantly
for this chapter, though, charges of relative weakness or strength
obscure the most fundamental point that President Carter underwent a
pronounced shift to the right on national security issues as his tenure
wore on. Roughly comparable to his growing conservatism in domestic
policy, as evidenced in his OSHA policies, his increasingly militarized
foreign policy agenda was even more dramatic, since the foundation of
whatever liberal reformist ideas he harbored was most securely rooted in
this arena. As in the domestic sphere, the Democratic president laid
the basis for the international dimension of Reaganism which followed.
Particularly from mid-1979 onward, Carter repudiated anything
resembling his earlier embrace of the cooperative, world management
policies espoused by his brethern of the Trilateral Commission. 10 This
perspective, which had supplied the elite establishment s analytic
rationale for his initial moralistc orientation to world issues, was a
distinct casuality of Carter's hardened stance. As Smith points out,
"The character of the Carter Administration's foreign policy changed
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radically during 1979, continuing and completing a shift which had begun
in 1978.
"
ll Indeed it had. For when all was said and done, his
professed nausea over nuclear weaponry notwithstanding, the erstwhile
detente-minded Carter had -- in the name of preserving "national
security" -- presided over the greatest buildup of offensive nuclear
weaponry in the nation's history, of which the MX stands as a prime
example.
Carter's Cold War transformation attests to the enduring vigor --
and danger -- of conventional notions of national security. The
presidency is both prisoner of and benefactor of these accepted ways of
thinking, rallying the public behind him when perceived threats to
national security arise, yet unable to actually provide anything like
real security in the nuclear age. Simultaneously trapped by and
sustained by such notions -- it is this dual bind that the structural
view of the presidency wants to explore and challenge. My intent here
is to undertake this kind of analysis by examining the policies of
Presidents Carter and Reagan toward the MX missile, a weapons system
that perfectly captures the dilemmas faced by presidents in their
pursuit of national security.
The Secluded History of the MX Missile
The genesis of the MX missile (for "Missile-Experimental") stands
in sharp contrast to the origins of OSHA discussed in the previous
chapter. Whereas OSHA emerged from the sometimes acrimonious interplay
among public officials, private industry and citizens, both organized
and unorganized, the MX missile system was conceived in relative
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obscurity. Like all major weapons systems, the MX was insulated from
public scrutiny until its development and deployment effectively were a
foregone conclusion. As one group of analysts has observed concerning
the vital issue of the function fulfilled by the nation's strategic
nuclear forces, such as the MX:
On a question of such fundamental importance to the
security of the United States and the world, one might
expect to find either general agreement among scientists
and policy makers, based on a coherent body of doctrine
and analysis, or alternatively an informed, sustained
public debate. Unfortunately, this is not so . 12
What is true in this case for overall U.S. nuclear policy, also is true
in the particular instance of the MX program.
Certainly the need for some amount of secrecy dictates that
military planners not i ndi scr i mi nantl y broadcast every technical feature
of proposed weapons systems. Yet one result of the nearly total
insulation and lack of broad debate is that both strategic theories and
actual weapons systems growing out them -- which obviously carry with
them important implications for the security of all of us -- can become
virtually unalterable facts of life in the military world before being
subject to legitimate outside critique. A good example is the notion of
a strategic triad , a cornerstone of nuclear policy.
The triad concept simply means that U.S. (and Soviet) weapons are
distributed over three modes of delivery: air-based, sea-based and
land-based. Presidents and their military planners routinely treat the
triad as sacrosanct. This results in the apparently ironclad need to
always have ongoing modernization plans for each leg of the triad,
guaranteeing the quantitative and qualitative proliferation of nuclear
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hardware. Yet such t eti 5hi zati on of the triad is completely
unwarranted
.
Far from being primarily the outgrowth of a conscious, well-
conceived plan, the triad actually resulted from bitter interservice
rivalry and the peculiarities of the defense budgeting process in
Congress. 13 The only logical necessity for strategic planners is the
requirement that the nation's forces be diverse enough to ensure
reliability and sur vi vabl i i ty . This might be achieved by strengthing
only one type of delivery system, say our invulnerable submarine fleet.
In theory, there is no reason why a monad or a dyad could not adequately
meet U.S. defense needs as a deterrent, and be both less costly and less
destabilizing than a system that includes relatively vulnerable land-
based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). As Herbert Scoville,
former Deputy Director of the CIA and Past-President of the Arms Control
Association, has concluded, "there is nothing sacred about our triad of
strategic weapons.... The important factor is to have a diversification
of strategic forces." 14 Air Force, Army and Navy turf battles, more
than the requirements of military ones, have created the triad. The
concept does not deserve the respect it is given.
The triad stands as an example of how little serious thinking at
times goes into the determination of the nation s "strategic thought.
As I will subsequently contend, the MX missile system itself, especially
in its current scaled down deployment mode, cannot withstand serious,
thoughtful scrutiny. Another seemingly intractable feature of the way
nuclear weapons are developed, very important for understanding the MX,
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is the tremendous lead time they require. Of his experience with this
phenomenon, Carter has noted:
New weapon systems are always being conceived; they
pass through research, design, and testing, and then
perhaps go on to deployment. This process can take
as long as ten years, and once it gains momentum, it
is almost impossible to stop. 1 *
Having said this, he does not use this insight to draw much in the way
of conclusions about U.S. weapons systems, their impact on the nuclear
arms race and related perceptions of Soviet nuclear capabilities and
intentions, or the ability of a president to interrupt or resist this
momentum. This is unfortunate, since he opted to confront the momentum
of two such nuclear weapons projects in decisions on the B-l bomber and
the neutron bomb 16
. Yet perhaps it is an understandable omission, given
that the reasons for these decisions would seem to preclude any insights
that fundamentally question the standard weapons development process.
In the case of the B-l, cancellation was ordered because newer, deadlier
technologies (cruise missiles and the stealth bomber) had obviated the
need for this new bomber (and still, Reagan revived it). And with the
neutron bomb, deferral was ordered because of insufficient public
support from our European allies, on whose soil the weapon would have
been based.
In any event, the inertia of the process usually is taken as a
fait accompli. Weapons are dreamed up by researchers and then some
threat is concocted to rationalize the development and deployement of
the now-"vital" weapon. Research money has been procurred; to waste it
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would be almost unthinkable. This is the pattern followed by the
erratic trajectory of the MX missile "debate."
Planning for an MX-style mobile ICBM began in the late 1950's. 17
At the time, the Air Force was searching for possible ways to address
the alleged possibility of U.S. vulnerability to a Soviet missile
attack. Fueled by the hysteria over the infamous "missile gap" -- one
of the most spectacular lies ever perpetrated in the cause of whipping
up support for national defense -- the Air Force searched in vain for a
secure basing scheme for a new mobile missile. Before discussing this
search, however, it is absolutely crucial to underscore the MX's origins
in this period of military mendacity. For it has never been possible to
separate the missile from a continual stream of official exaggeration
and outright falsehood, up to and including President Reagan's latest MX
designs. Indeed, the history of the MX is inextricably interwoven with
the history of a major development in U.S. strategic nuclear doctrine --
the advent and refinement of counterforce policy -- the reality of which
has been obscured, when not completely hidden, from the public.
The public face of nuclear doctrine, like the public face of the
MX, ususally has been presented as a product of the need to maintain
deterrence. 10 To digress briefly, the doctrine of deterrence maintains
that the policy of the U.S. is to amass nuclear weapons for defensive
purposes, to respond to Soviet attack. Deterrence results in the
nuclear stalemate often popularly know as MAD (for mutual assured
destruction): neither the U.S. nor the Soviets would launch its weapons
first because each could be certain the other would respond with massive
retaliation against a host of targets, including cities and industrial
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centers, bringing widespread ruin if not complete societal devastation.
Under the scenario of deterrence, nuclear weapons are intended for
second strike only, that is, in response to the first strike of an
opponent. It is not primarily a war-fighting doctrine.
The MX, by contrast, is an example of a weapon designed with
another doctrine in mind, that of counter for ce. A counterforce policy
has definite offensive implications. It targets an opponents weapons
(such as missile silos) and military command, control and communications
structures, with the idea that they could be destroyed before they are
used, thus providing the aggressor with a decisive military advantage.
Such a counterforce capability potentially provides the nation that
initiates a nuclear attack the ability to achieve a first strike
. While
in a literal sense of the term, a nation that launches its weapons first
is said to have undertaken a "first strike," the more precise and
germane sense of the word entails a strategic first strike -- a sudden,
preemptive, disarming first strike rendering an opponent unable to
respond. 19 Counterforce policy thus has war-fighting connotations. It
requires weapons with particular characteristics, foremost of which is
accuracy. Destroying cities calls for no special precision, since a
variance of a few hundred feet would not affect the outcome of the
mission. But to hit a silo or a bomber base, accuracy is essential.
Counterforce doctrine is unsettling because its premise is that
nuclear war is something more than a MAD option promising to obliterate
civilization as we know it. This option, while horrifying, is so to
such a degree that nuclear confrontation may appear a relatively remote
possibility. Yet by counterforce logic, nuclear war is something
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fightable and winnable, much like war with conventional technologies.
Given that countertorce makes nuclear war theoretically "limited" in
scope (limited to military/political targets), and hence more likely , i
t
is understandable why U.S. military planners did not rush to extol its
virtues to the public. 20 In -fact, successive administrations developed
strategic policies along two tracks, one essentially tor public
consumption and one tor private military calculations. Publically,
national security posture has held that our nuclear torces aim to deter
war and are strictly tor "national detense." It the truth be known,
however, countertorce has been at the center ot U.S. strategic policy
since the 195Q's. 21 The top secret Pentagon document that assigns a
specitic target tor each ot the nation's nuclear warheads — known as
the S 1 0 P
,
tor Single Integrated Operational Plan — has, since its
completion in 1960, accorded countertorce policy a predominant place in
U.S. strategy.
The disjuncture between the national security establishment's
public and private plans rests on the psychological ettects the
steadtast pursuit at countertorce, tirst strike policy might have on the
American people. As Paul Nitze -- decades-long Detense Department
adviser and currently Reagan's chiet arms control negotiator --
explained in 1956, there are two separate though related meanings to the
word "policy":
In one sense, the action sense , it reters to the general
guidelines which we believe should and will in fact govern
our actions in various contingencies. In the other sense,
the declaratory sense , it refers to policy statements which
have as their aim political and psychological effect (my
emphasis) 22
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Presumably, it would be difficult to sell publicly the benevolent belief
that our nation's nuclear forces are for "national defense" above all
else, if at the same time the maturation of counterforce doctrine was
the common public rationale for the evolution and expansion of our
strategic forces. Defense is more palatable than offensive capability.
The existence of this longstanding public/private split in nuclear
doctrine does not, however
,
mean that counterforce options literally
have never been mentioned outside the back rooms of Foggy Bottom.
Robert McNamara, President Kennedy's Secretary of Defense, alluded to
the development of a counterforce posture in both 1962 and 1967.
McNamara conceived of counterforce as a method of "damage limitation,"
to deter the potential annhilation of cities by striking at the enemies
forces. Presented this way, counterforce strategy sounds more humane;
people allegedly are not held hostage to nuclear terror. A substantial
gap existed, though, between the theory and practice of counterforce
war-planning. It was a hardware gap of sorts. And this gap was an
authentic one.
When President Nixon’s Defense Secretary James Schlesinger again
made public overtures toward counterforce policy in 1974, he also did so
in the name of offering a more humane alternative to full scale nuclear
devastation. Nixon had stated publicly how troubled he was that his
hands were tied by nuclear weapons, since the only response he had to a
nuclear attack was the massive retaliation against enemy cities.
"Should the President in the event of nuclear attack be left with the
single option of ordering the mass destruction of enemy civilians in the
face of the certainty that it would be followed by the mass slaughter of
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Americans?" he opined philosophically. 23 Nixon, of course, was
formulating a straw problem; the Pentagon's SI0P had always included a
major component of non-city-busting counterforce options. 24 But Nixon
and Schl esinger together were playing a moral trump card, asserting the
need for "flexible nuclear options" to obtain the necessary hardware to
close the gap between counterforce theory and practice. This ploy was
buttressed by the oft-used mythical scenario projecting that the Soviet
Union would soon have the ability to threaten a large portion (usually
set at about 90 percent) of our Minuteman I CBM force. Schlesinger
removed the velvet gloves in 1975, though, asserting publically for the
first time the U.S. need for the ability to launch a first strike
against the Soviets if the contingency arose. 2 * He hoped for a "super
missile," specifically designed to achieve preemptive hard silo kill
capability. The MX missile, placed into advanced development in 1974,
was to be a vital part of this overall plan.
The development of MX technology traverses this history of
doctrinal refinement. 26 In response to the Navy's highly touted
"virtually invulnerable" Polaris submarine, the Air Force in 1960 had
been working feverishly on its Project Big Star, which resulted in the
first major proposal for a new mobile ICBM. The Air Force came up with
a rail-based system consisting of 60 missile trains, each with five
missiles, rolling randomly on the nation's commercial rail network.
Phase one of this project was approved by the outgoing Secratary of
Defense. But the new Defense Secretary, McNamara, was dubious of the
entire railway plan, and put the project on hold. Among his objections
was a "public interface" problem, by which we can assume he meant
that
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train passangers might feel somewhat squeamish about riding the rails
along with weapons that could destroy the world as we know it. These
kinds of problems (often funny as black humor) with the basing of the
missile would plague the MX concept throughout its years. 27 As we will
see, they remain as formidable as ever today.
Many other mobile ICBM schemes have been considered by the Air
Force since 1960, along with proposals for sophisticated missile
characteri si tcs. In 1967 it announced another land-based proposal.
This ws the first of many "shell game" configurations, which attemped to
achieve invulnerability and deception by shifting the misisles among
multiple silos (many more silos than missiles) hardened to withstand the
impact of nuclear explosions. A year earlier, McNamara had ordered the
Pentagon's Institute for Defense Analyses to undertake a study of
follow-on generations of strategic weapons from all the armed services.
Known as the Strat-X Study (for Strategic Exercise Study), this analysis
shot down the Air Forces' elaborate shell game system. Strat-X had
concluded that the Soviets eventually would be able to detect the silos
actually housing the missiles. The study was enthusiastic about the
Navy's proposed underwater long-range missile system (ULMS) , though, and
advocated further development of this project, which eventually became
the Trident submarine system being deployed today.
Licking its wounds from Strat-X, but still undaunted, the Air
Force commenced with research on a number of basing modes for its ICBM,
which by 1969 included missiles that could be silo-based, rail-based,
truck. - based, and deeply underwater-based (in silos). In 1970 it added a
version of an air-mobile ICBM, launched from a Lockheed C-jA transport
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plane. The point here is that the Air Force was searching tor some way
to credibly base its new I CBM
,
eventually considering more than 40
ditterent basing options. The motivation tor this investigation came
as much trom interservice rivalry as it did trom any outside threat to
Minuteman missiles. According to Aviation Meek nf July 1970, the Navy's
nascent Trident program "poses a potential threat to the Air Force's
present monopoly on the ICBM arsenal, a tact ot which USAF is well
aware.
"
2V Thus, as one study recalls:
In the early sevent i es . . . Mi nuteman vulnerability was
still regarded as a relatively long-term threat. A more
immediate threat to the land-based ICBM came not trom the
Russians but trom the grand designs ot the U.S. Navy. 30
In 1975, with the MX otticially in advanced development stage
(development, that is, ot missile design, independent ot its basing),
Detense Secretary Schlesinger rejected the Air Force's air-mobile
concept in tavor ot further research into land-based modes. Decisons on
how to base the MX, in other words, were still very much up in the air.
What was certain by the end of the Ford administration, however, was
that despite conflicts over MX basing plans, the missile would be
brought to fruition. Moreover, of special importance for the remainder
of this analysis, the MX would proceed regardless of the veracity of
claims that the system was needed to counter a Soviet nuclear threat to
our Minuteman missiles. Soviet strategic capabilities were not the
primary driving force behind the MX. Changes in U.S. nuclear doctrine
toward a counterforce posture played the leading role. As is so often
the case with new weapons systems, though, the public face of the MX
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decision would most often be painted in Soviet red. The situation by
1976 thus could be summarized as follows:
Publicly, the decision to proceed with the MX was tied
to Soviet restraint in building up its new ICBM forces.
Within the Pentagon, however, the MX missile was non-
negoti abl e. 31
By 1977, then, President Carter was inheriting a full-fledged MX
program in desperate search of a land-based deployment mode. The
preferred Air Force basing mode at the time was a buried trench verison
although, as always, others were under consideration. But Carter
inherited something else besides a missile without a home. He faced a
shifting domestic climate on issues of national security, a climate in
flux partly due to a wel 1 -orchestrated rightwing offensive. This
ideological offensive provided the foreign policy analog to the AEI-type
campaign against OSHA and other regulatory programs in the domestic
sphere.
Leading the cause of resurgent militarism in the U.S. was the
Committee on the Present Danger (CPD)
,
an organization of both old
(Nitze and Eugene Rostow) and relatively new (Jeane Kirkpatrick)
conservatives who sought to help the nation regain its position of
unchallenged world leadership and military superiority lost in the wake
of defeat in Vietnam. 32 The CPD counseled a revival of Cold War
containment of alleged Soviet global expansion to overcome the "Vietnam
syndrome" and reassert U.S. military strength. Apart from Vietnam, the
CPD was reacting to the multicausal erosion of clear, unbridled U.S.
military superiority by the Soviets over the previous two decades.
Although a U.S. margin of supremacy in overall conventional and nuclear
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power actually still existed, "the very tact of Soviet approximation has
detonated the alarmist response in the USA...."” The CPD goal was to
relentlessly package the Soviet threat" as virtually the singular cause
of the country's ills, and by so doing pave the way for increased
expenditures in all areas of the defense budget. More generally, the
CPD functioned to move the terms of political debate rightward on a host
of national security issues.
Among the many issues on which the CPD wielded considerable
influence during the Carter years were opposition to the Panama Canal
Treaties, opposition to the nomination of Paul Warnke as head of both
the the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the SALT negotiations,
fierce opposition in the ratification debate on the SALT II treaty, and
support for the MX missile decison. On the MX issue, the CPD
essentially invented the most widely-cited rationale for deployment of
the MX, the chimerical "window of vulnerability," about which more
later. In terms of setting the context for the newly-elected President
Carter, though, no issue was more telling than CPD dominance of the
infamous Team B report. 34
Under mounting pressure from hard-liners during the 1976 campaign,
President Ford authorized Central Intelligence Agency Director George
Bush to reassess intelligence estimates of Soviet military capabilities
and doctrine. The seven-member group of outsiders, unflinching hawks
all, included four CPD members, with one of them, Richard Pipes, serving
as chair. While the Team B analysis was never made fully public, its
dire view of Soviet military power, notably its very dubious assessment
of burgeoning Soviet military spending, was deliberately leaked to the
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press at the end of December. And although many prominant national
security establishment figures openly took issue with the Team 8
findings -- particularly the alarmist and easi 1 y-ref utab 1 e claim that
the Soviets definitely had achieved overall strategic superiority — the
CPD agenda had been furthered. It had made its stridently anti-detente
position a force to be reckoned with. Its views had been prominent in
the press as the Carter administration prepared to take power. It had,
in short, presaged the Cold War revival to come.
President Carter: In Like A Lamb. Out Like A Lion
The metaphor of March actually overstates President Carter's shift
on matters of national security. The incoming Carter foreign policy
team in 1977 was not 1007. pure lamb to begin with. In fact, it had at
its core some tense internal divisions, which reflected the deep
fissures within the national security establishment. Carter ignored CPD
members when choosing his top advisers. But he did draw heavily from
the ranks of the rival Trilateral Commisison, the group responsible for
opening his eyes to the larger world of national and international
politics beyond the Atlanta corporate elite in 1973. Carter selected
some 25 Tr i 1 ateral i sts to serve in high level foreign policy posts,
among them Cyrus Vance, Harold Brown, Paul War nke , Andrew Young and the
commission's co-founder Zbigniew Brzezinski.
Even within this group, however, competing policy tendencies
existed. Most notable was the policy split between Vance, as Secrtary
of State, and Brzezinski as National Security Adviser. Vance was seen
as a strong supporter of arms control with the Soviet Union, searching
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for ways to forge cooperation between the superpowers. Trilateral world
order politics fit well with his overall geopolitical outlook. As a
fiercely anti
-communi st Polish emigre, Brzezinski took a tougher stance
toward the Soviet Union, linking a host of issues (SALT negotiations
being a major example) to their behavior in certain areas of the world.
He was inclined to view world events through the lens of east-west
rivalry, and would support arms control measures only if they codified
U.S. advantages, as did SALT II with its allowance for the expansion of
our counterforce capabilities which he so cherished. His attitude was
decidedly more militarist than Vance's on issues of the arms race and
U.S. -Soviet relations in general, although he shared Vance's Trilateral
perspective on other important issues, such as the pressing need for
greater collaboration among the major capitalist powers.
For perspective, it is useful to bear in mind that whatever the
policy differences between these two tendencies, they represented
conflict within a shared consensus on the basic need for U.S. military
prowess and the general benevolence of multinational corporate capital.
But the cleavage was real, resulting in some heated internal debates
over the specifics of policy, even if the ends were agreed upon. And it
helped define the character of the Carter administration as it struggled
to balance the disequilibrium. Smith describes the fundamental world
order v. militarism split embodied in Vance and Brzezinski as a division
that "ran like a fault line through the Carter Administration and all
discussion of the wisdom or folly of its particular decisions.
"
3S He
added that the tension contributed to Carter's downfall, commenting that
"He knew they represented different viewpoints but did not appreciate
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how deep the i ncompati bi i ty lay."®* Carter's memoirs confirm his
cognizance of this difference between Vance, who would become his close
personal friend, and Brzezinski:
Zbigniew Brzezinski was perhaps the most contro-
versial member of my team.
...Dr. Brzezinski might not be adequately deferential
to a secretary of state.
There were some inherent differences in the character of
the White House National Security Council staff and the
State Department. I attempted to tap the strongest ele-
ments in each as changing circumstances demanded
.
37
Apparently the president thought he could handle whatever policy
contradictions arose by selecting ideas from one or the other adviser
when it suited his needs, perhaps because he ultimately believed Vance
and Brzezinski 's accorded each other mutual respect. As Carter
remembers: "(In looking at my old notes, I find it interesting that
Vance recommended Brzezinski for this job, and Zbig recommended Cy for
Secretary of State. Both were good suggestions.)" 3 ® Yet Vance claims
that despite agreements to the contrary, and despite repeated directions
from Carter, Brzezinski would not abandon his attempt to assume the role
of chief foreign policy spokesman. In his memoirs, Vance writes of his
growing rift with Brzezinski:
Eventually, as divergences grew wider between my public
statements and his policy utterances, Brzezinski's
practice became a serious impediment to the conduct of
our foreign policy. It also became a political liability,
leaving the Congress and foreign governments with the im-
pression that the administration did not know its own
mind . 39
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What foreign policy analyst Fred Halliday refers to as the "studied
ambivalence of the Carter administration's national security policies
(its mixture of conciliation and belligerency) simply could not be
maintained. 40 In 1979 and 1980, the ambivalence was resolved in favor
of Cold War belligerency, punctuated by the departures of Warnke, Young
and, eventually, Vance. By the end of the Carter years, the lions
roamed freely.
In the beginning, though, it was Jimmy Carter, lamb and moralist,
that brought a squeaky clean view of the world before the Joint Chiefs
of Staff ,(JCS). There in January 1977 he proposed that the U.S. reduce
its stockpile of some 30,000 nuclear warheads down to 200, a supply
adequate to deter any potential adversary. 41 This was not a crazy idea.
If deterrence is the lone goal of U.S. nuclear strategy, 200 warheads
are sufficient to destroy the Soviet Union as anything resembling a
modern society. Defense planners had know this at least since the mid-
196Q's, when McNamara's Pentagon "whiz kids" perfected their computer
projections on nuclear war-f i ght i ng . But what neophyte Carter learned
was the stark reality that deterrence was not the only objective of the
nation's nuclear forces. In fact, the rhetoric of deterring nuclear war
was, and is, largely for public consumption, as I've argued. The real
JCS strategy was to "prevail" in a nuclear war, and to prevail required
counterforce capabilities. This made it much more difficult to conceive
of the arms race having an end point.
Undeterred himself, Carter did make some overtures toward reducing
the threat of the arms race, a sincere desire on his part, including
some early talk of banning all mobile ICBMs, such as the MX. Twice in
214
1977 the new president substantially cut funding requests for the MX.
In January, faced with the outgoing Ford administration request for $294
million for full-scale development of the MX in fiscal year 1978, he
postponed such development for at least a year and cut the request in
half* 42 And again in December, Carter cut funds for full-scale MX
development in fiscal year 1979. This time it was his own Defense
Secretary's approval of an Air Force $245 million plan that was denied,
largely because of uncertainty over how to base the missile, and because
it was thought that approval at this time could adversely affect the
ongoing SALT negotiations.
More telling than Carter's initial stopgap funding cuts
specifically for MX development was his overall view of the way to
address development and deployment of nuclear weapons as an issue in
arms limitation talks with the Soviet Union. As the administration's
SALT II strategy unfolded it became clear that a SALT-MX linkage was
being forged, a linkage ensuring that — lofty rhetoric about ending the
nuclear threat notwithstanding -- the MX was non-negotiable.
With the SALT I Interim Agreement due to expire in October 1977,
Carter wanted to reach a new agreement with the Soviets early in his
term. Toward this end he sent Vance and Warnke off to Moscow in late
March to begin laying the groundwork for a SALT II accord. 43 There they
put forward, and the Soviets emphatically rejected, a proposal calling
for "deep cuts" in nuclear weapons. Vance actually went with two
alternative bargaining proposals. A modest option simply built on the
agreement reached between President Ford and Soviet President Leonid
Brezhnev at Vladivostok in November 1974. Vance and Warnke both favored
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this more cautious approach, figuring it offered the quickest route to a
SALT II agreement, with "deep cuts" negotiable in what they hoped would
be future SALT III discussions. But the decision was made to press
ahead with more substantial reductions.
It is now widely acknowledged the Soviets had good reason to
vehemently denounce the "deep cuts" tactic. Although there are a number
of factors explaining why they did so with such fervor, the most
reasonable and obvious was that the proposed "deep cuts" would have to
come almost exclusively from the Soviet's heavy land-based ICBMs. Since
roughly 75 percent of their strategic nuclear forces are land-based,
this plan was transparently one-sided. Predictably, though, Soviet
rejection was seized by anti-SALT forces, especially the CPD, as
evidence of Soviet intransigence. With a homey flourish, Carter notes
in his memoirs that about a week, before Vance went to Moscow, "Henry and
Nancy Kissinger came by for supper." With Vance and Brzezinski present,
Kissinger (presumably Henry) endorsed the "deep cuts" idea, Carter
recalls, saying it "had a good chance to be accepted by the Soviets if
they are sincere and want to make progress on disarmament. 1,44 So the
stage was set. The Soviets did indeed reject the biased offer, thus
they are insincere, do not want progress in arms talks, and, relatedly,
we therefore (to protect ourselves from these calculating Russians)
should proceed at once with plans to add the MX, the Trident submarine,
cruise missiles, and a stealth bomber to our nuclear arsenal. This kind
of self-fulfilling prophecy -- used by some in the administration to
justify the need for the MX -- is the stuff of the arms race.
The deep cuts" gambit also revealed that President Carter
considered the issue of land-based ICBMs particularly crucial to the
larger issue of nuclear arms. Specifically, he bought into the key
argument that Soviet "superiority 11 in land-based missiles put our entire
Minuteman system at risk. This ICBM vulnerability argument -- later
sloganized into a prime ideological debating tool in Reagan's "window of
vulnerability" — was a major rationale for deploying the MX. Yet as we
will see, given the speciousness of the vulnerability argument and the
vexing, if not insurmountable, dilemma of MX basing, the more basic
reason for the MX was its war-fighting capability, its first strike
accuracy. For although there is a relationship between the design and
characteristics of a missile, on the one hand, and its basing mode, on
the other, it should be kept in mind that there is no logical connection
between a missile's accuracy and its pre-launch vulnerability. The MX
is no less vulnerable a target if it is super accurate, as planned, or
if its accuracy is just that of existing Minuteman III missiles. Only
mobility is a germane response to alleged vulnerability problems. 43
At times, administration officials admitted that the vulnerability
argument was much less than compelling. Defense Secretary Brown's own
words on this issue have been mercurial. In 1978 he openly ridiculed
the idea of a Soviet attack, against vulnerable U.S. missile silos in his
annual report for fiscal year 1979, saying the Soviets would not risk
such a "cosmic throw of the dice." The U.S. would have a wide range of
lethal options remaining if the Soviets took such an unlikely risk,
Brown contended, adding:
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In short, the [theoretical] vulnerability of
M I NUTEMAN is a problem, but even it we did nothing
about it, it would not be synonymous with the vul-
nerability of the United States, or even of the
strategic deterrent. It would not mean that we could
not satisfy our strategic ob jecti ves.
Brown would change his tone, though, as the prospects for a SALT II
treaty appeared to hinge on the U.S. going ahead with new weapons
systems, and as the I960 election approached. In 1979 and 1980 he often
warned of "the growing vulnerability of our land-based missile force,
while adding the proviso that this threat not only was more imminent
than previously believed, but also could eventually imperil our entire
nuclear arsenal . 0,7
Not surprisingly, Brzezinski saw a U.S. first strike threat posed
by the MX as "extremely, extremely threatening" to the Soviet Union, but
ultimately necessary to maintain a "strategic balance" between the
superpowers, given his endorsement of the view that the Soviets had
achieved such a capability. First strike ability, and the modernization
and expansion of U.S. nuclear forces, were unwavering necessities within
his worldview. For his part, Carter generally was more cautious about
assertions of U.S. vulnerability to a theoretical Soviet attack, and
about U.S. first strike effort. In his June 1978 Arms Control Impact
Statement for fiscal year 1979, he voiced his understanding of the MX as
a potentially destabilizing factor in the arms race:
...With the MX deployed in substantial numbers, in
addition to Minuteman, the U.S. would have acquired a
capability to destroy most of the Soviet silo-based
ICBM force in a first strike....
...under extreme crisis conditions, Soviet leaders...
might perceive pressures to strike first themselves.
Such a situation, of course, would be unstable.
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By 1977, with his MX plan in place, he would abandon altogether the
notion of it as a destabilizing influence, repeatedly calling it vital
to the maintenance of "essential equivalence" with the Soviets.
^ / and large, 1978 brought with it mounting pressure for President
Carter to appear tougher on the Soviets, particularly as the superpowers
worked to pare down their differences in the ongoing SALT II meetings.
One indicator of Carter s readiness to do so was his commencement
address at the Naval Academy on June 7. The president devoted the major
part of his speech to a harsh denunciation of the Soviet record on human
rights. Contending that the Soviets are engaged in an "aggressive
struggle" for political advantage and are guilty of a military buildup
"excessive far beyond any legitimate requi r ments , " he flatly asserted
that "the abuse of basic human rights in their own country -- has earned
them the condemnation of people everywhere who love freedom. " 4 ’ Carter
pieced together this important address out of two drafts, a conciliatory
one from Vance and a more confrontational one from Brzezinski. Vance
interpreted the final product as an expression of the administration's
inability to shed its image of inconsistency and uncertainty, but Carter
believed the main impression it left was clearly hard-line. 80 This
impression would grow in 1979, somewhat ironically, as the SALT II
negotiations wound down.
Carter made the two major MX decisions of his presidency in 1979.
On June 8, 1979 the White House announced its long-awaited decision to
proceed with building a full-scale mobile MX missile. 81 While the
details of the basing plan were to be revealed later, Carter had decided
to build to largest version of the MX permissable under the SALT II
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treaty being negotiated. He authorized construction of a ten-warhead
missile with a 92 inch diameter, instead of a smaller 82 inch version.
This seemingly minor difference actually carried some import. It
reflected at least two sets of pressures. First, the smaller version
would have made the MX launchable from the new Trident class submarines,
as well as from a ground-based mobile launcher. The "common missile"
option was scrapped, though, when it became clear that the Air Force and
the Navy could not come to grips with the idea of sharing any control
over these new technologies, and the Navy additionally feared a common
missile might decrease the need for its new deadly accurate Trident II
missile. Second, the larger missile was appealing to those, like
Brzezinski, who felt it was necessary to send the strongest possible
signal to the Soviets about American intentions to "get tough." Warnke
explains that Brzezinski pressed Carter to go with the bigger missile,
summing up the NSC director's philosophy as, "The bigger, the uglier,
the nastier the weapon — the better." The message to the Russians was
to be: "Shape up, buster. We've got the ability to do you in. We're
probably not going to do it — but it's an act of grace on our part."* 2
Supposedly such breast-beating would scare them and, even better,
appease the growing number of critics of a SALT II agreement.
The timing of the MX announcement accentuated Carter's mixed
motives. Coming only a week before he left for Vienna to sign the SALT
II accords, the MX decision was schizophrenic. The "man of peace"
authorizes the largest new nuclear weapons program since the hydrogen
bomb project, and then toasts the goal of world peace and reconciliation
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with Brezhnev. This contradictory juxtaposition fits well with what
later would become President Reagan's "peace through strength" credo.
Both Carter and Reagan have claimed on occasion that the MX is not a
"bargaining chip." This is true, in a sense. MX was not, and is not, a
bargaining chip to be used at the table with the Soviets. But it was a
bargaininig chip to be used with the U.S. Congress, with the intent of
buying Senate votes for ratification of the treaty, opposition to which
had become a kind of cause celebre to conseratives of both parties
opposing detente. The treaty simply could not have been ratified
without Carter agreeing to strongly endorse the MX, and to significantly
increase defense spending, both of which he did. The irony, of course,
is that for all his concessions to conservatives, the ratifying votes
were never cast.
In reality, though, the SALT II accord signed by Carter and
Brezhnev would not have made much difference anyway, in terms of abating
the arms race. As the administration explained on several occasions,
the treaty allowed the U.S. to move forward with plans to deploy not
only the MX, but the Trident submarine system; air-, sea-, and ground-
launched cruise missiles; cruise missile carrier aircraft; cruise and
Pershing II missiles in Europe; and a new long-range bomber. These are
all counterf or ce-enhanci ng weapons — hardly cause for celebrating an
outbreak of peace. Vance writes of the "deep sense of satisfaction"
felt by the Carter negotiating team as the president signed the SALT II
Treaty on June 18. The satisfaction is understandable, if codifying
enormous U.S. advantages over the Soviets was the goal. Of the final
agreement, Vance asserts:
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I was confident that the treaty could stand up well
in an objective debate. It was a balanced, carefully
wrought set of agreements that left us with virtually full
freedom of action to modernize our strategic forces in
every area of interest, while requiring a significant re-
duction in Soviet strategic forces. 53
The treaty was so "balanced" and "carefully wrought" that Brzezinski
actually could support it.
After the Vienna summit, and as the administration was parading
witness after witness before the Senate Foreign Relations committee to
advocate the virtues of combining its military buildup with approval of
the treaty, Carter announced the second half of his MX decision -- his
preferred basing mode. (For a sense of the tenor of the times, recall
that this announcement came on the same day as the President went on
television to quell the uproar over the monumentally ridiculous,
Democratically-baited red herring of Soviet combat troops in Cuba.)
Justifying the move on the grounds that it would strengthen deterrence
and meet the threat of Minuteman vulnerability, the president sketched
basing plans for a mobile MX ICBM system on September 7. "CTlhis system
will enhance our Nation's security," he assured, saying it "is not a
bargaining chip. It's a system that America needs and will have for its
security. 1,34
The basic details of the plan have been well publicized and do not
need close scrutiny here. 55 Suffice to say, the plan employed multiple
protective shelters (MPS) configured in a "racetrack" pattern.
5 * Spread
out across the Great Basin desert in Nevada and Utah, the plan entailed
200 missiles (each with ten nuclear warheads) to be shuttled among 4600
missile shelters (23 per site) on oval roadways, one roadway system per
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missile. The elaborate shell game was thought necessary to achieve the
degree of deception and mobility requisite with some notion of
invulnerability. It carried a stated price tag of $33 billion in 1980
dollars, but virtually no one took, that figure seriously. Pentagon cost
figures are legendary for being understated and unreliable. Indeed,
more disinterested assessments placed the cost of the MX project in the
range of $55 billion to well over $100 billion." 7 As the Air Force
Brigadier General in charge of selling the MX plan to residents of
Nevada conceded under questioning, "This is man's largest project. """
It was common to hear that the scope of the project would dwarf the
pyramids of Egypt. Yet even with such Rube Goldberg complexity, massive
cost, and environmental upheaval, the MPS scheme was no more certain to
ensure the deception necessary to achieve (in theory) i nvul ner ab i 1 ty
than any of the other 40-odd basing plans the Air Force has come up with
over the years. A sense of the poverty of the system's logic can be
gotten by considering that in the absence of a suitable arms control
agreement, plans existed for building thousands of additional missile
shelters if the Soviets responded by expanding their number of warheads
to target all the original 4600 shelters.®* National security, it
seems, was a spiraling, endless proposition.
President Carter provided a hint of the deeper logic of the MX,
though, in an interview with a group of editors after his September 7
announcement. Responding to a question about the wisdom of the U.S.
always maintaining its "defensive posture" in the face of Soviet
"aggressiveness," Carter claimed the MX "gives our country a better
defense or attack capability." 60 This attack capability is not often
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raised publicly, for reasons mentioned earlier. But as the Center For
Defense Information -- a wel 1
-respected (becasue it is staffed by
retired admirals and generals) Washington-based organization opposed to
excessive military spending -- argues, disapprovingly:
Simple logic leads to the conclusion that the MX is a
first strike weapon. There is no other logical mission
for a system which is designed with the power and accuracy
to destroy ICBM launchers. 61
The MX makes no sense as anything but an instrument of first strike.
Its pinpoint accuracy is not necessary except to preemptively attack
hardened missiles. As a second strike, retaliatory weapon, it is
useless. It would be aimed at empty missile silos, not exactly high
priority targets. As the saying goes, with counterforce missiles, you
either "use em, or lose em."
The fleeting candor of Carter's "attack" comment was offset by
countless standard invocations of the national security goal of goals:
deterrence. However, administration documents illustrate how confused
attempts to justify this goal can become. In a fall 1979 letter
responding to congressional inquiry, William J. Perry, Carter's Deputy
Assistant for National Security Affairs, made the following argument:
In regard to the first strike capability of MX, I should
emphasize that we have not changed our basic strategy,
which is and remains to deter war. Deploying MX will not
give us a disarming first-strike capability against the
Soviet Union, since the Soviets would still have large and
powerful strategic forces remaining after an MX strike.
62
Perry's case here is absolutely correct. As we will see later, a first
strike, though we pursue it, is probably unattainable. But if one
reverses his logic, it also absolutely refutes the Minuteman missile
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vulnerability argument used by all administrations, Republican and
Democratic, since the problem surfaced in the 1960's. If the Soviets
would have "large and powerful" forces left after a U.S. first strike
attempt, the U.S. also certainly would have such forces remaining if the
Soviets struck first. In fact, the U.S. forces remaining would be
larqer and more, powerful because a proportionally smaller numhpr of u.S.
missiles (roughly 25 percent, to the Soviets 75 percent) are land-based,
the most vulnerable leg of the triad.
Carter s MRS race track system generated rising public concern in
late-1979 and 1980. While some groups opposed the system and its
justification outright -- reacting negatively to the idea of turning
such a large chunk of the west into a "warhead sponge," as the target of
a saturation attack -- the most frequent opposition centered on the
environmental impact of the project, particularly its potentially
devastating effect on the region's water supply. In July 1979, polls
showed that 63 percent of the people in the Nevada-Utah area supported
the MRS system in their states; by February 1980, support had plummeted
to 39 percent.* 5 The governors of the two states opposed the basing
mode selected by the administration. But as the public posture of Utah
Governor Scott Matheson indicates, much of the "opposition" to the MX
plan wholeheartedly supported the ICBM vulnerability argument and also
supported the need for an MX system.* 4 Often this resulted in alternate
proposals to involve other states in the project so as to minimize the
impact to any one region or state, or plans to base the MX in the air or
on the sea.
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Reacting to these concerns, the Carter administration in May 1980
announced revisions of its MRS system. Most importantly, the new
variation would array the missile's protective shelters in a linear
fashion, abandoning the racetrack oval for a "drag strip." Defense
Secretary Brown contended that this modification would save considerable
amounts land and would be less costly. The other basic characteristics
of the system remained unchanged (eg. the number of missiles and
shelters), although a new shelter design was contemplated.
Technical aspects were not the most crucial development of the MX
system in 1980, however. Changes in the nation's political climate were
paramount, although it is essential to keep in mind that the president's
two major 1979 MX decisons preceded these climatic alterations. 65 In
the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, Carter
requested the SALT II treaty be withdrawn from Senate consideration.
Although there was little or no chance of the agreement being ratified
under any circumstances, pre- or post-invasion, the Soviet incursion
obviated the need for this eventuality. Coupled with the seizing of
American hostages in Iran, and the impending presidential election, U.S.
policy toward the Soviet Union turned increasingly hostile. As former
U.S. Ambassador to Moscow and historian George Kennan reflected, with
proper establishment anxiety, in February: "Never since World War II
has there been so far-reaching a militarization of thought and discourse
in the capital." 66 A heightened Cold War atmosphere pervaded as
Congress authorized the Pentagon to proceed with full-scale development
of the final Carter MX plan on August 1, calling the system "vital to
the security of the United States." But the event most boldly
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confirming the central status of the MX in U.S. strategic thinking was
the revelation of Presidential Directive 59 (PD-59)
.
Leaked to the press only a few days after the MX action in
Congress, and only a few days before the Democratic convention, PD-59
provided the first public articulation of the administration's nuclear
war-fighting strategy. The directive followed some earlier secret
directives (notably PD-18 of mid-1977) that had called for thorough
review of strategic targeting options. Brzezinski's aide Major General
William Odom drafted the plan, which called for preparation to fight
limited nuclear war, and to carry out decapitating strikes against
Soviet political and military command structures. Counterforce
targeting options had emerged from the shadows once again. A spate of
articles and columns appeared decrying the fact that the U.S. was now
"thinking the unthinkable." Of course, such thoughts were far from
novel; their emergence now simply confirmed a trend underway for well
over a decade. This time, however, the maturation of the doctrine was
apparent, including military objectives easily interpreted as moving
beyond even "limited" nuclear conflict. 67 Moreover, the strategy meshed
with several new technologies coming on line to make a U.S. first strike
technically feasible.
Such war-fighting plans verified the triumph of Brzezinski's view
of east-west relations. He had outlasted the primary detente-minded
adivsers in the administration. With protracted nuclear conflict on the
agenda of options, Brzezinski had convinced Carter of the potential
intimidatory value a nation might accrue by virtue of commanding the
military resources and philosophy of counterforce. The stance created
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by PD-59 fit the president's precarious political situation as he
struggled to project himself as a tough, even nationalistic, candidate
for reelection. What had eluded both McNamara, during the Kennedy-
Johnson years, and Schlesinger, during Nixon's second term, Carter was
on the brink of achieving. With PD-59, he forged the synthesis of
counterforce theory and practice.
President Reagan: The Lion Reigns
Whereas President Carter's embrace of counterforce doctrine
signified the final leg of his relatively measured journey rightward in
foreign policy, punctuated as it was by exogenous factors, President
Reagan did not need to learn any stark lessons of Realpolitik. He
naturally thrived in a milieu of Cold War militarism. Yet he brought to
issues of nuclear war a kind of of f handedness — something akin to Dr.
Strangelove — that was unsettling. A danger of PD-59 was that it would
encourage and legitimize a sanguine attitude toward nuclear war on the
part of the national security bureaucracy and future presidents. This
danger received confirmation within the Reagan White House, a fact to
which the casual story told by Ed Meese attests:
Cap Weinberger came in to see the President, and he said,
"Mr. President, you know, the press has been giving us a
hard time on the MX missile. I suggest that we rename it
the Hallmark missile.. .1 hope we never have to do it. But
if we do, I want the Russians to know that we cared enough
to send the very best." 68
This kind of a cavalier attitude toward such a cataclysmic possibility
has surfaced repeatedly during the Reagan years, though more frequently
in his first term. It stems, in part, from the prevalence within
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Reagan's national security apparatus of nuclear strategists openly
dedicated to the war-fighting proposition that nuclear conflict is in
some sense "winnable."
Colin Gray is an exemplar of this war-fighting school. In 1980
Gray co-authored an article entitled "Victory Is Possible" in which he
argued that nuclear war not only is winnable, but the president needs
the strategic capability in initiate such action:
The West needs to devise ways in which it can employ
strategic nuclear forces coercively.... American
strategic forces do not exist soley for the purpose
of deterring a Soviet nuclear threat or attack against
the United States itself. Instead, they are intended
to support U.S. foreign policy, as reflected, for ex-
ample, in the commitment to preserve Western Europe
against aggression. Such a function requires American
strategic forces that would enable a president to
initiate strategic nuclear use for coercive, though
politically defensive, purposes.... If American
nuclear power is to support U.S. foreign policy ob-
jectives, the United States must possess the ability
to wage nuclear war rationally. 69
Reagan appointed Gray, a staff member of the Hudson Institute, to the
advisory board of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and also named
him consultant to the State Department. Arguing that "victory or defeat
in nuclear is possible," Gray clearly endorses the first outcome of
prevailing. Elsewhere he has written favorably of the MX missile's war-
fighting potential to help the U.S. prevail, contending that "survivable
MX I CBM deployment is the key to victory-denial for the Soviets MX
cannot guarantee success to American arms, but it should ensure failure
for the Soviet Union." 70
Other Reagan defense advisers have made similarly provocative
pronouncements, some laced with biblical references to Armageddon
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ushered in by nuclear conflict. And then there is T. K. Jones, named
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering,
Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces. A staunch believer in the
survivability of nuclear war, with the proper civil defense precautions,
Jones created a stir by recommending that would-be nuclear war survivers
"Dig a hole, cover it with a couple of doors and then throw three feet
of dirt on top.... If there are enough shovels to go around, everybody's
going to make it. It's the dirt that does it." 71 My claim here is not
that Jones' eccentricity is typical of Reagan and his national security
team. But his ideas grew out of the widely-shared administration belief
in the efficacy and necessity of civil defense measures, and -- central
to Reagan's military policy -- the unanimous assertion of U.S. ICBM
vulnerability to Soviet attack.
The unreal nature of the military side of Reaganism can best be
capsulized in two fundamental myths, both directly connected to the
president's actions on behalf of the MX: the "decade of neglect," and
the "window of vulnerability." Reagan employs the "decade of neglect"
thesis to justify his crusade to "rearm" America. According to the
accusation of neglect, the U.S. unilaterally disarmed during the 1970's,
leaving the new president no choice but to "repair" the country's
"broken" military machine. The familiar Reagan charge goes like this:
When we took, office in 1981, the Soviet Union had
been engaged for 20 years in the most massive military
buildup in history. Clearly, their goal was not to catch
up but to surpass us. Yet the United States remained a
virtual spectator in the 1 970 ' s , a decade of neglect
that took a severe toll on our defense capabilities. 72
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There is superficial plausibility to the charge: following the
peak years of spending for the Vietnam War, U.S. military expenditures
were down throughout much of the decade, bottoming out in fiscal year
1975. 73 This decline was due primarily to U.S. disengagement from
Vietnam and the aftermath of the war, which included Congressional
reticence toward military spending and persistantly high rates of
inflation. Notice that these factors are independent of any "Soviet
Threat." The concomitant Reagan charge -- borrowed from the CPD's
aforementioned Team B fiction — was that the Soviets had undertaken a
massive increase in military spending during these years of a relative
U.S. ebb in expenditures and, relatedly, had overtaken the U.S. in
expenditures. But both charges are false, except if grounded in the
discredited Team B accounting methods. 74 Soviet military outlays
actually were gradual but steady throughout the period in question,
rarely rising above 2 percent per year. 73 And if NATO and Warsaw Pact
figures are included in the overall spending balance, the scale is
tipped even more toward the west.
While bogus in general, the "decade of neglect" thesis becomes
utterly ludicrous when applied to the Carter years. Actual defense
outlays rose more than 12 percent during Carter's four years, and would
have been higher if not for inflation. Increases in his last two
budgets were particularly precipitous. While this does not measure up
to Reagan's almost 30 percent increase in outlays during his first term
— at approximately $1.1 trillion, the largest sustained peacetime
military buildup in U.S. history -- it hardly constitutes "neglect."
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Moreover, Carter was responsible for major additions in the area of
strategic nuclear forces, including the MX missile, Trident submarine
(with the new Trident II missile), stealth bomber, and cruise missile
programs, as well as other military areas - a point Brzezinski has made
in defense of his former boss against charges that he was "soft" on the
Soviet Union . 7e As one careful analyst of the Carter military program
has observed, "the Reagan rhetoric tof the 'decade of neglect'] tended
to obscure the fact tht Reagan's program was mostly an acceleration of
the buildup alredy begun under Carter." 7 ? In light of the real military
affinity between the two presidents, Carter understandably has been
upset by Reagan's repeated attempts to pin the "neglect" charge on him.
In a front page story on March 2, 1986, the New York Times carried
an interview (arranged at Carter's request) to respond to Reagan's
assertion the week before that he had not increased military spending or
modernized strategic forces. The former president was "irate," saying
Reagan "habitually" misrepresents the record of U.S. military programs
with contentions "he knows are not true and which he personally promised
me not to repeat." 70 Carter pointed with pride to his contribution to
defense spending and strategic upgrading, saying that he and Presidents
Ford and Nixon had initiated almost all strategic nuclear weapons
programs. (Ignoring contrary evidence, Reagan has made demonstrably
misleading claims, such as his assertion, in the middle of Congressional
debate over MX funding, that after taking office "we began immediately
to make up for the irresponsibility of the seventies and to revitalize
the three legs of our nuclear triad. ") 7,? "This is the first time I have
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gone public," Carter lamented, "but some of his statements are almost
more than a human being can bear." 80
Although as we will see, circumstances have rendered President
Reagan unable to use the slogan "window of vulnerability" any longer,
the principle thesis of this second myth still is deployed. The Carter
administration, of course, also had subscribed to a version of the idea
that Minuteman missiles were becoming vulnerable to attack from Soviet
ICBMs. But this threat remained more explicitly theoretical for most of
Carter's term. It was only as the election approached within an
atmosphere of renewed Cold War politics that administration figures
claimed a more immediate ICBM threat, and extended it include a threat
to all U.S. forces, not just missile silos. For Reagan, however,
vulnerability always has been played as more imminent, a direct threat
to our ability to deter. The comparative level of alarmism trumpeting
the alleged danger is much higher. Of particular value during the 1980
presidential election, the frightening window metaphor conjures up
images of thousands of Soviet missiles flying into our national home,
while we sit idly by with no recourse. Or, knowing of these awesome
Soviet capabilities, U.S. leaders soon would have no choice but to
succumb to nuclear blackmail, as candidate Reagan meant when he told an
interviewer that the window soon would be open so wide "the Russians
could just take us with a phone call." 81
The beauty of the "window of vulnerability" thesis for the Reagan
administration has been its amorphous nature. Although the CPD-inspired
scenario consistently has proclaimed a Soviet ability to knock out 90
percent of our land-based missiles, the time frame has varied
-- early,
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mid, and late 1980's projections have been common -- as has speculation
o-f just how far open the window is at any one time. 02 And arguments
have ensued over how to best close the window. Given the fluidity of
the concept, its potential for ideological manipulation, it is useful to
keep in mind what the Federation of American Scientists had to say in
1974 about the Nixon-Schlesinger version a of surprise Soviet
counterforce attack scenario against U.S. ICBMs: "The entire scenario
is bizarre -- enormous risk, for no point. ...One can only imagine that
the Joint Chiefs have been smoking pot." 03 Today such scenarios still
offer an impaired perspective.
"Window of vulnerability" claims are deficient in a number of
respects, some of which have been touched upon earlier. Briefly put,
the argument about the vulnerability of land-based ICBMs requires one to
suddenly become blind to the retaliatory capacity of the other two legs
of the U.S. strategic triad. Fifty percent of all U.S. strategic
nuclear warheads are in submarines which are virtually invulnerable to
attack. And a full 25 percent of our warheads are aboard long-range
bombers. Even i_f_ the Soviets could take out 90 percent of our silos, we
still would retain the vast majority of our strategic weapons. It is
implausible in the extreme to assume any adversary would harbor the
intention of a first strike against such a force structure. Moreover,
in the event the Soviets intended such a suicidal venture, the liklihood
of them being technically capable of doing it are equally fantastic,
given the enormous problems of accuracy and operational reliability of
missiles under actual war conditions.
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The details at the massive uncertainties of a first strike are
well known. 0 * Without delving too deeply here into this somewhat arcane
(but actually comprehensible) world ot technical nuclear calculus, they
include problems of missile bias, the amount a missile drifts from its
flight path due to uncorrected gravitational field anomalies. Testing
to overcome bias never establishes anything approaching certainty, or
even high probability, since neither country test fires its missiles
over the north pole, the path they actually would travel in a nuclear
exchange. The general accuracy of a missile is influenced by other
factors as well, such as fratricide, which is the lingering effect of
debris, wind currents and shock waves from earlier warhead detonations
on incoming warheads. Warheads are extremely sensitive to such
environmental phenomena, and since pinpoint accuracy is necessary to
destroy a missile silo, even small decreses in precision can render a
warhead useless for its intended job. Reliability and readiness also
enter into calculations of vulnerability. Neither the Soviets nor the
U.S. can be sure what percentage of their total force would fail to
launch, or fail at other phases of its flight, although significant
failure is virtually certain. And in the area of general readiness,
the U.S. is for a number of reasons conceded to have a higher percentage
of its nuclear forces at an advanced state of readiness necessary for a
first strike.
Missile accuracy is measured by circular error probable (CEP),
defined as the radius of a circle centered on a target within which half
the warheads are expected to fall. The smaller the CEP, the greater the
accuracy. The MX has an estimated CEP of 300 feet, meaning in theory it
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should be able to deliver five of its 10 warheads to within 300 feet of
their target. With the deployment of the Navstar global positioning
satellite system, midcourse corrections for ICBMs (MX, Trident I and II,
and others) could bring the CEP for the MX to less than 100 feet. The
most accurate Soviet ICBM has an estimated CEP in the neighborhood of
600 feet, but they too are working to improve accuracy. Even a modicum
of evenhandedness
,
and knowledge of history, would grant the U.S. a wide
technological edge over the Soviets. Vet proponents of the "window"
thesis exaggerate claims about the pace and quality of Soviet advances
in accuracy, since in the absense of such improvements the window thesis
is transparently false. As Federation of American Scientists arms
control analyst Christopher Paine points out:
Crediting the Soviets now , or in the future, with
"worst-case" capabilities which they might obtain 10
years hence ... is one of the defense establishment's
primary techniques for selling new weapons programs
to Congress and the public. In the case of the ^BO-
SS "window of vulnerability," the available evidence
points to a distortion and exaggeration of Soviet
capabi 1 ities. . . . (his emphasis) 35
Although Paine's assertion is valid, what needs to be added is
acknowledgment that the Soviets are, by far, more vulnerable to a first
strike threat because of their previously-mentioned force structure .
top-heavy as it is with relatively vulnerable land-based ICBMs.
Whatever the vulnerability of Minuteman missiles -- and the evidence
above suggests is is greatly overstated -- the Soviets are saddled with
three-quarters of their strategic forces on the ground. Farfetched as
they are, vulnerability scenarios must be seen as a greater possibility
-- hence, danger -- to the Soviets than to the U.S. a4>
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Lest we be distracted by the details of the above discussion of
the implausibi 1 ity of vulnerability to a first strike, it bears
reiteration that the MX is irrelevant to such scenarios. A new missile
does not make American forces any less vulnerable. Equally irrelevant
to vulnerability is the MX s characteristic degree of precision
. New
missiles with sophisticated capabilities have no impact on Minuteman
vulnerability. Only a different basing mode for older land-based forces
-- or abandoning them altogether while enhancing our submarine force,
thus eliminating them as first strike targets -- genuinely would address
concerns about their vulnerability. Nevertheless, armed with his two
myths, which together instilled in him the belief that the Soviets had
achieved a "margin of superiority" over the U.S. in strategic nuclear
weaponry, President Reagan joined the MX fight.
Needless to say, Reagan viewed the missile system as a key
variable in the quest to close the window of vulnerability. However,
that rationale was becoming increasingly untenable. The first
administration action on the MX came in March 1981, when Secretary of
Defense Caspar Weinberger established a committee to explore alternative
basing modes. 87 Opposition to the system had been gaining strength in
Nevada and Utah, and the administration had doubts about the complexity
and survivability of the Carter multiple shelter scheme. The committee,
chaired by Nobel prize-winning physicist Charles Townes, was to report
July 1, 1981, but in fact a summary of its findings was not made public
until March 1982. Townes' panel found "no practical mode" of basing
ICBMs on land that would ensure survivability, a finding that jibed with
a major basing study released by the Office of Technology Assessment in
237
March 1981. When two of Reagan's Senate allies, Jake Garn (R. Utah) and
close friend Paul Laxalt (R. Nevada) announced their opposition to the
Carter plan envisioned for their states, the president the accumulated
weight of opinion left little choice but to search for an alternative MX
route
.
On October 2, 1981 Reagan formally scrapped the multiple shelter
basing system and, hoping to make the MX more saleable, reduced the
requested number of missiles to 100. With an obligatory reference to
the neeed to forestall the opening of a "window of vulnerability," he
said that up to 40 missiles would be housed temporarily in existing but
hardened Titan and Minuteman silos, the very silos under the gun from
the alleged Soviet threat. In the meantime, he outlined plans to search
for alternative permanent basing schemes, including air mobility, deep
underground basing and silos protected by ballistic missile defense
systems. All of these plans were mired in long-standing problems,
though, and testified to the fact the president was clutching at straw
in an effort to rationalize a fundamentally flawed missile. Even a
Congress by and large supportive of the idea of strengthening the
ground-based leg of the triad, and generally deferential to Pentagon
strategies of all types, was finding it hard to square the new plan (and
early 1982 revisions) with its stated aim of promoting invulnerability.
Whatever misgivings Congress had, however, did not prevent legislators
from continuing to authorize money for MX development, although
deadlines were set for final administration selection of a secure basing
mode
.
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The next major administration push -for the MX came November 22,
1982, as a Congressional basing mode selection deadline neared. That
evening the president went on national television to unveil his latest
MX plan. Earlier in the day, in a move that would have made Orwell
blush with pride, he had announced that henceforth the MX, a war-
fighter's weapon if there ever was one, officially would be called
"Peacekeeper." The president pulled out all the stops in his effort to
introduce the waiting public to the ways of peace, augmenting his
address with multi-colored charts portraying a dynamic and relentless
Soviet arms buildup, along side a pathetic, weak-kneed U.S. stasis.
You often hear that the United States and the Soviet
Union are in an arms race. Well, the truth is that
while the Soviets Union has raced, we have not. As
can see from this blue line... 00
Ah yes, the blue line. A relationship of direct proportionality seems
to exist between the magnitude of the deception and the need to
embellish it with the trappings of objectivity. The president assured
his listeners, "I could show you chart after chart where there's a great
deal of red and a much lesser amount of U.S. blue." Indeed. The point
of Reagan's theatrics was to support his contention that "the MX is the
right missile at the right time." As for the big decision, the MX was
to be based in 100 closely spaced superhar dened silos in Wyoming. Also
known as a "dense pack" mode, the plan hoped to maximize invulnerability
by using the effects of fratricide to throw off incoming Soviet ICBMs.
True, the Soviets would know exactly where all 100 missiles are, but
they would be spaced in such close proximity that to destroy some of
them would ensure that others survived because some attacking missiles
239
would be thrown off course. One rather obvious problem, unaddressed by
the president, is that the fratricide effect can be expectd to throw off
whatever surviving U.S. missiles were launched in retaliation.
Despite the charts with blue and red lines, "dense pack" did not
even make it through the Christmas holiday. The plan proved too hard
for Congress to swallow, and in late December the president's request
for roughly 1 1 billion for MX procurement was denied. Congress did,
however, approve funds for research and development on the missile and
basing, asking the president once again to reexamine basing modes and
report back after March 1, 1983. Ushering in the new year, President
Reagan established on January 3 his second MX commission, this time
headed by retired General Brent Scowcroft, former national security
adviser to President Ford. The president's Commission on Strategic
Forces (usually referred to as the Scowcroft Commission) issued its
final report in April. 09 The report made a straightforward argument for
the further development of U.S. counterforce capability, saying that in
order to "frustrate Soviet efforts at [nuclear] blackmail," and the
accompanying advantages of political coercion, the U.S.
must be able to put at risk those types of Soviet
targets -- including hardened ones such as military
bunkers and facilities, missile silos, nuclear weapons
and other storage, and the rest -- which the Soviet
leaders have given every indication by their actions
they value most, and which constitute their tools of
control and power. We cannot afford the delusion
that Soviet leaders -- human though they are and
cautious though we hope they will be are going
to be deterred by exactly the same concerns that
would dissuade us. 90
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The commission found a place for the MX within this counterforce
strategy, namely providing military planners the "ability to destroy
Soviet military targets, hardened or otherwise." Accordingly, the panel
recommended immediate deployment of 100 MX missiles in existing silos of
older Minuteman and Titan II missiles scheduled to be decommissioned.
In order to justify this basing method in vulnerable, unhardened
silos, the commission had to drop a bomb of its own -- it slammed shut
the "window of vulnerability." In essence, the commission said the
window never existed. There was enormous irony in Reagan's own group
of MX devotees putting the lie to his favorite slogan of fear, but the
magnitude of the deception proved too much. With measured words, the
commission report insists that "the different components of our
strategic forces should be assessed collectively and not in isolation,"
for
:
whereas it is highly desirable that a component of the
strategic forces be survivable when it is viewed
separately, it makes a major contribution to deterrence
even if its survivability depends in substantial measure
on the existence of one of the other components of the
force. S’ 1
In the language of establishment admonition, the commisison gently
chided those who "miscast" the issue of ICBM vulnerability by viewing
them in isolation, thus pushing for the quick deployment of an almost
totally survivable new ICBM. This haste and sense of immediate
vulnerability is unwarranted if U.S. strategic forces are viewed in
terms of their "mutual survivability."
Members of Congress were upset that MX survivability no longer
mattered very much, particularly when their memories told them that ICBM
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vulnerability, in the words of Senator Gary Hart, "was precisely what we
were talking about. But in the view of the Scowcroft report, weapons
programs sorely needed a "greater degree of national consensus," so a
little historical rearranging seemed in order. The commission offered
other recommendations as well, notably the development of a small,
single-warhead ICBM (since dubbed "Mi dgetman" ) to augment the MX;
research aimed at resolving the uncertainties regarding silo hardness,
to apply to the MX, a small ICBM, and other future ICBMS; and
accelerated research, development and testing of an antiballistic
missile system.
The Scowcroft Commission's findings effectively have framed the MX
debate over the last few years. And despite the fact that it censured
the "window" thesis and its proponents, both the now-explicitly-
vulnerable MX, and President Reagan's credibility on military issues,
have not lost their appeal. Yet the deterrence argument stands exposed.
The Scowcroft Commission said deterrence "requires us to determine, as
best we can, what would deter them [the Soviets] from considering
aggression, even in a crisis...." The MX represents the most tempting
target in the U.S. strategic nuclear arsenal. In Minuteman silos, it
serves as the prime object of a preemptive Soviet attack. Indeed, to
Soviet military planners, it must invite attack, since its principle
utility can only be to facilitate a U.S. first strike.
In the wake of Reagan's endorsement of the Scowcroft findings, the
MX was successfully test flown, and Congress authorized the production
of the first 21 missiles. Since then, the most significant controversy
over the project occurred in the spring of 1985 when, after considerable
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debate about the specific number, Congress placed a limit of 50 on the
number of missiles that can be housed in Minuteman silos. Debate was
accutely influenced by Reagan's skillful lobbying. In a radio address
on March 15, he described the Minuteman missiles as "aging." "It's sort
of like a 1963 jalopy with some new parts," he explained.’ 3 He failed
to mention that Minuteman missiles have been upgraded continually right
through the early 1980 s, and that "some new parts" on the Minuteman III
missiles include an improved guidance system giving them (theoretical)
accuracy in excess of the Soviet's most accurate ICBMs, and higher
explosive yield. To the "jalopy" gambit he added manipulation of the
arms negotiations gambit. With U.S. negotiators engaging the Soviets in
Geneva, he made the case that "the rug shouldn't be pulled out from
under them." This is a variation on an old theme; as we have seen, the
MX was linked to arms negotiations in the Carter administration as well,
when the SALT II Treaty was on the line.
The spring 1985 compromise stipulated that the president obtain
approval of a new, more secure basing mode before this limit can be
lifted. Following the Reykjavik Summit in October 1986, his second with
Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, Reagan began the process of complying
with this requirement. In his address to the nation upon his return,
the president had stressed the importance for arms control of the
distinction between words and deeds:
I told Mr Gorbachev — again in Reykjavik as I had in
Geneva -- we Americans place far less weight upon the
words that are spoken at meetings as these, than upon
the deeds that follow.
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Only two months later, the president unveiled his latest deed on behalf
of the MX. The new proposal resurrected the discredited "rail garrison"
option. Although the details remain to be worked out, initial plans
call for 25 six-car trains with each train carrying two MX missiles,
thus constituting the additional 50 missiles.* 3 The trains would remain
at air bases (10 possibile sites already have been selected) until a
time of national emergency, when they would be dispersed along domestic
rail lines. It is unreasonable, of course, to expect that the Pentagon
would yet come forward with its plans for resolving the tricky old
"public interface" problem, as well as the assorted dilemmas of
environmental impact, vulnerability (if that still merits any official
attention), and the like. Review of such matters will commence this
coming January, the same year the 50 original MX missiles in Minuteman
silos will become fully operational. The only certainty is that when
the time comes, the effort will be made to railroad the new scheme as
essential to our "national security."
The future of national security and arms control remains unclear.
The Reykjavik talks ran into the Star Wars juggernaut and Reagan's
unwillingness to consider serious restrictions on its development and
deployment. The strategic defense initiative (SDI) is being marketed as
a protective shield that will "make nuclear weapons obsolete." "How
does a defense of the United States threaten the Soviet Union or anyone
else?" the president wondered aloud after the summit. In fact, no one
takes the idea of SDI as a leakproof astrodome very seriously. But as
the Scowcroft Commission confirms, it is commonly understood within the
defense establishment that short of an impenetrable shield, a Star Wars
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ballistic missile defense (BUD) system would have enormous value in
offering "point defense" for U.S. strategic nuclear weapons. These
intermediate utilities," as they are called, like point defense, could
among other things provide cover for vulnerable weapons systems like the
MX. Thus they would enhance the security not of people, but of
counterforce weapons.
An SD 1 -MX link would underscore something that already is an
accomplished fact: the complete disappearance of meaningful distinction
between "offense" and "defense" in nuclear warfare. While counterforce
weapons continue to be researched, designed and built, we will be
subject to ever more presidential rhetoric about their contribution to
"national security" and "deterrence." The public rationalizations for
weapons such as the MX will get increasingly thin, as the clamour for
them thickens. In 1981 Defense Secretary Weinberger made the following
pitiful plea as he initiated the Townes Committee investigation into MX
basing modes: "We need the MX missile, please tell us where to put
it."'5’ 7' More than six years later, the Reagan administration still has
no publicly credible idea of how to solve this dilemma.
Conclusion: The Structural Inertia of National Security
It is almost incredible, until you ponder the routineness of it,
that 50 MX missiles will be fully operational by the end of next year.
Their deployment now cannot be stopped. And the others are on the way.
Their existence stands as testimony to the structural inertia of a
weapons system flying under the the all-purpose, one-thr eat-f i ts-al 1
banner "national security." The title of this chapter reads, in part,
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"The MX Missile Confronts Two Presidencies." Weapons like the MX appear
as life, as if they live and breathe, requiring that we do the only
thing humanely justifiable and find them a comfortable home. Presidents
are rhetorical gardeners whose job is to nurse these little sapplings to
health with stock phrases about "security" and "defense." As one arms
analyst has written of Reagan's MX plan:
The MX, it appears, will be deployed in silos, for
no other reason than the sheer momentum of its production
process. The production and deployment of the weapon have
become ends in themselves, serving no larger plan or
purpose than the Administration's diffuse and inchoate
desire for "strength.
"
va
The argument about momentum and structural inertia can be taken
too far, however. For there is. a larger purpose to the MX. Its goal is
to complement the ambitions of counterforce doctrine, which seek to
privide the U.S. with the ability to fight limited nuclear wars, or
launch a successful preemptive first strike against the Soviet Union.
It is within this (largely private) overall framework that programs like
the MX take on their (largely public) appearance of inevitability. If
the MX confronted Presidents Carter and Reagan, and not the other way
around, it is because neither one of them wanted to confront the logic
of national security driving the missile toward deployment.
President Carter came to office intending, at least rhetorically,
to question this logic. As I have indicated, he was mindful of the
"shadow over the earth," and saw as a contributory factor the weapons
procurement process, about which he observed that "once it gains
momentum, it is almost impossible to stop." But as the political
climate of the country grew darker, particularly around the midpoint of
246
his term, he could do nothing to lighten things up. Indeed, even as he
signed an arms control agreement, he was lengthening the "shadow over
the earth." The factors contributing to the shift toward militarism had
little to do with the "Soviet threat," with the sole exception of the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, whose linkage to arms control is of
dubious value and which, at any rate, postdated the rightward turn of
U.S. foreign policy.
Without an alternative logic, without a desire and a program to
challenge conventional notions of national security -- steeped in a
presumed connection between nuclear weapons and security, and fueled by
a visceral hatred for something called "communism" and vigilance against
the "Soviet threat" -- Carter was swamped by a tide of belligerence. By
the end of his term it seemed as natural for him to be endorsing an MX
scheme as it always would seem for his successor. In his memoirs Carter
offers this reflection on Soviet foreign policy: "CTlhe fact was that
when violence occurred in almost any place on earth, the Soviets or
their proxies were most likely to be at the center of it."^ Save for
intensity, this statement rivals any of Reagan's assertions that the
Soviets are "the focus of evil in the modern world." President Reagan,
for his part, did not undergo a shift on defense matters. As with his
consistent belief that regulation inhibits the great talisman of
economic growth, he had no intention of questioning any aspects of the
fundamental assumptions of "national security." For him, "national
security" needs are everywhere, always.
Congress also remained under the spell of "national security."
That body accepted wholeheartedly the definitions and goals of U.S.
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security needs underlying the various MX decisions. Legislators found
themselves, along with the president, debating and ultimately ratifying
the details of what kind of MX system we would have. But we would have
the system. As one MX-watcher notes, "Congress has consistently
authorized and appropriated funds requested for MX research and
development, and it has rejected amendments to delete funding ." 100 This
fact should give pause to political scientists wedded to conventional
theories of the presidency, and their overdrawn emphasis on the balance
of power between the executive and legislative branches. Concern for
this institutional balance assumes that one branch conceivably would do
something different than the other if the balance tipped in their
direction, something at odds with the beliefs and aims of the branch
disadvantaged by the imbalance. But this is not a reasonable assumption
within the current configuration of the two institutions.
Finally, it must be said that the MX dilemma is much larger than
just the MX missile and the assorted national security rationalizations
for its deployment discussed herein. National security is big business.
The imperatives of corporate profitability bring a whole different but
related set of pressures to bear on these military-technical decisions.
With the Reagan administration, and particularly with its advocacy of a
Star Wars program, the economics of defense are glaringly obvious. The
torrent of defense contracts associated with Star Wars, the MX, and a
host of other military projects shows no sign of abating. Indeed, the
entire edifice of the "Reagan recovery" is built upon a military
foundation. Perhaps the single most significant sectoral investment
trend in the economy over the last few years has been toward military
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investment
,
as key industries such as manufacturing and transportation
seek, to restore their economic health under the influence of military
Keynesianism or, more appropriately, "deficitary militarism." 101
Thus we have come full circle. Today more than ever, the
imperatives of the state -- economic growth and national security -- and
hence the imperatives of the presidency, are indissolubly intertwined.
And this bond makes the structural exigencies just that much more
dangerous for the presidency. As presidents press ahead in their
pursuit of national security -- along with the attendant ambiguities
inherent in counterforce weaponry and the apparent bounties of military
spending -- the self-defeating logic of that pursuit will become clearer
and more acute. The escalation and refinement of counterforce weapons,
and nuclear weapons generally, accelerates the arms race and makes
nuclear war more likely. The quest for national security, therefore,
increasingly undermines itself. This self-defeating logic tightly
confines the thoughts and actions of the president. Relaxing this logic
should be the most urgent political priority of the nuclear age.
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CHAPTER FIVE
CONCLUSION:
TOWARD A STRUCTURAL THEORY OF THE PRESIDENCY
There have been five considerable crises in American
history.... So far, it is clear, the hour has brought
forth the man.
— Harold Laski
,
1 9 4
0
1
The threat is nearly invisible in ordinary ways.
It is a crisis of confidence. It is a crisis that
strikes at the very heart and soul and spirit of our
national will. We can see this crisis in the growing
doubt about the meaning of our own lives and in the
loss of a unity of purpose for our Nation.
-- Jimmy Carter 2
As we came to the decade of the 80's, we faced the
worst crisis in our postwar history....
The heart of America is strong, good, and true.
The cynics were wrong -- America never was a sick
society. We're seeing a rededication to bedrock values
of faith, family, work, neighborhood, peace, and free-
dom — values that help bring us together as one people,
from the youngest child to the most senior citizen.
— Ronald Reagan 3
Once again, the American presidency is in crisis. In this year of
the carefully managed bicentennial celebration of the Constitution, the
presidency of Ronald Reagan is being held up to the light of scrutiny
not seen since the days of the Watergate hearings. Accordingly, we can
expect a flurry of political scientists postulating about the office,
its strengths, its weaknesses, its future.
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One theorist already has seen his stock rise, and he has weighed
in with a predictable "I told you so." Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., a
leading proponent of what I have called the restrictivist school of
thought, finds in the Iran-contra scandal confirmation of his thesis on
the "imperial presidency." Recall Schlesinger's argument that the
presidency becomes imperial when the constitutional balance between
presidential power and presidential accountability (especially vis-a-vis
Congress) is upset in favor of an overzealous exercise of former.
Schlesinger sees the constitutional balance fluctuating in a cyclical
fashion throughout history. This danger of systemic imbalance -- "the
perennial threat to the constitutional balance" — resides largely in
the sphere of foreign affairs, where "the imperial temptation" is always
just one international crisis away.* While Congress, the courts, the
press and the public strenuously exercise their role as countervailing
centers of power in the domestic sphere, they "generally lack confidence
in their own information and judgment" when it comes to foreign policy.®
So the imperial temptation lies in waiting, surfacing as the pol itical
will to challenge the chief executive ebbs.
President Reagan succumbed to the urge, engaging in activities
Schlesinger characterizes as "foolish," such as the " I r an-Ni car agua
flimflam." On this reading, then, the Iran-contra hearings represent a
healthy reassertion of Congress' rightful duty to check excesses of
power occurring within our system of separation of powers. To those
critics of the hearings who believe a tough congressional inquiry into
misdeeds of the Reagan administration will cripple the office, resulting
another "failed presidency," Schlesinger responds that "No one need
fear
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that the recurrent uproar against the imperial presidency will inflict
permanent damage on the office. For the American presidency is
indestructable.
Every day of the congressional probe brings with it sickening new
evidence of the deficiency of Schl esi nger ' s widely-acclaimed thesis.
Covered with an thick overlay of apology for the existence of the
investigatory committee, deference to the witnesses, and hopelessly
misframed questions (eg. "Richard Secord: patriot or profiteer?") the
hearings verily shout out the daydream-like quality of the argument that
Congress can be expected to restore balance to a foreign policy
apparatus tilted toward the president. Columnist Alexander Cockburn put
it well with his observation: "True to gloomy predictions, Republicans,
with the slack-jawed acquiescence and even vociferous support of most
Democrats, have turned the joint congressional investigation into a pro-
contra rally ." 7
We should have expected this bipartisan cheerleading for the
essence of Reagan's policy, of course. Only days before the hearings
commenced, Senate Intelligence Committee Chair David Boren (D. Oklahoma)
expressed what he considers to be the crux of the Iran-contra affair:
The American people should understand that the
worst thing that happened here, and the most danger-
ous thing that happened, is that the whole constitu-
tional process was perverted. Did the president
faithfully carry out the letter and spirit of the
law. ..or was he ignoring it, and, in fact, did he
subvert the process? (my emphasis ) 0
Important as laws such as the Boland amendments are, crucial though
cooperation and consultation between the executive and legislative
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branches surely is, the fact remains that Congress as a body does not
for a second oppose the notion that the United States has the right to
sit in judgment over the internal affairs of a sovereign nation "in our
backyard. The gist of Reagan's case against the "Communist menace" in
our hemisphere, the assertion that Nicaragua suffers under the heal of a
cruel Sandinista dictatorship, goes unquestioned on Capitol Hill. The
policymaking process is at issue before the joint committee, not the
policy itself. Schl esi nger ' s contention that an invigorated Congress
offers the remedy for America's occasional lapse into global messianism
thus is wide of the mark,. There is no substantive policy balance to be
restored; only a procedural imbalance exists, as Boren's comments
indicate. The presidency may on occasion become more or less
procedural ly imperial, but the historic, defining character of the
substance of U.S. foreign policy always has been steeped in the imperial
urge, and particularly so toward Central America. **
One of the central purposes of my study has been to fundamentally
challenge the way political science examines and theorizes about the
presidency. Schl esi nger ' s restrictivist perspective is but one example
of the dominant theoretical orientation of the field of presidential
studies to which I take exception. Chapter 1 surveys major works in the
discipline, breaking them down into two major schools of thought. The
expansivist school argues for vigorous presidential leadership of the
political system. With the image of Franklin Roosevelt's tenure firmly
in mind, expansivists stake out a position which commends the active,
power-wielding, and programmatic chief executive, a perspective that
perhaps finds its ultimate expression Richard Neustadt's equation of the
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good of the country with the good of the presidency. Although the
congratulatory glow of the expansivist sun is not as bright as it was
from the immediate postwar period through the mid-1960's, such ideas are
still with us. The works of expansivist James MacGregor Burns, for one,
have received special attention of late in the formulation of programs
to overcome the deadlock and incoherence that can result from a
political system of divided powers. 10
The danger inherent in the expansivist logic fueled the
alternative orientation, the restrictivist perspective, which adopted a
much more cautious approach to presidential power. To be sure, there
were some political scientists who blamed the decline of the office on
the pathological personality of Richard Nixon and character flaws of
Lyndon Johnson. These theorists longed for the day of a renewed
expansivist chief executive, albeit one with the "right" blend of
personality traits, whatever that might be. In the wake of Vietnam and
the fallout from Watergate, though, political scientists more commonly
began to perceive the shortcomings of unchecked presidential initiative,
particularly the constitutional deformation rampant in the many facets
of Nixon's secretive presidential war. Schlesinger, among others,
reoriented the field toward the assertion that the scope of executive
action at times must be restricted by a Congress willing to stand up to
the chief executive. And a corollary of this position has been the need
to hold down public expectations about what presidents in general can
accompl i sh
.
When it considers the presidency, political science tends to
vacillate between versions of these two dominant perspectives. In
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opposition to this orthodoxy, I have proposed in chapter 2 a structural
alternative. To differentiate a structural theory in the deep sense
that I intend from what are often termed the "structural" concerns of
the mainstream views, I explained that the two traditional theories
think of structure in a shallow way, exclusively in terms of
constitutional structure.** Thus the political structure often is
explored, leaving us with discussions of the relative balance of power
between the president and Congress, but without an analysis of the
fundamental assumptions underlying government institutions. Structure
understood in the deeper sense of the word, by comparison, would focus
analysis on these core assumptions which usually are taken for granted,
notably the context of the political economy of liberal democratic
capital ism.
On a structural reading of the presidency, the prevailing
approaches exhibit several interconnected deficiences. Orthodox
theories take for granted the setting within which presidents operate,
seldom questioning the priorities of corporate capitalism or the foreign
policy which supports its worldwide operation. Such theories cut
themselves off from the possibility that the "crisis" of the office —
which they all in some sense acknowledge -- may in fact have much to do
with the continued pursuit of goals consonant with these priorities.
Thus the ends of presidential behavior seldom are scrutinized; they are
treated as off limits. Only the means are addressed, rendering these
orientations highly instrumental in focus. In addition, the very nature
of the two perspectives narrows the range of acceptable debate about the
office, confining it to questions revolving around the relative balance
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of power between the White House and Congress, as it tilting one way or
the other would throw the system in a direction at odds with the basic
beliefs of orthodox consensus. Finally, such theories are overly
descriptive. Since "what is" is assumed to be "what should be," studies
proceed to explore government processes and the internal workings of the
White House, personality clashes, bureaucratic infighting, and related
issues that keep the focus an Washington as the center of action. A
structural view objects to this circumscribed vision, and proposes to,
in the words of presidency theorist Bruce Miroff, move the inquiry
"beyond Washington ." 12
One way to do this is to build on the the oft-noted observation
that because of the expectations of and demands on the office, and the
seemingly intractable nature of the problems we now confront, the
president has become the embodiment of the state. If, as Theodore Lowi
contends, the president really is the state personified, it behooves us
to ask what it is the state does . 13 A structural theory places the
imperatives of the state at the center of its analysis, seeing in those
imperatives an underlying continuity among presidencies which transcends
differences of party, policy and personality usually accorded primacy by
conventional theories. Three major strains of state theory are
identified: instrumental, structural -functional
,
and social struggle
theories. While these theories have important differences, notably
disputes over what areas of political, economic and social life merit
primary attention, they share an appreciation of the analytic centrality
of the capitalist nature of American democracy. Structural analysis as
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I construe it seeks to employ the common areas of these three components
of theories of the state.
Although few analysts have attempted to uncover the dynamics of
the office by forcing an explicit encounter between state theory and
theories of the presidency, when such efforts do occur, the most
convincing ones focus on two issue areas that dominate the president's
agenda as the leading state actor -- promoting economic growth and
national security. As Alan Wolfe has claimed, "there only two isues at
work in American politics most of the time: economic growth and
military strength. 14 Wolfe's assessment of these imperatives may be
overdrawn, but not too far. His work analyzes the political
implications for all administrations of the decline of postwar II. S.
hegemony. Accompanying this decline was the intensification of the
dilemma of promoting economic growth and security, which in the absense
of the unprecedented postwar economic expansion made it increasingly
difficult for presidents to meet the demands of varying constituencies.
The "impasse" between public expectations of economic prosperity and
military supremacy, and the waning ability of the state to furnish them,
has produced declining confidence in government generally, and in the
president as head of government.
Chapter 3 analyzes the imperative of economic growth as seen
through the efforts of Presidents Carter and Reagan to meet their
statutory obligation under the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970. Both presidents faced a political climate significantly altered
from the time of the law's enactment. While OSHA and other social
regulatory programs flourished in the atmosphere of the late 1960 s, by
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' s those enabling social struggles had largely run their
course as pressures on the state. In their place came self-conscious
elite mobilization to restore the primacy of market forces and trim or
dismantle government regulatory programs. The activities of the
American Enterprise Institute to delegitimize market intervention were
especially conspicuous in this regard. Caught in the bind of wanting to
retain something more than a nominal commitment to OSHA-type regulatory
laws, but feeling the pinch to stabililze an economy in precarious
shape, Carter resolved internal divisions in his administration by
emphasizing growth and business confidence over the needs of labor.
This tilt away from labor was particularly pronounced from 1979 onward,
but it did not generate economic recovery.
Reagan's ascendance accenuated the state's withdrawal from
meaningful interest in promoting safety and health at work, curtailing
(dramatically at times) the scope and intensity of QSHA's regulatory
effort while further centralizing and insulating that effort in the
Office of Management and Budget. In the name of freeing the market from
the yoke of "big government," Reagan championed deregulation of the
workplace through stricter use of White House regulatory review and
cost-benefit analysis. Reagan's strategy, then, continued the trend
begun in the latter part of the Carter years, and highlights the
continuity between the two administrations. Both presidents essentially
had to forego a serious and sustained enforcement of the OSH Act in the
name of achieving the greater goal of economic growth. The difference,
which structural analysis considers secondary, was that Carter did so
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with some reluctance, while Reagan had no intention of fulfilling those
kinds of comitments in the first place.
President Carter s mid-term shift on the national security issue
of the MX missile appeared more pronounced than his domestic policy
shift. He came to office with at least a rhetorical intention to move
the country away from the looming presence of nuclear weapons and its
obsession with the Soviet threat. There was no corresponding unique
feature to his domestic policy agenda, save for the vague promise of
honesty. As chapter 4 explains, his advisers were split on issues of
the Soviet Union and the arms race. As events unfolded within a foreign
policy climate turned rightward in part by elite policy planning groups
like the Committee on the Present Danger reacting to the alleged loss of
nerve in Vietnam and the lingering "Vietnam syndrome," Carter could do
little but shift with the tide, offering an increasingly militarized
foreign policy influenced by Zbigniew Brzezinski. The effort to
rationalize the MX missile as vital to national security became a key
part of this shift, as the president tried, unsuccessfully, to sell the
Senate on the idea of a SALT II Treaty by proving how "tough" his
administration was overall on military matters. Ultimately, neither the
treaty nor his get tough attitude was particularly convincing. In the
end, part of Carter's pledge of honesty endured, at least on matters of
nuclear arms, as PD-59 confirmed the counterforce nature of weapons like
the MX, whose ostensible purpose is deterrence. Bereft of a notion of
national security other than conventional adherence to anticommunism and
nuclear weapons as guarantors of peace, Carter became a war-fighter.
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From the beginning, President Reagan supported the MX as vital to
national security. Even moreso than his predecessor, Reagan embraced
counterforce weapons and war-fighting doctrine. He and his advisers
spent much time embellishing their rationale for the missile with
elaborate fictions about the "decade of neglect" and the "window of
vulnerability," in part to justify a basing mode for a missile that
simply could not be invulnerably based on the ground. So after two
special commissions returned a verdict of "vulnerable," the issue of
vulnerability was conveniently jettisoned from discussions of the
missile. And production of the MX proceeded apace, to be joined at some
future point by a ballistic missile defense system whose "defensive"
functions are utterly indistinguishable from its contribution to
offensive counterforce warfare.
The case studies in chapters 3 and 4 obviously do not ignore the
kinds of details about governmental processes and inside administrative
maneuverings that mark the case studies conventional theories of the
presidency draw upon. But these details hopefully have been marshalled
in a way that clarifies and underscores the underlying continuities
between the two presidencies. Structural theory must engage the means
of presidential policy, if for no other reason than to emphasize the
basic agreement about the ends of policy. For the point of the story
behind the two administrations is that when all the internal disputes,
policy proposals, and competing interests have run their course, the
core imperatives of national security and economic growth emerge from
the fray. While conventional accounts of the chief executive would
focus on the differences, to whatever degree they exist, as ends in
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themselves, structural theory looks to and questions the deeper
principles and interests that shape and confine the activities of all
presidents, regardless of party.
Furthermore, it bears notice here that the institutional balance
of power between the executive and legislative branches is in no way
decisive or even particularly illuminative on QSHA or MX policy in these
cases. Congress was just as willing as Carter and Reagan to exempt
firms from OSHA regulations and to see the 0MB gather power over
regulatory decisons. And congressional action on the MX can only be
described as wholesale capitulation to the idea that the MX would go on,
in some shape or form. The presidencies of Carter and Reagan --
different though they have been in terms of their strength vis-a-vis
Congress — thus stand as testaments to the shared ends of presidents,
as chief state actors. The structure of the presidency is most
forcefully constrained by, but is not reducible to, the pursuit of
growth and national security. Other issues surely are of concern. But
on no other matters are chief executives as nearly imprisoned by
structure as on the two major imperatives.
The foregoing discussion is not meant to imply that a structural
theory of the presidency is without need of refinement. Two aspects
seem to me to merit attention. First, but of secondary import, theories
of the state would benefit from greater stress on a temporal dimension.
As the political, social and economic climate changes, social struggle
brings more or less pressure to bear on the state for concessions. A
dramatic rise in such movement activity accounts for a large part of the
pressure on the state to adopt social regulations in the late 1960 s.
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Yet as the economy worsened and the imperative of economic growth became
exigent, social struggle had less impact and eventually little at all on
regulatory matters. Understanding the conditions for these shifts is
absolutely crucial to understanding the parameters within which
presidents operate. Too often, theories of the state are viewed as
either/or propositions. One either studies the elites holding state
power, or studies the functional provision of growth as structurally
bound, or studies social movements and their efficacy. A conclusion of
this study however, is the need to situate these components of the
theories in time. For as the climate of the political economy changes,
the component of state theory that has primacy may change as well, as it
did in the 1970's. Primacy is the issue, though. The drive to select
which theory definitively captures the essence of the state in
capitalist democracy seems futile, and needlessly devisive. 18
Second, and finally, a structural theory of the presidency must
provide a fuller, more nuanced analysis of public expectations than do
conventional theories. Presidential scholars increasingly point to the
disjuncture between what people expect from their president and what
reasonably can be delivered. But this very real gulf between
expectation and performance can be posed in ways that wind up blaming
the people for holding irrational desires. Such accounts can view the
public with disdain, as a mass of illusioned complainers who shun
political participation and thus bring their problems on themselves.
Harold Barger's recent text falls into such a trap. Postulating that
the presidency has become "impossible," that there is no way to rid
people of their hopeless illusions about the nature of executive
power,
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and noting the potential danger to systemic legitimacy, he concludes
that the hope for a more realistic public is slim:
Few governments, of course, ever live up to the ideal
[of representative government! because most people
lack the knowledge, skills, or motivation to make
rational judgments about those who rule them....
Citizens ought to act more rationally and realis-
tically, but we might just as well argue that sin or
greed should be eradicated from human nature
.
16
Blaming the people for the persistence of "illusions" about
presidential efficacy distorts the relationship between the citizen and
the state. The work of political theorist William Connolly has helped
put this relationship into clearer perspective . 17 People have a need,
even a will, to believe that they live in a country that does good
things in the world and can provide something like "the good life" for
them. Moreover, our notion of ourselves as free people living in a free
society is intimately connected to our belief that the state -- and the
president as head of state — has within its range of currently
available tools the means to effectively deal with society's problems.
As Connolly argues, "We define our grievances and policy agendas as
falling within the limits of action available to the welfare state so
that we can see the state, and ourselves, as free." 1 ® This need to
construe ourselves as free helps ossify our political dialogue within
very narrow but close-at-hand parameters, with "credible" options for
the political economy, for example, usually straying no farther than
variations on a relatively free market approach to the economy, or a
slightly more interventionary approach. Obviously the policy planning
network, among other factors, plays a key role here in orchestrating a
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limited range of "acceptable" thought, but the quest for personal
identity establishes the necessary the precondition for such management.
In an era of declining U.S. hegemony and concomitant economic
transformation, however
,
the state finds itself unable to generate the
kind of economic growth in accordance with previous notions of "the good
life." Constrained by the confines of range of options narrowly drawn,
the state is in a bind, and so are the people. This helps explain the
appeal of Reagan as a candidate. As the quotes that frame this chapter
suggest, Jimmy Carter's diagnosis of the nation's ills was complex (or
it had the appearance of complexity), calling for sacrifice, soul
searching and at an early point even a different way of looking at
international relations. But the reality of his program was nothing
more than relatively mild liberalism. When domestic and foreign policy
crises (real, imagined, and manufactured) mounted, his only recourse was
to move more fully into the orbit of conservative political and economic
thought, foreshadowing Reaganism. But Reagan, by contrast, was the real
article, offering a very reassuring message. To overcome our ills, all
we need do is what we have always done. Hard work and faith will make
us prosper; more weapons will make us strong.
Presidents naturally have a reservoir of good will and deference
amongst the public, stemming in part from the awe commensurate with
being a head of state as well as a more earthly head of government.
Reagan's own reservoir has been very deep; he has been popularly
characterized as wearing a "teflon coat" or having a certain magic.
And these impressions have persisted (the current Iran-contra scandal
notwithstanding) even though people often disagree with specific
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policies he pursues. It is his overarching approach -- familiar and
reassuring -- that appeals. But the fundamental problems of the
political economy remain intact. And the crises the U.S. faces in
international affairs certainly are no closer to being solved. Indeed
they have been exacerabated during Reagan's years. The luster of simple
solutions certainly will grow dimmer. Reagan has bought some time, much
more than Carter ever could hope to have. But that time will run out.
The lesson here, I think, for those endorsing a structural
approach to the presidency, is that if the presidency is ever to break
the grip of the imperatives of the state, which if left unattended
threaten a crisis of state legitimacy, the imperatives themselves must
be recast. The quest of economic growth must be loosened from the
strictures of business confidence and corporate designs. The economy
must be brought under more democratic planning and control. Only then
will the president, and the state, actually have within their reach the
policy tools necessary to meet the expectations that accompany their
democratic accountability. Additionally, the spiraling logic of
consumption and corporate product priorities must be countered. For a
more democratically controlled economy would not have escaped the
escalatory logic of growth — the consumptive equivalent of the arms
race — if the "more is better" logic goes unquestioned. In the absence
of such changes, the public will be consigned to frustration over the
intractability of the problems which emerge in these times of economic
dislocation and crisis . 20
Likewise, ideas about national security must be freed from their
moorings in the arms race, and especially the growing reliance on
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counterforce weaponry. The equation of nuclear arms and security, while
never true, is even less so, and even more dangerous, today. Moreover,
as suggested in the previous chapter, the issue of the arms race leads
right back into the issue of economic growth. The two are inseparable.
Of course, to even speak of redefining our notions of growth and
security sets the head spinning. And such thoughts surely contradict
the short term insight of President Reagan s simple, familiar messages.
But the problems of state crisis, presidential crisis, and public
expectations are intimately connected. To begin to come to grips with
how difficult the solution to them would be, is to begin to move toward
such a solution. Wolfe's insight on the presidency seems appropriate
here, and applies to more than just the economy:
The American people will either have to accept a
presidency as contained and narrow-based as their
economic system or they will have to democratize
their economy to match their grandiose vision of
presidential leadership
.
21
The vision people hold of the president and the state is not irrational
or unreasonable. But it is demanding. A presidency empowered to more
closely meet those demands in the ways barely sketched above would in
fact be a strong -- even "expansivist" -- chief executive. But it would
be a democratic strength, not a plebiscitary one. A centralized,
efficient, sheer "NeoHami ltonian" type of strength wed to the status quo
of corporate power would be no improvement over the drift and delay
mainstream theorists so lament . 22 Meaningful democratization of the
political economy would have to entail the simultaneous expansion of
popular avenues of participation.
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As for presidential scholarship, in the final analysis we are left
with an enduring paradox. The more we desire to understand the
presidency as an office and the many dilemmas it currently confronts,
the more we need to cast our vision beyond the procedural confines of
the office, and the personalities of those holding it, and into the
broader realm of theories of the state and political economy. For until
the twin structural imperatives of the state are rethought, challenged
and tamed, we can expect the presidency to remain in crisis.
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